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Abstract 
Trust problem in Software as a Service Cloud Computing is a broad range of a 
Data Owner’s concerns about the data. A Data Owner is an individual or an 
organization that owns data and outsources data and processing on the data to the 
Cloud. The Data Owner’s concerns about the data arise from the way the data is 
handled through the processing services and the operations. The reasons for the 
concerns are that the services and operations involving the Data Owner’s data are in 
locations and machines that are unknown to the Data Owner. Since the locations and 
machines providing the data processing services and operations on the Data Owner’s 
data are remote and unknown to the Data Owner, there exists a Data Owner’s lack of 
confidence on the data processing capability. A Data Owner’s lack of confidence on 
the data processing capability arises from a Data Owner’s data control challenges 
because the Data Owner’s data is beyond the physical periphery of the Data Owner’s 
physical control. Issues include that data distribution, data access, and data 
management over vulnerable paths lack mechanisms in favour of a Data Owner. 
Insiders of a Service Provider or a Cloud Service Provider and malicious users cause 
data protection and confidentiality breaches. There is no mechanism that allows a 
Data Owner to have the sense and ability to control the data security and privacy in 
Software as a Service Cloud Computing.  The data control challenges become 
prominent because data is replicated in different machines that are remote and 
unknown to a Data Owner.  
In this thesis, we make efforts to solve the trust problem in Software as a 
Service Cloud Computing. In the first phase, we break the trust problem into sub 
problems or sub questions in articulation with the contemporary literature review. 
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The trusted path is our solution to the first sub question, and we present the 
experimental evaluation and security analysis in support of the edge of our work. We 
devise a time limited clearance or Trust Ticket to ensure a Data Owner-controlled 
user’s access to data in remote machines; Trust Ticket protocol, its experimental 
evaluation, and security analysis lead to the solution to our second sub question in 
the fourth phase. In the fifth phase, we apply trusted computing in solving our third 
sub question, and we provide the solution and security analysis from the perspective 
of a single Cloud. Our experimental evaluation and feature selection provide the 
justification of our solution over the potential work that we have selected for 
comparison.  
In the sixth phase, we improve our work that we have introduced in the fourth 
phase. In improvement, we solve the limitation of a single Secret Key by applying 
secret sharing scheme. We introduce the suspend and resume strategy in distributing 
the specific tasks of authentication to an additional entity instead of increasing load 
of authentication on a single entity. In continuation with the sixth phase, we provide 
security analysis on the basis of experiments. 
In all the experiments, we have used Java Programming Languages. In some 
experiments for Trust Ticket as mentioned above in the fourth phase, we have used 
VMware ESXi 4.1 hypervisor. We have extracted the features of our work, and we 
have also extracted the features of the works with which we have compared our 
work. We have evaluated the experiments by having our programs run for multiple 
iterations of times, and during each iteration, our programs take the extracted 
features of ours and the other works into account for evaluating the practicality of the 
solution.  Multiple iterations range from 200 times, 2000 times, and 20000 times. We 
have picked up a few representative experimental results in the discussion. 
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E(m) KwT : Message, m is encrypted with KwT. 
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KO : Secret Key between Data Owner and registered user 
Kd,kdc : Session Key between a Data Owner and KDC 
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KDC : Key Distribution Centre 
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nx : Unique random numbers by x to avoid replay attack 
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UID, DID, AR : Registered user Identity, Data Identity, Access Right. 
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TVMM : Trusted Virtual Machine Monitor 
VM : Virtual Machine 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
We begin this chapter with the brief outline of nature, features, and risks of 
Cloud Computing. We further present relevant definitions, service models, and 
delivery models to facilitate the technical and literal understanding of Cloud 
Computing. The technical and literal understanding of Cloud Computing plays a role 
in visualizing the context of the trust problem in SaaS Cloud Computing. SaaS is 
Software as a Service which is backed by Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS). We 
discuss the insight into the problem in this chapter. With the context and insight, we 
provide the outline of the entities causing the trust problem, and we provide the 
breakdown of our main research question into sub questions. In relation with each 
sub question, we provide the objectives, significance, and approach of this research. 
We conclude this chapter with our contribution to this thesis and the organization of 
the thesis.    
1.1 Overview of Cloud Computing 
Cloud Computing is the new way of creating and delivering on-demand 
computing services. The services include everything from applications to data 
centres over the Internet and on a pay-per-use basis [1, 2]. Cloud Computing is also 
often referred to as “Cloud” or “the Cloud” [1].  
The whole process of creating and delivering computing services adds 
competitive value to business, operation, and innovation; however, security concerns 
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are among the leading barriers to the Cloud adoption. These security concerns cause 
the trust problem [3-11] in the Cloud.  
A Data Owner or tenant or Cloud consumer does not trust the Cloud, as the 
mode of operation of the Cloud is different from that of the traditional computing. In 
the Cloud, a Data Owner does not know the location of an application that runs on a 
virtual machine and takes input from a Data Owner. A Data Owner does not know 
the location of the physical computation server on which virtual machines are created 
for handling the Data Owner’s data as well. A Data Owner does not know the people 
behind the physical computation server. A Data Owner is not aware of the locations 
of storage servers that a Service Provider or a Cloud Service Provider uses to store 
the Data Owner’s replicated data. In the past, through the traditional computing, a 
Data Owner knew where the application was running and taking his/her input. A 
Data Owner knew where the physical computing server was running, and how the 
physical server was taking data from the application that was running on it. A Data 
Owner also knew the people maintaining the physical server. Furthermore, a Data 
Owner knew the storage servers where the data was stored. A Data Owner knew how 
all entities- data, computing server, and storage servers- were protected. A Data 
Owner also knew with whom he/she was sharing the system and data. Moreover, a 
Data Owner knew and oversaw how different users and groups were being isolated 
for accessing data. Cloud Computing changes a Data Owner’s known perception 
regarding all aspects of traditional computing. The change caused by the Cloud 
introduces security concerns; from security concerns, trust problems arise despite 
competitive advantages of unlimited storage, computation, and on-demand 
scalability services.  
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In the next section, we illustrate the definition of key terminologies for clear 
understanding of the technical content, research problem, and research 
methodologies. 
1.1.1 Definition of Key Terminologies 
Cloud services [2, 12, 13] are consumer and business products, services, and 
solutions that are delivered and consumed in real-time over the Internet. A 
representation of Cloud services in the following Fig. 1.1 shows the 
x flow of interactions in the arrangement of layers and services,  
x service development, deployment, and consumption, 
x link of each top level service with infrastructure management layer,  
x link of an infrastructure management layer with the virtualisation layer, and  
the virtualisation layer encapsulates the hardware and operating system as a 
virtual machine on a physical machine; a virtual machine runs as a web 
server; a Data Owner’s or a user’s profile specific application source code 
runs on the web server. The application, in the form of a service, running on 
the web server becomes available to the Data Owner or the user. The service 
becomes available, over a browser, in response to the request of the Data 
Owner or the user of the Data Owner. 
In the following Fig. 1.1, service users (SUs) access the services provided by 
Service Providers (SPs). Service Providers develop and deploy services in their own 
infrastructure or in the infrastructure of other Cloud Service Providers. Cloud Service 
Providers that provide infrastructure to other Service Providers are infrastructure 
providers (IPs).    
Chapter 1 Introduction 
4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1.  Cloud Computing actors (IPs, SUs, SPs) form everything as a service [13]. 
Different service users access the same service; however, the same service 
becomes available to each service user in a unique way because of virtualisation. In 
addition to traditional computing, we illustrate the core idea of virtualisation and 
Cloud Computing in the respective definitions. 
Traditional Computing [1, 14] is a model of computing mostly done on the 
premises of an enterprise. Data storage and maintenance of computing 
infrastructure are internally made by the personnel of the enterprise. Scalability of 
resources and services are internally made by purchasing new hardware and 
software resources. New hardware and software resources remain unused during 
off-peak hours. Frequent updates of resources and software are needed to meet the 
performance goal.  Updates require replacing old or obsolescent hardware or 
software with new ones. The underutilization of hardware and software resources 
during off-peak hours adds counterproductive impact on the inevitable financial 
expenditure for frequent updating new software and hardware. However, a Data 
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Owner or an enterprise has sole control over the data and the processing of the data. 
The following figures show the inherent features of Traditional Computing. Servers, 
applications, and data being in the vicinity of the Data Owner or the enterprise are 
accessed by remote users as in Fig. 1.2. A more distributed form of servers with 
applications and servers for data is in proximity to the Data Owner as in Fig. 1.3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2. Traditional Computing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.3. Traditional Computing with architecture, operating systems, and applications.  
 
Cloud Computing [1, 2, 7, 12] is a model for enabling convenient, on-demand 
network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, 
servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and 
released with a minimal management effort or a Service Provider’s interaction. This 
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characteristics, three service models, and four deployment models. Five essential 
characteristics are on-demand self-service, broad network access, resource pooling, 
rapid elasticity, and measured service; three service models include Software as a 
Service (SaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS), and Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS); 
and four deployment models include Private, Public, Hybrid, and Community 
Clouds. In Cloud Computing  
x Heterogeneous hardware and software computing resources are remote to 
an enterprise or a Data Owner or a tenant. 
x Remote and heterogeneous computing resources become one computing 
environment to an enterprise or a Data Owner over the internet.  
x Data and processing on the data are respectively stored and made in remote 
storages and remote computing platforms in unknown locations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.4. Generalized view of Cloud Computing.  
In Fig. 1.4, we present a generalised view of Cloud Computing. In this view, an 
enterprise takes a service from one or more Cloud Service Providers. A Cloud 
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Service Provider puts the data of an enterprise in multiple locations that are unknown 
to the enterprise; the enterprise, however, uses the infrastructure of one or more 
Cloud Service Providers to decrease operational expenses. While Cloud Computing 
decreases operational expenses for an enterprise, there are risks of data mishandling 
in the Cloud.  
In the following Fig. 1.5, we provide a more specific aspect of Cloud 
Computing. In this specific aspect, a Service Provider develops and deploys a service 
in its own infrastructure; the Service Provider has access to the infrastructure of other 
Cloud Service Providers during its peak period. As in the step 1_1 of Fig. 1.5, a Data 
Owner or a client approaches the Service Provider with a web browser 1. Steps 1_1, 
1_2, and 1_3 and steps n_1, n_2, and n_3 are related to Fig. 1.5. In connection 
with the step 1_1, the Data Owner accesses to the service provisioned to him/her 
through a virtual machine. The virtual machine is created on the first host or physical 
server in the step 1_2 of Fig. 1.5. The virtual machine runs a web server and 
responds to the Data Owner, and the Data Owner interacts with the web server 
through the web browser 1 as shown in the step 1_3. With the increase of Data 
Owners or clients, the Load Balancing and Auto Scaling Group increase the number 
of virtual machines. The overall process, as shown in the steps n_1, n_2, and n_3 of 
Fig. 1.5, prepares the virtual machines to respond to the n-th Data Owner and 
provide services to the Data Owner. 
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Figure 1.5. Cloud Computing with remote users for Services over web browsers. 
Virtualization [15-17] is an abstraction layer. This abstraction layer being a 
piece of software separates the physical hardware from the operating system for 
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resource utilization and flexibility. This layer also separates the request of a 
resource or a service from the underlying physical delivery of the resource or the 
service.  Virtualization allows multiple virtual machines, with heterogeneous 
operating systems and applications, to run in isolation and side-by-side on the same 
physical machine. In Virtualization,  
x A single physical server or host is close to an enterprise or a user. 
x A host controls multiple (virtual) machines that are created on the host. 
x A host provides many computing environments. 
x A single user accesses multiple physical devices by interacting with the 
virtual machines, as virtual machines are created on a physical server, and 
the physical server is connected with multiple physical devices. 
x Multiple applications run on each virtual machine.  
x Each virtual machine on a host runs any operating system. 
x An enterprise supports many users per piece of hardware.       
A host or physical machine [5, 18] is the X86 based machine on which the 
virtualization layer executes. Multiple virtual machines are created on a host. Each 
virtual machine runs an operating system from a pool of many operating systems. 
Using the resource of the host, a virtual machine runs a designated application on 
top of the operating system for a particular tenant or a Data Owner.  
In the following Fig. 1.6 and Fig. 1.7, we respectively present the principle of 
virtualisation and a virtual machine used in Cloud Computing. A system, without 
virtualisation, requires more resources of upfront investment than a system with 
virtualisation. With virtualisation, a system provides more flexible services.  
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A virtual machine  is the software based representation of a physical machine 
having its own set of virtual hardware (e.g., RAM, CPU, NIC, hard disks, etc.). From 
a client interface, an operating system and applications are loaded on the virtual 
hardware of a virtual machine. The operating system, in a virtual machine, finds a 
consistent set of hardware, and the operating system does not depend on the actual 
physical hardware components. 
1.1.2 Cloud Computing Models 
In the following figure, we present the alignment of services in Cloud 
Computing. Application domain includes a set of services. These services are in the 
form of SaaS or PaaS or IaaS, or the combination of the SaaS and IaaS.  
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Figure 1.8. Components and Services in Cloud Computing.  
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In the next sections, we provide key features of the Cloud service delivery 
model and Cloud service deployment model.  The Cloud service delivery model also 
referred to as the SPI model covers services in the area of Software as a Service 
(SaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS), and Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS).  
1.1.2.1 SPI Model 
In this section, we discuss IaaS, PaaS, and SaaS. We provide the detailed 
architecture and deployment related features of SaaS.  
Software as a Service (SaaS)
Business Process, Collaboration, CRM/ERP/HR, and Industry Applications
Platform as a Service (PaaS)
Java and Web 2.0/3.0 App Runtime, Development Tools, and Databases.
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS)
Server, Data centre fabric, storage, and network
 
 
Figure 1.9. Alignment of Services in Cloud Computing.  
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) provides massively scalable, elastic 
computing resources via the internet. Computing resources include storage, 
computing platforms for virtual machines (VMs), operating systems, memory, and 
processing power. A pay-per-use model of usage applies to the use of a computing 
resource. 
Platform as a Service (PaaS) runs on an automatically deployed virtual 
resources on Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS). PaaS delivers collaborative, 
integrated,  runtime environment, middleware, and development tools in developing 
and deploying full-fledged SaaS application.  
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Software as a Service (SaaS) is a software model. In this model, an entity is a 
Service Provider which hosts applications or software in an infrastructure.  The 
infrastructure is possessed and managed by either the Service Provider or a Cloud 
Service Provider or both for the software. A Cloud Service Provider is a different 
entity from a Service Provider. A Data Owner or a tenant or a client rents the use of 
the software that is centrally hosted in a server. The locations of the software and the 
server are known to the Service Provider or the Cloud Service Provider instead of the 
Data Owner. SaaS Cloud Computing, in brief, refers to using software that is  
x  Not stored on a Data Owner’s or a tenant’s hard drive. 
x  Hosted by a Service Provider in its own infrastructure or in public repository  
  maintained by a Cloud Service Provider.   
x  Licensed for pay-as-you-go or pay-per-use 
x  Accessed over internet anywhere and anytime. 
Individual enterprises or business enterprises use SaaS as a common delivery 
model for its ability to reduce costs and simplify deployment. In a traditional web 
application, the concurrent use of the application by many users limits the 
performance of the application and the server running the application. While 
additional servers improve the performance, the underlying architecture of traditional 
web application leaves some of the servers unused. However, SaaS Cloud 
Computing architecture, as already mentioned, runs software on the infrastructure of 
a SaaS provider or on the infrastructure of a Cloud Service Provider. The 
infrastructure includes physical machines with hypervisors and storages. Physical 
machines with hypervisors generate virtual machines on demand. Virtual machines 
run as web servers; SaaS runs on virtual machines running as web servers, and it 
becomes available to a tenant or a Data Owner over a browser and the internet as 
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pay-per-use. In the background of using the SaaS software, when the traffic increases 
or decreases for a particular service of a SaaS, a Load Balancing and Auto Scaling 
Group increases or decreases the number of virtual machines The increase or 
decrease of virtual machines happens beyond a Data Owner’s or a tenant’s 
perception. A Data Owner’s or a tenant’s perception is about the performance of the 
SaaS instead of the servers generating the virtual machines, the virtual machines 
holding web servers, and web servers executing the source code of the SaaS. A 
virtual machine is the representation of a physical machine by software. A virtual 
machine runs on a physical machine; a hypervisor or virtual machine monitor 
continuously executes on the physical machine. A hypervisor is a layer of software 
that runs on a bare metal of a physical machine or on top of an operating machine of 
a physical machine. In our work, we have used VMware ESXi 4.10  hypervisor that 
works on the bare metal of the physical machine with 3.2 GHz processor, 18 GB 
RAM, and 1 TB Hard Disk. The machine is connected to a remote machine over the 
high speed network and internet connectivity in the Deakin University. A hypervisor 
has a client interface; the client interface runs on a remote machine. The client 
interface allows virtual machines to be created on the physical machine on which the 
hypervisor runs. For a unique service to a Data Owner or a tenant, a Service Provider 
or SaaS provider maintains the profile of each tenant or Data Owner. The profile 
includes, but is not limited to, GUI.xml for a graphical user interface; Menu.xml for 
a menu; dbConnection.xml for a database connection; and Role.xml for a role. An 
Elastic Block Storage works as a logical storage for a virtual machine; according to 
the profile, the Elastic Block Storage puts the source of a particular tenant or a Data 
Owner into the virtual machine. A virtual machine, with the SaaS application source 
code of a particular Data Owner or a tenant, runs as a web server on a physical 
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machine. The virtual machine provides computing services to a Data Owner or tenant 
or a user of a Data Owner. However, the physical machine on which the virtual 
machine runs is unknown to the Data Owner or the tenant.  
1.1.2.2 Delivery Model 
Public Cloud is created by a vendor that offers services to the general public. 
Public Cloud services, as shown in   Fig. 1.10, are 
x Internet-accessible.  
x Unknown and remote with  
 Data computation servers and Data storage servers.  
 Locations and People behind the computation and storage.  
x Multi-tenanted 
 Co-location of many tenants or Data Owners or users. 
 Serving the same application to many tenants in a unique way. 
 Increasing or decreasing the number of virtual machine instances as 
per the rise or fall of the requirements for a service.  
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Figure 1.10. Public Cloud Computing  Services. Figure 1.11.  Private Cloud Computing Services. 
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The private Cloud is hosted by an organisation within the control of the 
organisation, and the organisation utilizes the service. The primary aim is for data 
accessibility and fault tolerance. The prior Fig. 1.11 shows the structure of Private 
Cloud services.  
Hybrid Cloud applies to organisations that have set up Private Cloud services 
in combination with external Public Cloud services.  
Community Cloud is a slight variation of Hybrid Cloud. The core strength of 
the Public Cloud and Private Cloud is presented in the following table. 
Table 1.1. Concise Comparison of Public Cloud and Private Cloud. 
Public Cloud Private Cloud 
Low Investment High Investment 
No Control over data Internal IT organisation retains control over data  
Security concerns for multi-
tenancy and data handling 
Fewer security concerns for multi-tenancy and data 
handling 
 
In the following section, we present the contextual details of trust problem in 
SaaS Cloud Computing.  
1.2 Context of Trust Problem in SaaS Cloud Computing 
Cloud Computing is a new way of computing with its origin in distributed 
computing [1, 13, 19]. It uses a “Cloud” metaphor to represent the internet or large 
networking infrastructures. While Cloud Computing is a new way of computing, 
trust and security concerns arise from the unclear nature of the computing operations 
in Cloud Computing in general and Software as a Service in particular. For example, 
in Cloud Computing, the storage of data and computations are no longer performed 
on computers within the premises of Data Owners or enterprises. The storage of data 
and computations are performed on computers or distributed facilities operated and 
controlled by Service Providers or Cloud Service Providers. A Service Provider is 
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different from a Cloud Service Provider. A Service Provider solely deploys and 
provisions its Software as a Service on its own infrastructure or on its own 
infrastructure in articulation with one or more Cloud Service Providers. The 
articulation is needed to meet the demand of its Data Owners or users. A Service 
Provider hosts applications, in the form of Software as a Service on a “Cloud”; the 
“Cloud” consists of virtual machines or computers and physical machines or servers 
or hosts. The Service Provider also takes infrastructure as a service from a Cloud 
Service Provider during peak hours of the Software as a Service.  The Infrastructure 
as a Service taken by the Service Provider from the Cloud Service Provider includes 
creating virtual machines on the physical servers or hosts maintained by the Cloud 
Service Provider. Virtual machines run as webservers. These webservers execute 
application source code that is placed under the web servers by Service Providers, 
and the web servers respond to Data Owners’ or users’ request. These virtual 
machines and physical servers provide infinite scalability over the internet. 
Therefore, Cloud Computing is web based instead of desktop based [13, 20]. Data 
Owners or enterprises or users can access all their programs and documents from any 
computer connected to the internet. Cloud Computing, through virtualization [21], 
emphasizes the fact that “the network is the computer”  [22, 23]. While a Data 
Owner or an enterprise finds infinite scalability with no upfront investment, web 
based ubiquitous connectivity to programs or documents, and the network as the 
computer, there is a lack of confidence and trust from the point of view of a Data 
Owner or an enterprise.   From the perspective of a Data Owner or an enterprise, the 
lack of confidence or lack of trust in Cloud Computing originates from the security 
concerns. The security concerns arise from  
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x an untrusted path between a Data Owner or an enterprise and the Service 
Provider or the Cloud Service Provider,  
x unknown physical servers,  
x unclear security posture of the remote platforms to which the physical 
servers belong,  
x remote and unknown source of the virtual machines, as virtual machines are 
created on the physical servers that are in remote and unknown locations,   
x insiders belonging to a Service Provider or a Cloud Service Provider handle 
the physical servers, and 
x insiders causing the risk of inspecting or mishandling data beyond the 
knowledge of a Data Owner or an enterprise.  
Unlike conventional application-oriented supercomputing paradigms and grid 
computing, Cloud Computing built upon Web 2.0 is service oriented. Its three 
categories of public, private, and hybrid models offer three different levels of 
services [13, 20, 24, 25]. The importance of these services is highlighted in [20].  
Software as a Service is more attractive as a Cloud service than a standalone 
software. Customers are not explicitly buying Cloud Computing; they are buying a 
Cloud service that is enabled by Cloud Computing. Cloud Computing is hidden 
underneath a Cloud service, for example Software as a Service, as a delivery model 
outlined in [12, 13]. The hidden aspect causes lack of trust and confidence because  
x computing infrastructure is in remote and unknown locations,  
x a Data Owner or an enterprise or a user of the Data Owner or the enterprise 
makes a service request to the entity that is invisible; the entity is, for 
example, a Service Provider or a Cloud Service Provider, 
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x a path between the service requesting entity (a Data Owner) and service 
serving entity (a Service Provider or a Cloud Service Provider) has security 
risks from adversaries, 
x deployment of computing resources, in response to the service request, is 
made by the invisible entity,  
x  sources on which the computing resources are deployed are utter unknown 
to a Data Owner or an enterprise, 
x  interactions and outcome of the interactions among the sources and the 
intermediate entities under the invisible entity are also utter unknown to a 
Data Owner or an enterprise, and 
x destination of  the data and subsequent operations on the data under the 
Service Provider or the Cloud Service Provider are unknown to the Data 
Owner or the enterprise. 
Trust problem arises from the hidden nature of Cloud Computing for a Cloud 
service, particularly Software as a Service. Since the nature of Cloud Computing is 
hidden, a Data Owner or an enterprise remains uncertain about the uninterrupted 
flow of data, computation, and interactions. The flow of data is bidirectional between 
a Data Owner and a Service Provider or a Cloud Service Provider. Computations 
include cryptographic functionalities on data. These functionalities are done before 
putting the data in the Cloud from a Data Owner and after retrieving the data from 
the Cloud for a Data Owner. Interactions take place among a Data Owner, a Service 
Provider or a Cloud Service Provider, and intervening entities. Interactions are part 
of activities that are needed to realise the consumption of a Cloud service.   
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In traditional computing, it is possible to apply strong controls to enforce 
policies over authorized access, authentication, confidentiality, and integrity, as the 
computing facilities are within the reach of an enterprise or a Data Owner. However, 
applying the same controls as the ones applied or worth applying in traditional 
computing is more complicated for Cloud Computing. We have illustrated the 
inherent features of traditional computing and Cloud Computing in the prior section 
of defining key terminologies. In Cloud Computing, a client or a Data Owner does 
not know the location of the replicated data, the servers on which virtual machines 
are created, the servers and virtual machines performing the computation, and the 
routes to the servers.  
Outsourcing data or information to the Cloud poses threats for confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability aspects of the key security principles. Data Owners find it 
risky to outsource sensitive data to unknown and shared locations that are in sole 
control of a Cloud Service Provider [5, 26, 27]. Therefore, a Trust Enhanced Security 
[28-32] in Cloud Computing deserves investigation to make data and computation 
confidential in the Cloud.  A Data Owner’s control over data is a Data Owner’s sense 
and ability to control the data security, privacy, and management [27]. Due to the 
shared and open nature of Cloud Computing [33],  insiders’ threats cause a data 
confidentiality breach [20, 31]. The risk of a Data Owner’s data to become mixed 
and reused with that of other Data Owners is  also prominent [34]. This may happen 
when data is not deleted with complete control over the data. Data Owners’ control 
over data and computation [20, 28] is related to a Trust Enhanced Security 
mechanism; therefore, this type of control is essential [29-31] for the wide adoption 
of Cloud Computing in general and Software as a Service in particular. 
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In this section, we have summarised the critical contextual issues regarding the 
trust problem in SaaS Cloud Computing. These critical issues highlight the 
relationships and interactions among entities in Cloud Computing.  
In the following section, we provide the insight into trust problem in SaaS 
Cloud Computing. Insight into trust problem highlights the specific causes and 
effects of trust problem under the foregoing context; the specific causes and effects 
reveal the inner nature of trust problem. 
1.2.1  Insight into Trust Problem in SaaS Cloud Computing 
In this section, we provide the deep understanding of trust problem in SaaS 
Cloud Computing. The insight into trust problem becomes evident with the deep 
understanding of the causes and effects of trust problem as well as the inner nature of 
trust problem in SaaS Cloud Computing.  
We use the critical features of SaaS Cloud Computing in relation with the 
foregoing context of trust problem to illustrate the insight into trust problem. In the 
following Fig. 1.12, we illustrate the causes and effects, and inner nature of SaaS 
Cloud Computing. In the following Fig. 1.12, a SaaS Service Provider launches its 
application on its own infrastructure in articulation with the infrastructure of the 
Cloud Service Provider n. At any i-th event and a time period of t0, a Data Owner 
approaches the SaaS Service Provider through the web browser 1. The Data Owner’s 
approach at the time period of t0 is denoted by (i+t0)_1 in the following Fig. 1.12. In 
this approach, a Load Balancing and Auto Scaling Group responds to the service 
request by creating a virtual machine on the physical server 1.   
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Acronyms and Symbols:
App: Application hosted by an SP in its own infrastructure or in a CSP.
CS: Cloud Service Provider.
SP: Service Provider.
SP1_DC1:Data centre 1 of the service provider 1 for hosts and storage servers.
SP1_DC1:Datacentre 2 of the service provider1 for storage servers.
CSP1_DC1:Data centre 1 of the first CSP for hosts and storage servers.
CSP1_DC2:Data centre 2 of the first CSP for storage servers.
CSPn_DC1:Data centre 1 of the n th CSP for hosts and storage servers.
CSP1_DC2:Data centre 2 of the n th CSP for storage servers.
CSPn_DC3:Data centre 3 of the n th CSP for hosts and storage servers.
WS: Web Server.
(i+t0)_1 : During an i-th event and a time period of t0, a Data Owner makes a service request to a Service Provider. This service request is from
browser 1.
(i+t1)_1 : During the i-th event and a time period of t1, an elastic load balancer and auto scaling creates a virtual machine for the Data Owner from
browser 1. The virtual machine is created on Physical Server 1 of the Service Provider. A webserver also runs on top of the operating
system of the virtual machine.
(i+t2)_1 : During the i-th event and a time period of t2, an elastic block storage puts the application source code in the webserver. The source
code preserved in the Service Provider is specific to the profile of the data owner.
(i+t3)_1 : During the i-th event and a time period of t3, the Data Owner from the browser 1 interacts with the application.
(i+t4)_1 : During the i-th event and a time period of t4, the data of the Data Owner from the browser 1 is stored in storage servers that are close to
the Service Provider. The Service Provider stores data that are received through the application running on the webserver.
(i+t5)_1: During the i-th event and a time period of t5 and t6, the same data is replicated in remote servers of the same Service Provider. 
(i+t6)_1
(i+t7)_1: During the i-th event and a time period of t7, the Service Provider replicates the same data and stores them in storage server of another
Cloud Service Provider.
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Figure 1.12. Part 1 out of 3 of Insight into SaaS Cloud Computing. 
The physical server 1 is the server that runs with a hypervisor; the hypervisor 
runs on the bare metal of the physical server 1. The Service Provider runs a web 
server on the virtual machine. The complete approach denoted by (i+t1)_1 includes 
(i) receiving a service request, (ii) creating virtual machines, and (iii) running a web 
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server on the virtual machine. The key insight here in Fig. 1.12 is that the Data 
Owner is not aware of 
x The path between the Data Owner and the Service Provider.  
x How his or her service request is received and processed with  
 the physical server that is unknown and untrustworthy,  
 the virtual machine created on the physical server, and  
 the insiders of the Service Providers handling the physical server and  
        the virtual machine. 
x The virtual machine and the web server that runs on the virtual machine. 
In the above Fig. 1.12 as denoted by (i+t2)_1, the Elastic Block Storage places 
the source code of the application in the web server. The source code is specific to 
the Data Owner that makes a service request as denoted by (i+t0)_1 in Fig. 1.12.  The 
Data Owner interacts with the running application on the web server as shown in 
(i+t3)_1 of the above Fig. 1.12. The insight here is that the Data Owner is not certain 
about the source and authenticity of  
x the web server that runs on the virtual machine, 
x the virtual machine that runs on the physical server1, and 
x the physical server 1 that belongs to the data centre of the Service Provider.   
We further observe that the Data Owner making a service request sends data to 
the Service Provider. The Service Provider stores the replicated data in several 
locations. We refer to the approaches from (i+t4)_1 to (i+t7)_1 of Fig. 1.12; in these 
approaches, the data from the Data Owner flows to the Service Provider. The insight 
here in Fig. 1.12 is that   
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x The Service Provider maintains the data in multiple locations. 
x The multiple locations are unknown to the Data Owner.  
x The Data Owner does not have control over the data in multiple locations. 
Control over data refers to the Data Owner’s sole knowledge about the 
access, handling, and sharing of the data; data security and management 
remain in effect during the access, handling, and sharing of the data. 
x The Data Owner has no confidence about data security and management, as 
there is no evidence of the activities done in the presence and absence of the 
Data Owner. 
In the following Fig. 1.13, we observe two situations with an event, j for the 
Data Owner of the above figure and an event, k for a user of the Data Owner. In the 
first situation, the Data Owner retrieves data and sends the updated data. The Service 
Provider reflects the updated data in all locations. In the second situation, the user 
retrieves data. In the two situations, virtual machines are created on separate physical 
machines.  The insight here in Fig. 1.13 is that  
x A Data Owner is not aware of his or her users’ access to the data. 
x It is not always feasible for a Data Owner to remain online to check users.  
x A Data Owner is not aware of the authentication of users accessing the data.  
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App: Application hosted by an SP in its own infrastructure or in a CSP. CSP:Cloud Service Provider. SP:Service Provider. WS:Web Server.
SP1_DC1:Data centre 1 of the service provider 1 for hosts and storage servers.
SP1_DC1:Datacentre 2 of the service provider1 for storage servers. CSP1_DC1:Data centre 1 of the first CSP for hosts and storage servers.
CSP1_DC2:Data centre 2 of the first CSP for storage servers. CSPn_DC1:Data centre 1 of the n th CSP for hosts and storage servers.
CSP1_DC2:Data centre 2 of the n th CSP for storage servers. CSPn_DC3:Data centre 3 of the n th CSP for hosts and storage servers.
(j+t0)_y:During an j-th event and a time period of t0, the data owner of the Figure 1.2.1.1 makes a service request to the same Service Provider.
This service request is from browser y.
(j+t1)_y:During the j-th event and a time period of t1, an elastic load balancer and auto scaling creates a virtual machine for the data owner from
browser y. The virtual machine is created on the Physical Server 2 of the Service Provider. A webserver also runs on top of the operating system
of the virtual machine.
(j+t2)_y:During the j-th event and a time period of t2, an elastic block storage puts the application source code in the webserver. The source code
preserved in the Service Provider is specific to the profile of the data owner.
(j+t3)_y:During the j-th event and a time period of t3, the data owner from the browser y interacts with the application.
(j+t4)_y:During the j-th event and a time period of t4, the data owner from the browser y retrieves the data from the Service Provider. The Service
Provider sends the data through the application running on the webserver.
(j+t5)_y and (j+t6)_y:During the j-th event and a time period of t5 and t6, the updated data of the data owner is replicated in remote servers of the
same Service Provider.
(j+t7)_y:During the j-th event and a time period of t7, the Service Provider replicates the same data and stores them in storage server of the same
Service Provider.
(j+t8)_y:During the j-th event and a time period of t8, the Service Provider replicates the same data, and stores them in storage server of another
Cloud Service Provider.
(k+t0)_z:During the k-th event and a time period of t0, a user of the data owner makes a service request to the Service Provider. The user makes
service request from browser z.
(k+t1)_z:During the i-th event and a time period of t1, an elastic load balancer and auto scaling creates a virtual machine for the data owner’s user.
The user is from browser z. The virtual machine created on the Physical Server 3. A webserver also runs on top of the operating system of the
virtual machine.
(k+t2)_z:During the k-th event and a time period of t2, an application that is specific to the user of the data owner runs on the web server. The
elastic block storage puts the source code of the application on the web server.
(k+t3)_z:During the k-th event and a time period of t3, the user interacts with the application.
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Figure 1.13. Part 2 out of 3 of Insight into SaaS Cloud Computing. 
In the following Fig. 1.14, we provide the insight into the SaaS Cloud 
Computing from the perspective of users belonging to different Data Owners.  
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Acronyms and Symbols:
App: Application hosted by an SP in its own infrastructure or in a CSP. CSP: Cloud Service Provider. SP: Service Provider.
SP1_DC1: Data centre 1 of the service provider 1 for hosts and storage servers.
SP1_DC1:Datacentre 2 of the service provider1 for storage servers.
CSPn_DC1: Data centre 1 of the n th CSP for hosts and storage servers.
CSPn_DC2: Data centre 2 of the n th CSP for hosts and storage servers.
WS: Web Server.
(k+s0)_w: During an k-th event and a time period of s0, a user of the data owner of the Figure 1.2.1.1 makes a service request to the same
Service Provider. This service request is from the browser w.
(k+s1)_w: During the k-th event and a time period of s1, an elastic load balancer and auto scaling creates a virtual machine for the Data Owner’s 
user who is from browser w. The virtual machine is created on the Physical Server 3 of the Service Provider. A web server also runs on the
operating system of the virtual machine.
(k+s2)_w: During the k-th event and a time period of s2, an elastic block storage puts the application source code in the web server. The source
code preserved in the Service Provider is specific to the profile of the Data Owner’s user.
(k+s3)_w: During the k-th event and a time period of s3, the Data Owner’s user from the browser w interacts with the application.
(k+s4)_w: During the k-th event and a time period of s4, the Data Owner’s user from the browser w retrieves the data from the Service Provider.
The Service Provider sends the data through the application running on the web server.
(k+t0)_z: During the k-th event and a time period of t0, a different Data Owner’s user makes service request to the Service Provider. The user is
from a browser z.
(k+t1)_z: During the k-th event and a time period of t1, an elastic load balancer and auto scaling creates a virtual machine for the user. The user is
from the browser z. The virtual machine is created on the Physical Server 3. A webserver also runs on the virtual machine.
(k+t2)_z:During the k-th event and a time period of t2, an application that is specific to the user of the different Data Owner runs on the web server.
The elastic block storage puts the source code of the application on the web server.
(k+t3)_z:During the k-th event and a time period of t3, the user interacts with the application.
(k+t4)_z:During the k-th event and a time period of t4, the user retrieves data.
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Figure 1.14. Part 3 out of 3 of Insight into SaaS Cloud Computing. 
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In the above Fig. 1.14, two users of different Data Owners access their 
respective data through applications running on two different virtual machines. 
However, the two virtual machines run on the same physical server 3 in Fig. 1.14.   
The physical server 3 belongs to the Data Centre 1 of the Service Provider 1. The 
insight in Fig. 1.14 is that Data Owners are not aware of the isolation of their data. 
1.2.2 Entities Causing Trust Problem in SaaS Cloud Computing 
The following entities cause the trust problem: 
x A Service Provider or a Cloud Service Provider that operates in a remote 
environment. 
x Physical servers under a Service Provider or a Cloud Service Provider are in 
unknown and remote locations. Platforms of Physical servers are also 
unknown and subject to continuous changes. 
x  Insiders or internal employees of a Service Provider or Cloud Service 
Provider. Insiders have sole monitoring control over the creation, 
transmission, and termination of virtual machines.  
x A user specific application run on a web server is from a Service Provider; 
the web server runs on a virtual machine. A Data Owner is not aware of the 
modification of the specific profile of the Data Owner’s user. 
1.2.3  Significance of Trust Problem in SaaS Cloud Computing 
There are advantages in nascent Cloud Computing in general and SaaS Cloud 
Computing in particular. However, there are limitations and problems regarding a 
Data Owner’s confidence and trust about Cloud Computing. In the previous sections, 
we have illustrated the context and insight into the trust problem. The trust problem 
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diminishes and nullifies the core competencies and advantages of Cloud Computing. 
Core competencies provide capital expenditure and operational expenditure over 
conventional computing. Some of the core competencies include pay-per use of 
computing resources and rapid elasticity of on-demand computing resources.  These 
computing resources include hardware and software that become available to a Data 
Owner or a user. A Data Owner or a user does not have to purchase, shift, deploy, 
and hold the computing resources for ever. A Data Owner or a user does not have to 
carry out maintenance for the computing resources whatsoever. Instead of one-off 
huge investment for the computing resources, a Data Owner pays just for the 
duration of the computing resources that he or she uses. From the perspective of a 
Data Owner, there is no need for upgrading the computing resources. The foregoing 
competencies are some of the many core competencies of Cloud Computing; these 
core competencies establish the edges of Cloud Computing over traditional or 
conventional computing.    However, the trust problem in Cloud Computing is a bar 
to wide adoption of Cloud Computing. 
1.2.4  Running Example 
We depict trust problem in SaaS Cloud Computing with the following example. 
Donald is a Data Owner in the SaaS Cloud Computing maintained by Snowan. 
Donald has several users such as Umor, Ushang, and Ukilis. Snowan has the support 
of SaaS transmission servers, SaaS computation servers, and SaaS storage servers. 
Each SaaS computation server has virtualization facility to scale up and down on 
demand from the perspective of an infrastructure or resource or fabric support.  
Donald is interested for SaaS Cloud Computing as he does not want to make one-off 
investment for software and underlying infrastructure. Software and underlying 
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infrastructure become available to Donald; these computing resources become 
available on demand by means of virtualization. Each of the machines or hardware 
and software is in remote and diverse platforms. Donald does not have any 
knowledge of the remote machines; these remote machines store Donald’s data, do 
the data processing capability, and respond to Umor’s,  Ushang’s, and Ukilis’s access 
request to Donald’s data. It is not feasible for Donald to be always online. Donald 
may share a Secret Key with each of his users. Insiders or administrators in Snowan’s 
offices may inspect Donald’s data during data processing. Anyone of the users may 
become malicious and share a Secret Key with an insider in Snowan’s offices. 
Donald is worried about the data control challenges.   
The foregoing example is a gist of the trust problem in SaaS Cloud Computing 
in particular and Cloud Computing in general.  While Cloud Computing is a new 
way of computing with many favourable features, its wide adoption faces critical 
questions. These questions attribute a negative impact to the core competencies [24, 
35]. These critical questions arise from the lack of Trust Enhanced Security measures 
from users’ or Data Owners’ perspectives [4, 29, 36-38]. 
1.3 Problem Statements  
In this section, we present the research question. The main research question is 
further broken down into sub questions for the clarity of delving into the trust 
problem in SaaS Cloud Computing. The main research question is as follows: 
How can we establish Trust Enhanced Security in SaaS Cloud Computing by 
addressing data control challenges? 
The main research question is split into the following research sub questions. 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
30 
 
i. How can we establish an end to end trusted path between a Data Owner and 
a Service Provider or Cloud Service Provider (CSP)? 
ii. How can we establish and ensure a Data Owner-controlled users’ access to 
data?  
iii. How can we propagate a Data Owner’s control to handle insiders’ threats 
that cause or attempt to cause confidentiality breach in data management?  
iv. How can we nullify a malicious user’s effort to share the Data Owner-given 
Secret Key with an insider in a CSP?  
1.4 Objectives and Significance of this Research  
There are solutions in the literature to address the trust problem in Cloud 
Computing. However, these solutions are conceptual ones. These conceptual 
solutions are devoid of effective algorithmic protocols to solve the trust problem in 
SaaS Cloud Computing. Our research aims to provide Trust Enhanced Security 
(TES) protocols in SaaS Cloud Computing. These security protocols are needed to 
counter major security challenges that cause the trust problem in SaaS Cloud 
Computing. Towards achieving a Data Owner’s high Trust Perception Level, major 
security challenges that our Trust Enhanced Security measures in SaaS Cloud 
Computing aim to address are:   
x How to explore and setup an end to end trusted path between a Data Owner 
and a Cloud Service Provider for a Data Owner’s control over data. 
x How to overcome a Data Owner’s data control challenges caused by 
malicious users and insiders’ threats. 
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x How to design, develop, deploy, and   evaluate new algorithms and protocols 
for a Data Owner’s confidence and trust. 
The objectives are to develop system architectures, algorithms, and protocols 
with experimental evaluation in Java Programming Language and a Cloud like 
environment under the VMware ESXi 4.10 hypervisor.  
1.5 Approaches of this Research 
From the experimental point of view, we conduct our research with the 
following approaches. 
Table 1.2. Tabular representation of our approach to this research. 
Algorithms developed Problems addressed 
 
Algorithm for an end to end trusted path between a Data 
Owner and a CSP.  
A Data Owner’s control over 
data during data distribution. 
Algorithm for users’ registration and Secret Key distribution 
to registered users by a Data Owner. 
A Data Owner-controlled users’ 
access to data in SaaS Cloud 
Computing. 
Algorithm for linking a registered user and a CSP with a time 
limited Trust Ticket. 
Algorithm and protocol for the trust enhanced secure 
execution environment (TESEE).  The TESEE puts 
encryption, decryption, authentication, ID, and Key 
management within the internal control of a Data Owner 
through the mediation of a trusted third party (TTP) and 
deployment of a time limited Trust Ticket (TT).  
Propagating a Data Owner’s 
control to handle insiders’ 
threats in a remote machine 
holding SaaS data processing 
capability.  
Algorithm and protocol to improve the Trust Ticket with the 
application of secret sharing scheme and suspend and resume 
strategy. 
Nullifying a malicious user’s 
effort to share a Data Owner-
given Secret Key with an insider 
or others.  Algorithm to make a Data Owner-given Secret Key non-
sharable. 
Algorithm to authenticate a user through user specific 
characteristics to form the Data Owner-given Secret Key. 
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1.6 Contribution of this Thesis 
We provide the contribution of the thesis by articulating our core objectives for 
each of the research sub questions. In the following table, we present the contribution 
of our thesis in clear and concise segments. 
Table 1.3. Tabular representation of our contribution to this Thesis. 
Sub Questions Objectives 
How can we establish 
an end to end trusted 
path between a Data 
Owner and a CSP? 
Establish an end to end secure trusted path between a Data Owner and 
a cloud Service Provider (CSP) by applying cryptographic and mutual 
authentication techniques. 
How can we ensure a 
Data Owner-controlled 
users’ access to data? 
Devise and deploy a time limited Trust Ticket or time limited clearance 
by a Data Owner for a registered user’s access to data in a CSP. 
How can we propagate 
a Data Owner’s control 
to handle insiders’ 
threats that cause or 
attempt to cause 
confidentiality breach 
in data management? 
 
Devise a Trust Enhanced Secure Execution Environment (TESEE) by 
applying authentication, access control, trusted computing, and 
database techniques. The TESEE requires the coordination of a trusted 
third party (TTP) and a time limited Trust Ticket (TT). 
Authentication, access control, encryption, decryption are in the 
internal control of a Data Owner through the mediation of a TTP. 
How can we nullify a 
malicious user’s effort 
to share the Data 
Owner-given Secret 
Key with an insider in a 
CSP? 
 
Improve the Trust Ticket mechanism by  
x applying a secret sharing scheme in coordination with a TTP and a   
      TT to prevent malicious users. 
x authenticating a user through user-specific credential verification  
      for a  Data Owner-given Secret Key. 
 
1.7 Organization of this Thesis  
The Thesis is organised into the following chapters. 
Chapter 1 provides the salient insight into the broader understanding of the 
Cloud Computing field. The broader understanding starts with the general overview 
of the technical phenomena in Cloud Computing. Gradually, the chapter moves onto 
the specific details with relevant illustration, figures, and references to the literature. 
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The gradual specific details present the research problem by enumerating the 
prominent issues that needs attention in the research.  
Chapter 2 highlights the contemporary literature review of the existing works. 
The prominent aspect of the review includes the arrangement of the salient features 
of the works as opposed to their limitations. The arrangement of salient features and 
limitations of the existing works provides an insight into the knowledge gap that is 
prevalent in the field of Cloud Computing research.  
Chapter 3 explores the first research question that has been articulated in the 
chapter1. The first publication outlined in the Publications is a subset of the chapter 3 
that provides an evolutionary problem solving approach to the first research question. 
This chapter provides inherent fundamental and technical details that are specific to 
obtain a reasonable solution to the problem embedded in the first research question. 
The reasonable solution is the algorithmic protocol that is obtained through 
successive refinements of the typical security protocols, and the algorithmic protocol 
is for the trusted path among the participating entitles in the Cloud. This chapter also 
provides an experimental evaluation and security analysis of the algorithmic 
protocol. 
Chapter 4 provides the conspicuous insight into the second research problem 
elaborated in chapter 1. To the second research question, chapter 4 captures the idea 
from the other existing renowned fields of studies that are orthogonal to Cloud 
Computing. The idea advocated by chapter 4 is that of Trust Ticket, an encrypted 
container. The second publication outlined in the Publications is a segment of the 
chapter 4 that advances the experimental details of the second research question. 
Trust Ticket is a logical outcome of a user’s registration with a Data Owner, and the 
Data Owner distributes the Trust Ticket to the newly registered user. The Data 
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Owner also shares the Trust Ticket with the Service Provider to link the user with the 
Service Provider. Chapter 4 provides experimental results and security analyses. Two 
experiments are conducted in the environment setup with the VMWare ESXi 4.1 
hypervisor that runs on the physical machine having 18GB memory and facilitates 
the creation of virtual machines on the physical machine.  
Chapter 5 provides a new mechanism in handling insiders’ threats, and the new 
mechanism in chapter 5 is compared with another potential work in the literature. 
Chapter 5 addresses the third research question regarding the propagation of a Data 
Owner’s control in handling insiders’ threats, and this chapter focuses on a Data 
Owner’s Trust Perception Level and Insiders’ Threats Appearance. Experimental 
evaluation is done in Java Programming Language, and security analyses in 
articulation with the experimental outcome provide the edge of our scheme over the 
other competing work. The approach of the scheme in chapter 5 improves a Data 
Owner’s Trust Perception Level and minimizes Insiders’ Threats Appearance. 
Chapter 6 presents our improvement on our work in chapter 4. While improving 
our work in chapter 4, we have addressed the fourth research question in chapter 6.  
The fourth research question focuses on preventing a malicious user from sharing the 
Secret Key with insiders or outsides in a Service Provider. We categorize interactions 
of our protocols into interaction classes, and we extract the features of our protocols. 
We perform experimental evaluation by taking the features of our improved scheme 
in chapter 6 and the prior scheme in chapter 4. Experimental evaluation and security 
analyses in chapter 6 provide the improvement of our scheme in chapter 6. 
Chapter 7 highlights the concluding remarks. These concluding remarks include 
the summary of the major contributions, major benefits, and hints about the 
limitations and directions leading to the future works. Major contributions include 
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our approaches, solutions, experiments, insight into our solutions through 
experimental evaluations, and the reasons for which our approaches and solutions 
become better than those of the competing approaches and solutions by adding value 
to the existing body of knowledge. Major benefits include the features of our solution 
in making an effort to remove the trust problem in the Software as a Service Cloud 
Computing. Future works include substantial attempts to address the limitations that 
we have incorporated in chapter 5. 
Bibliography presents the contemporary works available in the literature.  
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Chapter 2 
Related Works 
In this chapter, we provide a comprehensive literature review on Cloud 
Computing from trust and security perspectives. We also provide tabular 
representation of the related works; in the tabular representation, we highlight the 
approach and contribution of each work.   
2.1 Categories of Trust Enhanced Security Approaches and    
 Solutions 
In this section, we provide the following four categories of security approaches 
and solutions. We enumerate the four categories as follows:  
x Type A: Lack of data control and data confidentiality.  
x Type B: Loss of visibility and insiders’ threats.  
x Type C: Trust propagation.  
x Type D: Lack of accountability, transparency, and trust evidence. 
Table 2.1. Categorisation of security approaches and solutions in the literature. 
Type Theme Key Outlines 
A 
Lack  of  
data control  
and data 
confidentiality. 
Data protection mechanisms are yet to ensure a Data Owner’s 
confidence. Protection mechanisms also lack techniques to evaluate 
remote environments that provide physical servers or nodes and 
virtual machines on the nodes. Bidirectional mechanisms for data 
protection during a Data Owner’s data outsourcing, accessing, and 
sharing involve Data Owners and Service Providers. Key 
management is yet to ensure data confidentiality. There is a lack of 
data protection mechanism to eliminate the data confidentiality 
breaches by insiders’ in Service Providers. Data protection 
mechanisms lack algorithms and protocols with experimental 
scenarios and results. 
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B 
Loss of 
visibility and 
insiders’ threats. 
Cloud Computing provides off-premise computing facilities as 
opposed to on-premise computing facilities of Traditional 
computing. A Data Owner or a Cloud user does not have visibility 
into the happenings of off-premise computing facilities whatsoever. 
This loss of visibility causes lack of confidence in Cloud Computing 
in general and SaaS Cloud Computing in particular. Insiders in 
Service Providers add further concerns over the loss of visibility, as 
insiders tend to inspect a Data Owner’s data in the off-premise 
computing facilities. Insiders’ threats become prominent by taking 
advantages of a Data Owner’s loss of visibility into the off-premise 
computing infrastructures and operations. Insiders’ threats, 
influences, and interferences also cause a Data Owner’s lack of 
confidence; a Data Owner’s lack of confidence results in trust 
problem in SaaS Cloud Computing in particular. 
C 
Trust 
propagation. 
Maintaining a Data Owner’s confidence and propagating a Data 
Owner’s privilege during the flow of data and processing provide the 
basis of trust propagation.  The flow of data and processing is among 
a Data Owner, a Data Owner’s users, intermediate entities, and a 
Service Provider.  
D 
Lack of 
accountability 
and trust 
evidence. 
 
A Data Owner stores data in the Cloud, and retrieves data from the 
Cloud. There is no evidence of accountability and trust in favour of a 
Data Owner during a Data Owner’s or a Data Owner’s users’ access 
to the data. For the confidence of a Data Owner in SaaS Cloud 
Computing, maintaining evidence of checks and balances enhances 
existing accountability and trust.   
 
In the following section, we present the features and limitations of techniques 
that handle the lack of data control and confidentiality. The lack of data control and 
confidentiality causes the trust problem in SaaS Cloud Computing.  
2.2 Handling the Lack of Data Control and Confidentiality 
In this section, we provide techniques of handling the lack of data control and 
confidentiality challenges. Data control over data in the Cloud is a Data Owner’s 
sense of security over data; the sense of security over data in the Cloud is the same as 
the sense of security over data in in-house facility. These techniques in the 
contemporary literature have key features and limitations.  Some techniques are 
outlined in the literature in the form of survey; other techniques illustrated in the 
literature provide conceptual solutions without algorithm, protocol, and experimental 
evaluation; and some other papers   present solutions to research issues with 
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algorithm, protocol, and experimental evaluations without relevant security analyses. 
In the following sections, we provide key features and limitations of the techniques 
that we have extracted from the contemporary literature of Cloud Computing. 
2.2.1 Key Features 
In this section, we provide key features of the techniques handling the lack of 
data control and confidentiality challenges. 
i. Multi-Cloud Approach for 
a. data protection and availability [39]. Involving multiple clouds instead 
of single cloud eliminates the risk of data processing and availability. 
Data processing is done in multiple clouds without involving a principal 
Service Provider in core data processing; the key feature is that the 
principal Service Provider from which a Data Owner takes service is 
isolated from major processing on data. Data is also preserved in 
multiple clouds to have access to data during the outage of the service 
from a principal Service Provider.  
b.  data protection [40] from insiders. Authors have proposed two Clouds 
for processing data. The two-cloud processing prevents one Cloud from 
intercepting the critical computing part processed in another cloud. 
Other papers [41, 42] have reiterated the theme of the paper [40]  with 
variation and  emphasis on shifting internal data processing control 
from in-house facilities to off-premises facilities.  
ii. Survey on 
a. data protection [7] in the Cloud. A Data Owner outsources data to 
cloud, and there is no mechanism under a Data Owner to inspect the 
data in the Cloud. From the perspective of a Data Owner’s data 
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outsourcing and the architecture of Cloud Computing, the author in [7] 
has derived the special security aspect of Cloud Computing. The 
authors in [7] have pointed  that data protection issue, in the Cloud, has 
been one of the key security issues. Furthermore, other papers [43-46] 
have also pointed out that data protection issue or data confidentiality 
breach of great concerns.  While capacity and architecture of Cloud 
Computing is innovative, the lack of data protection mechanism creates 
a Data Owner’s lack of confidence; the lack of confidence results in 
lack of trust in the Cloud.  
b. data management [47] in the Cloud. The paper [47] has provided large 
scale data management under different infrastructures of Cloud 
environment. In large scale data management, a Data Owner has less 
opportunity of involvement and interaction in inspecting the outsourced 
data than the same data in the in-house facility.  With regard to a Data 
Owner’s less opportunity of involvement and interaction in inspecting 
the outsourced data in the Cloud, a Data Owner has less confidence and 
trust on the scalable computational resources of Cloud Computing. 
c. security in the Cloud [48]. J. P. Durbano et al. in [48] refer to security 
as the breach of a Data Owner’s control and confidentiality of data 
outsourced to cloud.  This paper argues that security is the number one 
obstacle to Cloud Computing. For the security in the Cloud, J. P. 
Durbano et al. highlight the need of a Data Owner’s management of a 
virtual machine throughout its life cycle; during the life cycle of a 
virtual machine, the virtual machine process a Data Owner’s data in the 
Cloud.  
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d. data protection [49] with encryption, and perfect and supervisory 
system in the Cloud. Throughout the survey, the authors attempt to look 
for mechanisms that encrypt data under the control of a Data Owner; 
the Data Owner outsources the encrypted data with a perfect and 
supervisory system to accompany the data. The theme of the paper [49] 
is reiterated in another paper [29].  
e. data protection breach [50, 51] in the Cloud. The major theme of the 
papers is the data protection breach or data confidentially breach; the 
data protection breach or data confidentially breach results from the 
lack of a Data Owner’s control over data. A Data Owner’s control over 
data arises from a Data Owner’s outsourcing of data to a location in the 
Cloud; the location is completely unknown to the Data Owner; and the 
Data Owner has the lest controlling or monitoring capability to prevent 
the data from being inspected or compromised by adversarial attacks in 
the presence or absence of the Data Owner in the Cloud. Data 
confidentiality breach and lack of control over data are responsible for 
trust and security problem. The salient agreement of the papers [50, 51] 
is that trust and security problem needs to be resolved first.  
f. data protection [52] breach that is majorly caused by insiders’ 
influence, and insiders’ influence become prominent for the lack of a 
Data Owner’s control over data in the Cloud. The authors have pointed 
out trust and security problem of Software as a Service (SaaS); lack of 
visibility regarding the secure storage of replicated data in multiple 
unknown locations leads to lack of control over data. Malicious 
employees are insiders’, and they cause threats that breach the 
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confidentiality of data. Due to multi-tenancy, co-location of data from 
different organizations or users becomes a common phenomenon in 
Cloud Computing. Data protection and segregation in SaaS are pointed 
out in the paper. Preventing multiple users from viewing one another’s 
or each other’s data is a concern in SaaS. The authors have highlighted 
the need for strong encryption in concert with fine-grained 
authorization to control access to the data. The authors have also 
justified their proposition regarding SaaS and a Data Owner’s 
outsourcing of data and computation to unknown locations in Cloud 
Computing. Storing and accessing data at different locations are based 
on meta-data information. Storing related data in different locations 
based on meta-data would make data invaluable to malicious users or 
malicious insiders even if malicious users recover part of the data. 
Other papers [53, 54] has reiterated the foregoing theme with emphasis 
on access control for data protection. 
iii. Framework or mechanism for  
a. data protection [55] in the Cloud. K. Takahashi et al. in [55] propose a 
conceptual framework on sensitive information protection. The theme 
of the framework is based on the shared responsibility between a user 
and a Service Provider.  While the framework is interesting, there is no 
implementation and evaluation. 
b. data protection [56] in the Cloud. K. Hwang and D. Li propose 
expected value, entropy, and hyper entropy that are solely known to a 
Data Owner. Expected value depends on the data content. While 
entropy and hyper entropy add randomness, they do not depend on the 
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data content. While the data colouring process with expected value, 
entropy, and hyper entropy is under a Data Owner’s control, it is not 
clear how the users of the data will access the data.  This mechanism is 
interesting in Cloud Computing aspects. However, there is no detailed 
algorithm and protocol to carry out the protection mechanism. 
c. data protection [57]. In this paper [57], the authors have proposed bit 
level data slicing and data obfuscation mechanism to prevent a Data 
Owner’s data from being exposed. Their proposed mechanism is based 
on a Data Owner-controlled access token instead of encryption. 
Encryption causes server-side overhead by creating server-side 
workload. Data with slicing and obfuscation is stored in separate 
operational partitions. This kind of storage makes data ineligible to the 
adversaries since accessing one partition would not reveal the bit level 
slicing and meaning.  
d. data control [58]. In this paper [58], Krautheim proposes Private Virtual 
Infrastructure (PVI) to tackle the loss of control and associated risks of 
data compromise. The proposed framework consists of private virtual 
infrastructure and agents. PVI and agents are under the control of a 
Data Owner; PVI and agents visit the platform of Cloud Service 
Provider (CSP) to have the relevant visibility of the security settings of 
the CSP. The pre-measure of the security settings informs users about 
the trustworthiness of a remote platform.   
e. data protection [59] in the Cloud in collaboration with agents. The 
approach in the paper [59] engages Static Agents and Mobile Agents. 
Each Static Agent remains in a virtual machine (VM) under an Agency. 
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An Agency is an environment for agents to execute their operations. 
Agency protects underlying VMs from unauthorised access by 
malicious agents. A Static Agent and Agency are under control of a 
control centre. Whenever Static Agents detect any suspicious activity, 
they maintain a log file and send alerts to the control centre in the form 
of ID. Control centre sends investigative task-specific Mobile Agents to 
every agency that sent similar alerts. Mobile Agents visit and 
investigate the VMs.  Mobile agents collect and correlate information, 
and send the result or carry back the result to the control centre. 
Alerting console of the control centre analyses the information and 
compare the intrusion or attack pattern with the collected information.   
f. data confidentiality [60] for a Data Owner’s trust. This mechanism 
concentrates on a Cloud Computing environment that a Data Owner or 
a cloud customer controls. In this model, a Data Owner releases a 
Cloud Service Provider of the management of the cloud platform; the 
Data Owner accomplishes data processing in the cloud platform.  
g. data protection through a secure virtual machine for a Data Owner’s 
trust [36] in the Cloud. M. Descher et al. in [36] provide mechanism of 
secure virtual machine to process a Data Owner’s data that is 
outsourced to the Cloud. In support of the mechanism, M. Descher et 
al. provide architecture of Boot System (BS) and Encryption Partition 
(EP) for mounting and dismounting code for the secure virtual machine.  
h. mutual data protection [61] in the Cloud. In this framework, the authors 
have pointed out reverse access control mechanism. In this mechanism, 
cloud customers enforce the authentication and authorization 
procedures. These procedures are used by a Cloud Service Provider. 
Conversely, a Cloud Service Provider ensures that a cloud customer 
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does not violate the security settings of the Cloud Computing 
environment. 
i. data protection [62] in the Cloud. The authors propose property based 
attestation of a platform to resolve the problem caused by binary or 
remote attestation; a Data Owner’s data is processed in such a platform 
in the Cloud. However, the state of a system measured by property 
based attestation during boot time may not be the same as the one 
during challenge time. This gap leads to uncertainty. Attestation report 
based on boot time measurement is less useful than the report that needs 
to be done during challenge time.  Besides, the state of the platform 
component may be different from the state that was evaluated and 
certified by a certification authority.   
j. data protection [63] in the cloud.  The paper [63] uses agents or bots to 
collect the information of the platform. On verification of the platform, 
the paper proposes mechanism to send data in the target platform. With 
regard to the deployment of agents and collection of information from 
agents, the theme of the paper [63] has slight variation with the other 
papers [36, 48, 59] in the literature.  
k. data protection with the trusted virtual environment [38] of dual root. 
This dual rooted trust in the Cloud is achieved by combining trust from 
a Service Provider’s domain and a Data Owner’s private virtual 
infrastructure. The combined trust is maintained through a trusted 
endorsement key, and the combined trust is placed in a virtual 
environment in the Service Provider’s domain. In this paper, the virtual 
environment is described as trusted virtual environment module since a 
Data Owner uses this trusted virtual environment module to retain 
control over data for protection. Another paper [36] reiterates a Data 
Owner’s retaining control over data with different conceptual 
framework. This paper [38], however, has provided more in-depth 
activities of a Data Owner and a Service Provider in its framework for 
dual rooted trust and data protection. 
l. data protection [64] in the Cloud.  The proposed data protection 
approach splits the functionality of the trusted platform module (TPM) 
for a Data Owner’s trust. The proposed approach allocates resource 
Chapter 2 Related Works 
45 
 
intensive processing and data protection responsibilities to a measured 
virtual machine monitor; conversely it allocates the critical and less 
resource-intensive ones are in TPM. 
m. data protection [65] with key management. S. Lei and G. J. Dai Zishan 
in [65] illustrates encryption key management infrastructure in Cloud 
Computing. The claim of the proposed mechanism is to ensure data 
confidentiality for a Data Owner’s trust. In the proposed mechanism, 
the key management tasks are performed using the infrastructure of a 
Cloud Service Provider.  
n. data protection [66] from Software as a Service (SaaS) and 
Infrastructure as Service (IaaS). The papers use key features of remote 
attestation, trusted computing principle, and cryptography to show the 
interaction among entities. The protocols in the papers show the 
inherent propagation of a Data Owner’s data; the papers also show the 
involvement of the entities in the propagation of the data.  
o. data protection [67] in the Cloud without trusted third party. W. Han-
zhang and H. Liu-sheng have proposed a mechanism to ensure 
confidentiality and integrity. The proposed mechanism in the paper [67] 
eliminates the dependency on trusted third party by incorporating 
trusted platform module. This paper finds property based attestation 
more suitable than remote attestation. However, the property based 
attestation lacks improvement in dynamic formation of relevant 
property for attestation; another paper [68] proposes to improve the 
property based attestation for dynamic formation of relevant property. 
2.2.2 Limitations 
In this section, we provide key limitations of the techniques handling the lack of 
data control and confidentiality challenges. For enumerating the limitations, we 
follow below the chronological order of enumerating the features introduced in the 
prior section. 
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i. Multi-Cloud Approach for data protection 
a. There is no algorithm, protocol, and experimental evaluation in support 
of the multi-cloud approach [39] to handling data protection and data 
availability. 
b.  While the paper [40] has emphasised private Cloud for critical 
computing part, it has not provided any algorithm for the interaction of 
entities in the private Cloud with that of the public Cloud. In the public 
Cloud, the non-critical data is processed.  
ii. Survey 
a. While the paper [7] has derived special security aspect of Cloud 
Computing, and also related the special security aspect with trust 
problem in the Cloud, there is no concrete approach to solve trust 
problem. 
b. S. Sakr et al. in [47] have highlighted large scale data management in 
different infrastructures of Cloud environment. However, there is no 
mechanism proposed and highlighted as to how a Data Owner can have 
more opportunity to inspect data in the cloud than the same data in the 
in-house facility.   
c. J. P. Durbano et al. in [48] has pointed out the need for a Data Owner’s 
management of a virtual machine throughout its lifecycle. However, it 
is not clear in the paper as to how a Data Owner initialise, originate, 
and maintain a virtual machine that processes the Data Owner’s data.   
d. The paper [49] points out encryption and supervisory system for data 
protection. However, it is not mentioned how encryption and 
supervisory system would function to control the data in the cloud. One 
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of the approaches might be to attach data control mechanism with the 
data sent to the cloud. That control mechanism would interact with the 
Data Owner. Data would remain in the Cloud in encrypted form. Users 
might obtain a Secret Key from the Data Owner. With the Secret Key, 
users might complete secure and trusted interaction with the Cloud 
Service Provider to receive the encrypted data. Users might decrypt the 
data upon receiving the encrypted data. 
e. The two papers [50, 51] point out prime issues concerning trust and 
security problem in the Cloud. However, the authors have not proposed 
any concrete solution with relevant security analysis. 
f. While the paper [52] points out critical limitations of Software as a 
Service (SaaS), there is no concrete solution to overcome the 
limitations.  
iii. Framework or mechanism for data protection 
a. While the framework [55] provides insight into data protection and 
trust problem in Cloud Computing, there is no implementation and 
evaluation. 
b. In the data protection [56] mechanism, K. Hwang and D. Li have 
engaged a Data Owner in the data protection through data colouring 
process. The data colouring process is with expected value, entropy, 
and hyper entropy is under a Data Owner’s control. However, it is not 
clear in the paper as to how the users of the Data Owner will access the 
data.  The mechanism attempts to engage a Data Owner in Cloud 
Computing security aspects, and ensures a Data Owner’s trust. 
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However, there is no detailed algorithm and protocol to carry out the 
protection mechanism. 
c. While data slicing and obfuscation in [57] prevent a Data Owner’s data 
from being exposed, the detailed workflow regarding data slicing and 
obfuscation mechanism is not clear in the paper. It is not clear as to how 
end users of a Data Owner access the obfuscated data. Further, 
algorithms for transparent interactions among Data Owners, users, an 
application Service Provider (or Service Provider) and Cloud Service 
Provider (or infrastructure provider) are missing. It is not clear 
regarding the controlling mechanism of deletion and migration of bit 
level sliced data. 
d. For a Data Owner’s control over data, the paper [58] proposes a 
framework of private virtual infrastructure and agents. The PVI and 
agents visit the platform of a CSP and premeasure the security settings. 
However, there no algorithm and protocol for the interaction among 
entities for the launch of the PVI and agents in the CSP. Further, there 
is no experimental evaluation. 
e. Although the paper [59] attempts to ensure a Data Owner’s control with 
agents, the whole scheme is not clear regarding the protection of virtual 
environment.  This lack of clarity arises from the lack of specific 
solution for the protection of virtual environment or agency and static 
agents in the agency. Besides, the mechanism lacks coherent protocols 
and algorithms. Experimental part is unclear since there is no evident 
evaluation data and graphs. Furthermore, there is no clear 
representation of a pattern that a Mobile Agent collects and compares 
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with existing patterns. There is no algorithm or protocol for information 
collection and comparing the collected information with existing 
patterns. 
f. While a Data Owner manages a cloud platform for processing data, 
there is no consistent protocols and algorithms in support of the claim 
of the paper [60]. 
g. M. Descher et al. in [36] have proposed the Boot System (BS) and 
Encryption Partition (EP) for mounting and dismounting code for 
secure virtual machine. During the mounting and dismounting of code 
for secure virtual machine, interactions between the BS and the EP take 
place. As per the proposed mechanism in [36], a Data Owner retains 
control over the data that is processed in the secure virtual machine. 
However, there are no protocols, algorithms, and experimental 
evaluation in support of the secure virtual machine and the claim made 
in favour of the secure virtual machine and a Data Owner.  
h. While mutual data protection [61] in the Cloud involves a Data Owner 
and a Cloud Service Provider, there is no mechanism proposed to trace 
whether or not either a Data Owner or a Cloud Service Provider breaks 
the mutual protection. There is also no experimental evaluation and 
prototype with regard to a proof of concept. Security analysis on the 
protection mechanism is not consistent with regard to the purpose of the 
proposed framework. 
i. The data protection mechanism in [62] uses property based attestation 
of a platform;  the authors have argued that property based attestation of 
a platform is better than binary or remote attestation.  However, the 
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authors have not provided any experimental evaluation in support of 
their argument.  
j. While the paper is [63] provides insight into trust problem in the Cloud 
and becomes an extension of another paper [58], there is no 
experimental result in support of the claim made in the paper. 
k. The paper [38] has shown clear division of internal activities of a dual 
rooted trust between a Data Owner and a Cloud Service Provider for 
data protection. However, there are no protocols and algorithms for the 
dual rooted trust. There is also not experimental evaluation and security 
analysis showing the claim of the framework, adversarial attacks, and 
counterattacks of the framework against the adversarial attacks. 
l. Although the paper [64] provides a sharp division of data process 
responsibilities, the paper lacks clarity from  experimental and  
analytical standpoints. 
m. The proposed key management [65] for data protection and trust is 
performed using the infrastructure of a Cloud Service Provider. 
However, it is not clearly demonstrated how the confidentiality of data 
remains intact when key management is performed under the 
infrastructure of a Cloud Service Provider. One of the critical aspects of 
the proposed approach is the unavailability of the key management 
functionality at the collapse of the infrastructures of the Cloud Service 
Provider. To reveal and eliminate the critical aspects of the proposed 
approach, the authors have not provided scenario based interactions. 
The paper lacks scenario based interactions to demonstrate the 
protocols and algorithms for experimental evaluation. The paper also 
Chapter 2 Related Works 
51 
 
lacks clarity to justify the claim of the proposed approach with regard to 
adversarial attacks and counterattacks against the adversarial attacks. 
n. White the papers [66] show salient interaction among entities for the 
secure transfer and outsource of data in the Cloud, there is no scenario 
based security analysis and experimental evaluation. From the 
standpoint of trust, there is no evidence of activities that the entities do 
throughout their entire involvement in the data transfer and outsourcing. 
While remote attestation claims to identify a platform a valid or genuine 
one, there is no mechanism proposed in the paper to trace the change of 
the trustworthy status of the platform.   
o. While the paper [67] has eliminated the need for trusted third party, 
there is no convincing security analysis in favour of the claim made in 
the paper. 
2.3 Handling Insiders’ Threats and Loss of Visibility 
In the literature, there are techniques for dealing with insiders’ threats and loss 
of visibility. In this section, we organise the techniques from the literature for 
handling insiders’ threats and loss of visibility. In a scenario of Cloud Computing, a 
rudimentary view of Insiders’ threats for a Data Owner’s data in the Cloud is that a 
Data Owner’s data is vulnerable to malicious entities or employees in a Service 
Provider. A Data Owner’s data is processed in a virtual machine; the virtual machine 
is created on one of the physical machines of the Service Provider or on one of the 
physical machines in the infrastructure of another Cloud Service Provider. The 
Service Provider runs its entire services with the virtual machines on its own physical 
machines; however, when the Service Provider runs out of the physical servers, it 
extends its services with virtual machines running on the physical machines from 
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another Cloud Service Provider. In another scenario, a Service Provider runs its 
services entirely on the infrastructure of another Cloud Service Provider. In any case 
of the foregoing scenarios of data under the physical machines of the Service 
Provider or the physical machines of another Cloud Service Provider, there is a risk 
for a Data Owner’s data to be inspected or compromised by malicious entities or 
malicious employees of the Service Provider or the Cloud Service Provider.  
Furthermore, when a Data Owner outsources the data, the Data Owner has no 
visibility of the data, processing done on the data, and storage of the data in remote 
locations known to the Service Provider or the Cloud Service Provider. A Data 
Owner’s loss of visibility means that a Data Owner is not apprised of the virtual 
machine processing the Data Owner’s data and the physical machine on which the 
aforementioned virtual machine is created and activated. For dealing with insiders’ 
threats and loss of visibility, the techniques in the contemporary literature have key 
features and limitations.  Some techniques are provided in the literature in the form 
of surveys; other techniques illustrated in the literature provide conceptual solutions 
without algorithm, protocol, and experimental evaluation; and some other techniques 
are solutions to research issues with algorithm, protocol, and experimental 
evaluations. In the following sections, we organise key features and limitations of the 
techniques extracted from the contemporary literature of Cloud Computing. 
2.3.1 Key Features 
i. Profiling Users’ Behaviour and Monitoring Access Pattern  
a. preventing insiders’ threats and attacks [69]. In this paper [69], S. J. 
Stolfo, et al. have proposed two directions in preventing malicious 
insiders. The two directions depend on each other.  In the first direction, 
S. J. Stolfo, et al. have outlined the need for profiling user’s behaviour; 
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the profiling includes the legitimate users’ behaviour. The users include 
the entities that have legitimate access to a Data Owner’s data in the 
Cloud. In the second direction, the authors have pinpointed on the 
monitoring of access pattern; the access pattern is derived from the 
profile of legitimate users and their legitimate behaviour. In the second 
direction, the authors also have proposed a disinformation based decoy 
for the users whose behaviour patterns accidentally mismatch with the 
profile based ideal pattern preserved.  
ii. Multi-Cloud Approach  
a. preventing insiders’ threats and unavailability of data [41]. In this paper 
[41], the authors have proposed a mechanism for solving Cloud service  
unavailability and insiders’ threats. The proposed mechanism involves 
more than one Cloud. Processing data in one Cloud has the risks of 
service availability failure with the disruption of storage or processing 
entities. In this paper, the authors have found that a single Cloud service 
has less significance than multi-Cloud service, and the risk of insiders’ 
threats in single Cloud is more than multi-Cloud. 
iii. Trusted Computing Based Approach 
a. providing visibility of the off-premise platform [70]. In this paper the 
authors have pointed out authentication mechanism for trust in Cloud. 
In the authentication mechanism, the authors have outlined internal 
architecture and features of the off-premise platform; the internal 
architecture and features associate a Data Owner regarding the Cloud 
functionality, and provide confidence on the Cloud functionality.  
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b. handling insiders of a Cloud Service Provider [71]. The authors have 
proposed that malicious interference or tampering with the data and 
operations is most critical kind of attack surface in the Cloud.  
iv. Authentication, Access Control, and Encryption 
a. providing a Data Owner’s confidence in SaaS [72]. In this paper, the 
authors have concentrated on authentication, access control, and 
encryption for preventing insiders, and ensuring a Data Owner’s 
confidence. 
b. providing a Data Owner’s confidence [52]. This paper provides a 
mechanism for storing and accessing data at different locations based 
on meta-data information. The mechanism includes storing related data 
in different locations based on meta-data, and making data invaluable to 
malicious user even if malicious users recover part of the data.  
2.3.2 Limitations 
i. Profiling Users’ Behaviour and Monitoring Access Pattern   
a. While S. J. Stolfo, et al. in [69] have proposed the profile based ideal 
access pattern and monitoring, the paper is unclear from four prominent 
points. With regard to the first point, the key entity exercising the 
profiling of users’ behaviour and the monitoring of the access pattern is 
not articulated whatsoever in the paper. The second point is that there is 
no illustration of the parameters on which the profiling of users’ 
behaviour and the monitoring of the access pattern are done. This point 
is about coordinating the entities for filtering a normal user from an 
insider, and preventing an insider from performing any illegitimate 
activities on the data. Regarding the third point of security analysis, the 
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authors have not provided any scenario based adversarial insiders’ 
attacks and counterattacks against the adversarial insiders’ attacks in 
support the claim of the paper. 
ii. Multi-Cloud Approach for preventing insiders’ threats 
a. M. A. AlZain, et al.in  [41] have pointed out the significance of multi-
Cloud over sing Cloud. The significance is about a solution to data 
unavailability and a prevention of insiders’ threats. However, in support 
of their claimed significance, there is no experimental evaluation and 
scenario based security analysis. 
iii. Trusted Computing based Approach 
a. While the paper [70] attempts to associate a Data Owner regarding the 
internal view of Cloud functionality, there is  no algorithm, protocol, 
experiment, and security analysis in support of the claim. The claim of 
the paper is that associating a Data Owner with the internal view of 
Cloud functionality builds a Data Owner’s confidence on the Cloud 
functionality.  
b. Although the paper [71] paper has pointed out the negative impact of 
insiders’ malicious interferences, there is no best case and worst case 
scenarios for the adversarial attacks and defences. 
iv. Authentication, Access Control, and Encryption 
a. The author in [72] has concentrated on authentication, access control, and 
encryption for preventing insiders, and ensuring a Data Owner’s 
confidence. However, there is no algorithmic protocol, experiment, and 
evaluation in the paper. 
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b. While the paper [52] provides data storage and access at different 
location, there is no scenario based adversarial attack and counter attack 
in support of the claim of the paper. 
2.4  Realizing Trust Propagation 
In this section, we provide existing techniques of maintaining a Data Owner’s 
confidence and propagating a Data Owner’s privilege during the flow of data and 
processing. These techniques in the contemporary literature have prominent features 
and limitations.  These features are inherent in the functionalities of the techniques. 
Some techniques outlined in the literature are in the form of survey; other techniques 
being available in the literature provide conceptual solutions; these conceptual 
solutions are devoid of algorithms, protocols, and experimental evaluation; and some 
other techniques   present solutions to research issues with algorithm, protocol, and 
experimental evaluations. Key features and limitations of the techniques that we have 
extracted from the contemporary literature of Cloud Computing are organised in the 
following sections. 
2.4.1 Key Features 
i. Trusted Third Party (TTP) Based Mechanism 
a. propagating trust in the Cloud [11]. D. Zissis and D. Lekkas have 
proposed a trust propagation mechanism in top-down notion. In the trust 
propagation, they have used trusted certificates. Each entity on the 
bottom trusts the flow from the top.  The authors have defined a trusted 
third party (TTP) inside the Cloud; the top down notion of trust 
propagation is operated by the TTP. This top town trust propagation 
starts with the user. Users, applications/application owners, virtual 
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servers, and hardware obtain certificates from the TTP inside the Cloud. 
Users’ certificates trust application owners’ certificates which trust the 
certificates of virtual servers.  Virtual servers’ certificates trust hardware 
certificates. From a client to a host connected with SSL, and from a host 
to a host is with IPSec. However, the paper has not shown detailed 
mechanism to ensure data confidentiality, prevent malicious insiders’ 
threats, collocation of users’ data due to multi-tenancy, and control over 
data outsourced to the Cloud.  
ii. Access Control and Key Management Based Mechanism 
a. establishing trust chain and managing evolving trust [73] with 
propagation and revocation of privilege among entities in Cloud 
Computing.   The authors have pointed out that evolving trust depends on 
the dynamic nature of access control requirements and dynamically 
changing trust values; The dynamic feature and dynamically changing 
trust values become prominent because of  Data Owners’, users’, Cloud 
consumers’, and Service Providers’ interactions. Interactions are related 
to requirements-driven trust negotiation with access control and key 
management. They have proposed access control and key management 
for trust management and trust chain establishment. The authors have 
highlighted trust management and trust chain establishment to ensure 
propagation and revocation of privilege among entities in Cloud 
Computing.   
iii. Access Control and Authentication Framework for Trust Propagation 
a. provides the following research questions with regard to evolving and 
bidirectional trust [74].  How can a Data Owner control and protect data 
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with authorized access to it when data is moved to the Cloud? How 
would be the framework to handle trust and security in the Cloud by 
managing trust and maintaining evolving trust? How would identity and 
access management and key management for authenticating users in 
multi-tenant environment play a role in the framework for trust 
establishment and trust evolution? How would the trust evolution form 
with ongoing observation of activities of entities and the recommendation 
of entities?  How would be the bidirectional trust for trust chain?  How 
would be cryptographic form of security for the delegation of privilege 
propagation and revocation in trust chain?  
2.4.2 Limitations 
i. Trusted Third Party (TTP) Based Mechanism 
a. While propagating trust in the Cloud [11] by D. Zissis and D. Lekkas 
maintains  a top-down notion, there is no protocol for interaction among 
entities. Furthermore, there is no algorithm and experiment on the 
principal theme of the top-down notion of trust propagation; the principal 
theme is to establish a user or a Data Owner’s confidence in the Cloud 
functionality; there is no security analysis in support of the security 
strength of the proposed approach.   
ii. Access Control and Key management Based Mechanism 
a. H. Takabi, et al. in [73] have proposed evolving trust propagation in the 
form of privilege propagation and revocation. However, there is no 
algorithm and protocol or mechanism to support the points made in the 
paper. 
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iii. Access  Control and Authentication Framework for Trust Propagation 
a. While the paper [74] has provide research hints for evolving and 
bidirectional trust, there is no  protocol and algorithm expressing the 
solution. 
2.5 Handling the Lack of Trust Evidence 
In this section, we provide techniques of maintaining evidence of checks and 
balances for accountability and trust. A Data Owner outsources data to the Cloud and 
retrieves data from the Cloud. Furthermore, a Data Owner’s users access data in the 
Cloud. A Service Provider with its own infrastructure or in collaboration with the 
infrastructure of a Cloud Service Provider provides service to a Data Owner and the 
users of the Data Owner. These services include responding to the Data Owner’s data 
processing and storage in their infrastructure and repository; responding to the Data 
Owner’s users’ access request to the data in the repository of the Service Provider. 
Most of these services are performed by intermediate entities of the Service Provider 
beyond the direct supervision and inspection of the Data Owner. There is a lack of 
accountability and trust in the entire service delivery, as the Service Provider and its 
intermediate entities carry out all functionalities in locations and servers that are 
remote and unknown to the Data Owner. We explore the literature for the techniques 
of accountability and trust evidence in the entire service delivery. These techniques 
in the contemporary literature have key features and limitations.  Some techniques in 
the literature are in the form of survey while other techniques are conceptual 
solutions lacking of algorithms, protocols, and experimental evaluation, and some 
other techniques offer solutions with algorithm, protocol, and experimental 
evaluations without thorough analyses based on attacks. In the following sections, we 
provide key features and limitations of the techniques in the chronological order. 
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2.5.1 Key Features 
i. Maintaining Evidence and Tracking data in the Cloud 
a. providing preventive, detective, and corrective  controls for 
accountability in the Cloud [75, 76]. The authors have pointed out the 
lack of trust as a prime barrier to wide adoption of Software as a Service 
Cloud in particular. Achieving accountability is a step for building trust 
in the Cloud. R. K. L. Ko, et al. in [76]  have pointed out seven top 
threats in addition to exploring the details of accountability for trust in 
the Cloud. The authors in  [75] and [76] have provided three controlling 
approaches for accountability. The first approach is preventive measure 
of control in which risk is prevented before occurrence. In the second 
approach of detective measure, a risk is detected before applying the 
third approach that is known as the corrective approach.  S. Pearson in 
[75] have pointed out the three approaches for accountability with much 
insight and illustration of the three approaches. However, R. K. L. Ko, et 
al. in [77] have explored the three approaches with more insightful 
scenarios and use cases. 
b. proving the track of data [78] in the Cloud. Y. S. Tan, et al. in [78] have 
proposed a data tracker that tracks data in uncontrolled Cloud 
environments. The authors have provided scenarios and use cases to 
illustrate the concept of the tracker. 
2.5.2 Limitations 
i. Maintaining Evidence and Tracking data in the Cloud 
a. S. Pearson in [75] has highlighted the significance of trust problem as a 
wide barrier to Cloud adoption, and accountability is a step for building 
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trust. R. K. L. Ko, et al. in [76]  However, there is no scenario based 
evaluation of the approaches for achieving accountability in the Cloud. 
R. K. L. Ko, et al. in [77] have provided more insight and illustration 
than S. Pearson in [75] regarding the three approaches for accountability. 
However,  R. K. L. Ko, et al. in [77] have  also not provided any 
experimental evaluation and security analysis. 
b. While the paper [78] provides a tracking mechanism with a tracker, the 
tracker is vulnerable to adversaries. A possible approach to ensure a safe 
location of the tracker is to use trusted computing principle; with the 
trusted computing principle, a platform might be verified before the 
tracker is placed in the platform.     
2.6 Tabular Form of All Approaches and Solutions 
A concise tabular representation of the above and remaining papers is as follows:  
Table 2.2. A summary of the literature review. 
Type A  Lack of data control and data confidentiality (data protection) 
Type B  Loss of visibility and insiders’ threats 
Type C  Trust propagation  
Type D  Lack of Accountability and Trust Evidence 
 
Type Paper Year Solution/Approach Features 
 
A [39] 
 
2012 A conceptual model for data security.  There is no algorithm 
and experimental 
evaluation. 
[7] 2012 An excellent survey on data protection.  
[47] 2011 An excellent survey on data management 
in Cloud. 
 
[55] 
 
2011 Conceptual framework on sensitive 
information protection.  
Shared responsibility between a user and 
a Service Provider 
While the framework 
is interesting, 
implementation and 
evaluation work is 
yet to be done. 
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[56] 2010 Data protection mechanism with data 
slicing and obfuscation. 
While the mechanism 
is suitable for Cloud 
Computing, there is 
no clear algorithm 
and experimental 
result. 
[57] 2009 Data protection by bit level data slicing 
and obfuscation instead of encryption. 
Detailed workflow of 
the mechanism and 
transparent 
interactions among 
entities are not clear.  
[58] 2009 
 
Conceptual framework for shared 
responsibility between a Data Owner and 
a cloud Service Provider (CSP) from 
IaaS perspective. The proposed 
framework allows users to have the 
relevant visibility of the security settings 
of a CSP. Pre-measure mechanism 
informs users about the trustworthiness 
of a remote platform.  
No experimental 
outcome is provided. 
[59] 2009 Mobile agent based pre measuring and 
tracking solution. 
 
No algorithm with 
experimental 
evaluation. 
[60] 2010 Conceptual model for a customer’s 
confidence through shared security 
responsibility between a CSP and a cloud 
customer. 
No consistent 
protocols and 
algorithms for the 
model.   
[48] 2010 
 
Discussion on data control and 
confidentiality with respect to virtual 
machine security and life cycle. 
No experiment. 
[36] 2009 A framework of retaining control over 
data in IaaS. 
Supportive 
algorithms and 
protocols for 
interaction between 
supportive entities are 
not given.   
[61] 2010 Conceptual solution of mutual protection 
and trust. Main theme is the secure 
outsourcing of data and processes 
without outsourcing a Data Owner’s 
control.  
No experimental 
evaluation provided 
as a proof of concept 
and attack tolerance. 
[62] 2011 Runtime measurement of a platform with 
property based attestation resolves the 
problems caused by remote attestation. 
No algorithm or 
protocol. 
[63] 2010 Providing runtime measurement of the 
platform. This measurement informs 
about the trustworthiness of the platform 
to remote users.  
No experimental 
outcome is provided. 
[38] 2010 
 
Conceptual solution by providing 
platform trust and information owner 
trust. This framework eliminates the 
limitation of vTPM.  
No experimental 
outcome is provided. 
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[64] 2011 Splitting the TPM functionalities to 
ensure data confidentiality. 
No algorithm and 
evaluation. 
[65] 2010 Key management for data protection. Not clear. 
[49] 
 
2010 A conceptual model for supervising the 
data. 
No Algorithm and 
experimental 
evaluation for 
supervising the data. 
[50] 2010 Discussion on data confidentiality and 
control. 
No solution. 
[51] 2010 Data control and confidentiality are 
important aspect in Cloud Computing. 
No solution. 
[18] 2009 TVMM based solution for trust enhanced 
data protection in IaaS. 
No experimental 
evaluation.  
[52] 2011 Discuss data protection from  SaaS 
perspectives. 
No experimental 
evaluation. 
[66] 2010 Trusted SaaS model to handle control 
and confidentiality issues.  
There is no 
experimental 
evaluation. There is 
no clear distinction 
between a user and 
Data Owner in the 
model. This model 
depends on trusted 
third party. 
[67] 
 
2010 A mechanism to ensure confidentiality 
and integrity, and it eliminates the 
dependency on trusted third party by 
incorporating trusted platform module. 
This paper finds property based 
attestation more suitable than remote 
attestation.  
No experimental 
evaluation. 
[68] 2010 Solution to improve remote and property 
based attestation. 
However, the 
protocol and the 
analysis are not clear. 
[53] 2011 Detailed discussion on various security 
aspects of SaaS. 
No experimental 
evaluation. 
[54] 
 
2010 Proposed solution for confidentiality 
breach uses location transparency and 
transaction isolation. 
No experimental 
evaluation. 
[44] 2010 Confidentiality breach is one of the 
vulnerabilities. 
No solution 
proposed. 
[47] 2011 
 
Discussion on data management in the 
cloud. 
No experimental 
evaluation. 
[43] 2010 Discussion on several issues including 
data control and confidentiality. 
Emphasis on 
Transport Layer 
Security.  
[79] 2010 Secret sharing based multi-party solution 
for information protection. Eliminates 
the need for a trusted third party. 
 
Analysis and 
mechanism are not 
clear.   
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[10] 2010 Trusted computing based solution for 
control over data and confidentiality of 
data 
No algorithm and 
protocol showing the 
interaction among 
entities. 
[80] 2010 Conceptual solution is based on dual data 
processing storage services for control 
over data and confidentiality of data. 
No discussion based 
experimental results. 
[29] 2009 Hypothetical model to extend Data 
Owner’s control using trusted 
computing. The concept of the  model is 
to create and verify trustworthy 
execution environment for data or 
content protection.  
Detailed procedure is 
yet to be developed. 
[42] 2011 Conceptual solution by placing key 
management under an organization or a 
Data Owner. 
No detailed 
procedure or 
algorithm in support 
of the solution. 
[45] 2011 A conceptual model for handling 
confidentiality issues raised by insiders’ 
threats. 
Clear algorithm and 
evaluation are 
missing. 
 
B [69] 2012 Handling insiders with access patterns. Responding to an 
insiders with 
predefined fake 
information.   
[41] 2012 Handling insiders’ threats with focus on 
multi-cloud instead of single cloud. 
There is no 
algorithm, protocol, 
experiment, and 
security analysis.  
[70] 2011 Authentication with SAML based on 
SOAP and XML. Access control with 
XACML complements SAML. Trusted 
computing is found to be applicable. 
No clear approach.  
[72] 2011 Discussion on  SaaS with emphasis on 
access control and authentication and 
encryption. 
No solution. 
[52] 
 
2011 Discuss data protection from  SaaS 
perspectives. Storing of and accessing to 
data are based on  meta-data driven 
information. Fine-grained authorisation 
to control access to data is also proposed. 
Adding security as a service for dynamic 
security requirement is proposed. 
No clear algorithm 
and protocol. 
[71] 2010 Discuss on the malicious interference. No approach found. 
[81] 2010 Location independent security boundary 
for the data in the cloud. Security 
boundary is based on encryption and 
access control based  
There is no 
evaluation with 
experimental 
outcome.  
[82] 2011 Trusted Cloud Computing based 
conceptual solution. Need for a holistic 
access control mechanism is stressed. 
No algorithm and 
protocol with 
experimental 
evaluation. 
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[83] 
 
2010 Conceptual solution hints for access 
control, data tagging and obfuscation.  
No detailed analysis 
of the solution with 
experimental results. 
 
C 
 
[11] 2012 Conceptual solution with a trusted third 
party (TTP). 
Mechanism to ensure 
data confidentiality and 
prevent insiders’ threat 
is not supported with 
algorithm and protocol. 
[73] 2010 Access control and key management 
based conceptual solution to establish 
trust chain. Privilege propagation and 
revocation in the evolvement of trust.     
Algorithm and protocol 
with  experimental 
results are missing. 
[74] 2010 Conceptual framework of bidirectional 
and evolving trust supported with 
access control and authentication 
No clear algorithm and 
protocol. 
[82] 2011 
 
Stress is given on access control based 
solutions towards trust in cloud. 
No experiment. 
[84] 2010 Model with an experimental result. Experimental results do 
not meet the problem 
and purpose.  
[85] 2010 Trust model is based on the collection 
and the evaluation of 
recommendations.   
Experimental 
evaluation given.  
Trust accuracy and 
transaction success rate 
are not clearly defined 
and reflected in the 
experiment. 
[86] 2009 Model of secure data flow processing 
for establishing trust in open 
environment. 
  
 
The algorithm and the 
experiment parameters  
(data flow processing 
delay and attack 
detection probability) 
needs improvement for 
clarity. 
[87] 2007 This paper highlights the need for trust 
in cloud.  
This is the first paper 
demanding trust in 
cloud. 
[8] 2010 Conceptual outline of trust on the 
remote machines holding and 
processing users’ data.  
While trust without 
touch is the main 
theme of the paper, 
there is no algorithm or 
protocol and 
experimental 
evaluation. 
[88] 2010 A conceptual solution to establish trust 
in Cloud Computing. 
Mechanism lacks 
clarity.  
[38] 2010 
 
Conceptual solution by providing 
platform trust and information owner 
trust. This framework eliminates the 
limitation of vTPM. 
No experimental 
evaluation. Hard to 
follow. 
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[89] 2004 Discussion on the improvements of the 
property based attestation over remote 
attestation. This paper shows how 
attestation identity key (AIK) is 
generated and masquerade attack in 
remote attestation is nullified. 
 
[15] 2010 TPM based solution for trust. No algorithm is 
presented. 
[90] 2011 
 
TPM based solution for trust in Cloud 
Computing. This paper points out 
limitation of TPM specification.  
 
[91] 2010 TPM based solution for trust. No algorithm is given. 
[92] 2011 TPM based conceptual solution for 
establishing trust 
No focussed algorithm 
or protocol and 
experimental results   
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execution environment of cloud. The 
paper claims that secure coprocessor 
has scalability problem in Cloud 
Computing. 
Attestation 
environment at run 
time is yet to be done 
 
 
[98] 2010 Conceptual model on establishing trust 
on VM machine execution 
environment. 
Trust mechanism is not 
clear. 
[99] 2005 Proposal on Trust Enhanced Security 
mechanism with authentication and 
execution trust. 
 
Chapter 2 Related Works 
67 
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execution domain. 
There is no algorithm 
and protocol in support 
of the mechanism. Also 
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layer of Cloud 
Computing the 
framework works. 
[101] 2010 
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execution model.  
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adversaries. 
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No mechanism 
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[83] 2010 Conceptual hints for access control, 
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the solution with 
experimental results. 
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[6] 2009 A trust model representing a trust 
circle. Experiment highlights trust 
accuracy and transaction success rate. 
While experimental 
results are shown, the 
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remains unclear.  
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are not clearly 
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trust 
Experimental 
evaluation is given. 
[34] 2010 Information flow control based 
solution for security in Cloud. It 
provides each user with time limited 
clearance as single sign-on access 
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2.7  Chapter Summary 
This chapter has provided a critical review of the contemporary works that are 
aligned with the focus of our work. The critical review includes the features and 
limitations of the works. These features and limitations have provided us with the 
insight into finding the gap of knowledge in Cloud Computing from the perspective 
of the trust problem, and the gap of knowledge has led us to formulate the research 
question and its sub questions.  
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Chapter 3 
An End-to-End Trusted Path between a Data 
Owner and a CSP 
In this chapter, we apply cryptographic principles in generating protocols. These 
protocols are for interactions between a Data Owner or a user or an information 
owner and a Service Provider or a Cloud Service Provider or CSP; for distinctive 
roles of a Data Owner or an information owner and a user outlined in the chapter 1, 
we mention a Data Owner or a user or an information owner individually instead of 
simply using one general term to represent them. These protocols establish an end-to-
end trusted path between a Data Owner or a user or an information owner and a 
Cloud Service Provider. One of the components of the trusted path includes a time 
limited tag that is specific to a Data Owner or a user or an information owner.  A 
time limited tag is from a Cloud Service Provider. The Cloud Service Provider 
verifies a Data Owner or a user or an information owner based on a Data Owner id or 
a user id and a time limited tag; on successful verification in favour of the Data 
Owner or the user or the information owner, the Cloud Service Provider creates a 
virtual machine on one of its physical machines, and a web server on the virtual 
machine. On successful creation of the web server, an Elastic Block Storage of the 
Cloud Service Provider or Service Provider puts the source code of an application in 
the web server; the application runs on the web server. A Data Owner or a user, with 
user id, password, and time limited tag, interacts with the application running on the 
web server; the web server runs on the virtual machine that runs on one of the 
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physical machines of the Cloud Service Provider. In the following sections, we 
provide the relevant aspects of an end-to-end trusted path by   
x Illustrating the need for establishing a secure channel between a Data   Owner 
or a user and a Cloud Service Provider to get rid of an adversary. 
x Elaborating ideal scenarios or best case scenarios that show the prominent 
features of a secure channel to be a trusted path. 
x Elaborating worst case scenarios or attack scenarios that show the prominent 
limitations of a secure channel to be an untrusted path. 
x Specifying the claims achieved by applying security principles of encryption, 
decryption, and authentication techniques for a secure channel to be an end-
to-end trusted path. 
x Justifying the claims for establishing a secure channel to be a trusted path 
through experimental outcome and security analyses.  
3.1 Introduction 
A secure channel between a Data Owner or a user and a Cloud Service Provider 
is also referred to as a trusted path. This secure channel becomes an end-to-end 
trusted path between a Data Owner or a user and a Cloud Service Provider through 
intermediate and intervening entities. We will discuss the intermediate and 
intervening entities and present protocols in the later stage of the chapter. The 
following figure, at the outset, provides an overview of the primary elements of 
Cloud Service offering with regard to the evolution of our work. A Service Provider 
offers Software as a Service with its own infrastructure or the infrastructure of a 
Cloud Service Provider. With regard to the following figure, we envisage that a 
Service Provider is synonymous with a Cloud Service Provider in that a Service 
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Provider offers Software as a Service with its own infrastructure or the Service 
Provider borrows infrastructure from the Cloud Service Provider while offering 
Software as a Service. In the following figure, a Data Owner or a user accesses the 
data through Software as a Service; data is replicated in Cloud storages. 
CSP
IaaS
Data
Owner
User
Cloud Storage
Data DataData
Cloud Storage
Data DataData Data
User
PaaS
SaaS
 
Figure 3.1. SaaS by a Service Provider with its own infrastructure or with that of a CSP.  
The end-to-end trusted path is necessary for a Data Owner or a user to become 
connected with a Cloud Service Provider. The end-to-end trusted path between a 
Data Owner or a user and a Cloud Service Provider is for a Data Owner or a user to 
become verified by the intermediate entities and the Cloud Service Provider; on 
verification, the Data Owner or the user receives a time limited tag. Based on the tag, 
the Service Provider or the Cloud Service Provider creates virtual machine(s) on the 
physical server(s) of the Service Provider or the Cloud Service Provider, creates web 
server(s) on the virtual machine(s), runs the source code of the application(s) on the 
web server(s), and allows the Data Owner or the user to interact with the 
application(s) for transferring data between the Data Owner or the user and the 
Service Provider or the Cloud Service Provider. While transferring data, the secure 
channel becomes an end-to-end trusted path with the intermediate entities; the secure 
channel protects data from malicious activities. Malicious activities include the 
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attempts of an adversary to have illegitimate access to the data or interrupt the 
communication between a Data Owner or a user and a Cloud Service Provider; these 
attempts are perpetrated by impersonating a Data Owner or a user or a Cloud Service 
Provider. In the following section, we provide the ideal scenarios.   
3.2 Ideal Representative Scenarios 
In ideal or best case scenarios, we envisage that a Data Owner or a user 
connects with a Service Provider or a Cloud Service Provider, and the Cloud Service 
Provider or the Service Provider verifies the Data Owner or the user for allowing the 
Data Owner or the user to access the services. The Service Provider makes the 
services available to the Data Owner or the user by using its own infrastructure or the 
infrastructure of the Cloud Service Provider. The difference between a Service 
Provider and a Cloud Service Provider is highlighted in the foregoing section. A 
Service Provider becomes synonymous to a Cloud Service Provider when a Service 
Provider executes and offers services on its own infrastructure, for example, physical 
machines. Physical machines include computation servers and storage servers, virtual 
machines on the physical servers, and network connectivity among the machines. We 
present the following scenarios in connection with the clarity and the concept of our 
work. 
Ideal Scenarios of a Data Owner connecting with a Service Provider 
The first ideal scenario is that a Data Owner connects with a Service Provider or 
a Cloud Service Provider. A Data Owner is an individual or an enterprise; the Data 
Owner or the enterprise maintains multiple copies of data into multiple servers 
located within the enterprise. The Data Owner or the enterprise frequently updates 
the multiple servers which also need frequent maintenance. However, in this 
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scenario, the Data Owner maintains a single server for the data, and the Data Owner 
outsources the replicated data to the Service Provider. There are two aspects in this 
scenario:  
x A Service Provider with its own entire infrastructure.  
x A Service Provider with entire infrastructure from a Cloud Service Provider.  
In the first aspect of the first scenario, the Data Owner or the enterprise connects 
to the Service Provider, and the Service Provider authenticates the Data Owner or the 
enterprise. Upon the authentication of the Data Owner, the Service Provider allows 
the Data Owner to access the services to store, retrieve, and update data. These 
services become available to the Data Owner through an application that runs on a 
virtual machine; the Load Balancing and Auto Scaling Group of the Service Provider 
uses an available virtual machine or creates a new virtual machine on one of the 
physical machines of the Service Provider. The virtual machine runs a webserver, 
and Elastic Block Storage of the Service Provider executes the source code of the 
application on the webserver. The application becomes available to the Data Owner 
or the enterprise through a browser. The Data Owner performs transactions on the 
outsourced data that is in the Service Provider, and the transactions take place 
through the application. The data, from the storage of the Service Provider, becomes 
available in a virtual machine before transactions; the virtual machine created on one 
of the physical machines of the Service Provider is a storage server; this storage 
server is linked with the application that interacts with the Data Owner through 
browser. The virtual machine that becomes the storage server and interacts with the 
application transfers Data Owner’s data to the storage of the Service Provider. The 
Service Provider receives data from the Data Owner through a path from the Data 
Owner to the application, from the application to the virtual machine functioning as 
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the storage server, and from the virtual machine to the storage of the Service 
Provider. The Service Provider replicates data in its storage in multiple locations. 
The Data Owner and the Service Provider update the Data Owner’s single server 
with the latest data at regular interval.   
In the second aspect of the scenario, the Service Provider offers its service on 
the infrastructure of a Cloud Service Provider. A Data Owner or an enterprise 
connects to the Service Provider through an application over a browser. The 
application runs on a web server, and the web server runs on a virtual machine. The 
Service Provider creates the virtual machine on one of the physical machines on the 
Cloud Service Provider. The Service Provider authenticates a Data Owner or an 
enterprise that connects to it. Upon authentication, the Service Provider links the 
Data Owner or the enterprise with the application running on the web server, and the 
web server runs on the virtual machine. In both aspects of the first ideal scenario, we 
envisage that the paths between a Data Owner and a Cloud Service Provider exist 
without adversaries. However, in an attack scenario, as presented in the next section, 
the paths between a Data Owner and a Cloud Service Provider are vulnerable to 
adversaries. 
Ideal Scenarios of a Data Owner and a User connecting with a Service Provider 
The second ideal scenario consists of a Data Owner and a user connecting with 
a Service Provider or a Cloud Service Provider. A Data Owner is also an individual 
or an enterprise; a user is either an employee of the enterprise or a user of the data 
maintained by a Data Owner through a Cloud service. A Service Provider provisions 
the Cloud service as a Software as a Service on the infrastructure of a Cloud Service 
Provider. The Service Provider authenticates the Data Owner and the user. The Data 
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Owner outsources data to the Cloud, and a user of the Data Owner accesses the data. 
In this ideal scenario, we consider that there are no adversaries in the paths between a 
Data Owner and a Service Provider, or in the paths between a user and a Service 
Provider. However, from the perspective of an attack scenario in the next section, the 
paths between a Data Owner and a Service Provider and the paths between a user and 
a Service Provider are prone to attacks. 
Ideal Scenarios of a User connecting with a Service Provider 
In the third ideal scenario a user depends on a Service Provider for Cloud 
Services. The Service Provider runs its services in the form of Software as a Service 
on the infrastructure of a Cloud Service Provider. A user connects to a Service 
Provider with a unique id and a password, and the Service Provider authenticates the 
user. The user, upon authentication by the Service Provider, interacts with other 
users, and the user also shares news, views, and pictures of personal, social, political, 
and global events. In the ideal scenario, there are no adversaries in the paths between 
a user and a Service Provider. However, the attack scenario of the next section 
reveals possibility of attacks.  
Ideal Scenarios of multiple Data Owners sharing data through a Service 
Provider 
The fourth ideal scenario is that multiple Data Owners or enterprises interact 
with themselves through a Service Provider or a Cloud Service Provider. The Cloud 
Service Provider authenticates the Data Owners or enterprises before they interact or 
exchange data. There are two phases. In the first phase, a Data Owner, for example, 
Alice outsources the data in the Cloud through Software as a Service that is available 
to the Data Owner through a browser. The Service Provider makes Software as a 
Chapter 3 An End-to-End Trusted Path between a Data Owner and a CSP 
76 
 
Service available to Alice and authenticates Alice for using the Software as a Service 
for outsourcing the data. In the second phase, the Service Provider or the Cloud 
Service Provider authenticates another Data Owner, for example Bob. Bob accesses 
the data that is outsourced by Alice. We envisage that the path among Data Owners 
or enterprises and the Cloud Service Provider are without adversaries. However, in 
the attack scenario, there are possibilities of attacks, as pointed out in the next 
section. 
Ideal Scenarios of a Data Owner connecting with an old Service Provider and a 
new Service Provider 
The fifth ideal scenario is that a Data Owner connects with an old Cloud Service 
Provider and a new Cloud Service Provider. The purpose of the connection is to 
switch into the new Cloud Service Provider or take an additional service from the 
new Cloud Service Provider. From ideal points of view, there are no adversaries in 
the path between a Data Owner and an old or a new Cloud Service Provider.  
3.3 Vulnerabilities and Attacks  Scenarios 
In this section, we point out the vulnerabilities and attacks that are prominent 
with regard to the prior ideal scenarios. 
Vulnerable and attack scenarios of a Data Owner connecting with a Service 
Provider 
With regard to the first ideal scenario, there are vulnerabilities that lead to 
attacks.  Paths between a Data Owner and a Service Provider are untrustworthy. 
There are no entities overseeing the paths between a Data Owner and a Service 
Provider. Vulnerabilities include untrustworthy paths and lack of entities overseeing 
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the paths. These vulnerabilities cause man-in-the-middle attacks. In such attacks, 
adversaries keep on pretending either a Data Owner or a Service Provider. 
As regards the first ideal scenario, the Data Owner or the enterprise connects to 
the Service Provider, and the Service Provider authenticates the Data Owner or the 
enterprise. While the Service Provider authenticates the Data Owner or the 
enterprise, the authentication of the Service Provider on the part of the Data Owner 
remains unconvincing. From the standpoint of trust, the Data Owner needs 
confidence on the Service Provider, and the Service Provider needs confidence on 
the Data Owner. Mutual authentication between the Service Provider and the Data 
Owner provides one of the foundations of confidence that leads to trust. Lack of 
transparent mutual authentication is vulnerability; this vulnerability causes mistrust. 
This mistrust is a source of apprehension about a Cloud Service from a Service 
Provider. 
Vulnerable and attack scenarios of a Data Owner and a User connecting with a 
Service Provider 
As regards the second ideal scenario, a Data Owner and a user connect with a 
Service Provider or a Cloud Service Provider. A Data Owner is either an individual 
or an enterprise; a user is either an employee of the enterprise or a user of the data 
maintained by a Data Owner through a Cloud service. In this scenario, a Data Owner 
is sceptical or apprehensive about the paths between a Data Owner and a Service 
Provider; paths between a Data Owner and a Service Provider are untrusted. Paths 
between a user and a Service Provider are also untrusted. There is also a need for 
mutual authentication. Untrusted paths and lack of mutual authentication are 
vulnerabilities; these vulnerabilities cause man-in-the-middle attacks and mistrust.  
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Vulnerable and attack scenarios of a User connecting with a Service Provider 
With regard to the third ideal scenario of a user connects with a Service 
Provider. In this scenario, a user is an individual irrespective of any affiliation with a 
Data Owner or an enterprise.  In connection with the third ideal scenario, a user 
depends on a Service Provider for Cloud Services. The Service Provider runs its 
services in the form of Software as a Service on the infrastructure of a Cloud Service 
Provider. A user connects to a Service Provider with a unique id and a password, and 
the Service Provider authenticates the user. The user, upon authentication by the 
Service Provider, interacts with other users, and the user also shares news, views, and 
pictures of personal, social, political, and global events. However, there exist 
untrusted paths between the user and the Service Provider. Untrusted paths are 
vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities cause man-in-the-middle attacks. In an attack 
scenario, we envisage that an adversary causes man-in-the-middle attack; by 
executing the attack, the adversary updates news, views, and pictures that instigate 
social, political, and global unrest. 
Vulnerable and attack scenarios of multiple Data Owners sharing data through 
a Service Provider 
In connection with the fourth ideal scenario, a Service Provider or a Cloud 
Service Provider is a central point of sharing data among Data Owners or enterprises. 
The Data Owners or enterprises interact with themselves through a Service Provider 
or a Cloud Service Provider. The Service Provider authenticates the Data Owners or 
enterprises before they interact or exchange data. There are two phases from the 
perspective of outsourcing and accessing the data.  In the two phases, there are 
vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities are untrusted paths among Data Owners and the 
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Service Provider. In the first phase, the paths through which the Data Owner and the 
Service Provider interact are untrusted, as the Data Owner and the Service Provider 
are susceptible to man-in-the-middle attacks. Notwithstanding the foregoing 
vulnerability, the Service Provider authenticates a Data Owner; the Data Owner 
outsources the data to the Cloud through Software as a Service that becomes 
available to the Data Owner through a browser. In the second phase, another Data 
Owner interacts with the Service Provider amid the same vulnerability as the one in 
the foregoing first phase; the Service Provider authenticates the Data Owner. Upon 
authentication by the Service Provider, the Data Owner in the second phase accesses 
the data. However, vulnerabilities, man-in-the-middle attacks, and lack of convincing 
authentication of a Service Provider on the part of a Data Owner create mistrust.  
Vulnerable and attack scenarios of a Data Owner connecting with an old 
Service Provider and a new Service Provider 
The fifth ideal scenario is that a Data Owner or the user of the Data Owners 
connects with an old Service Provider or Cloud Service Provider and a new Service 
Provider. In this scenario, the Data Owner is an enterprise, for example Neo 
Insurance Company. The Neo Insurance Company depends on a Service Provider, 
for example Oldion Cloud Services Company for its employee’s payroll. During 
flooding, there are huge increases for insurance requests by customers and sub 
agents; also there are corresponding responses by the Neo Insurance Company and 
its agents.  For handling the customer’s requests and responses, the Neo Insurance 
Company depends on another Service Provider, for example Newonian Cloud 
Services Company. The Neo Insurance Company or its users connects with the 
Newonian Cloud Services Company. In this scenario, the Neo Insurance Company 
interacting or connecting with the Newonian Cloud Services Company means that the 
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employees of the Neo Insurance Company interact or connect with the Newonian 
Cloud Services Company. In the attack scenario, we envisage that there are 
adversaries in the paths between the Neo Insurance Company and the Oldion Cloud 
Services Company and/or the Newonian Cloud Services Company.  
3.4 Claims 
In this section, we provide the following claims: 
An end to end secure channel between a Data Owner or a user and a Service 
Provider or a Cloud Service Provider protects the mishandling of (i) session keys, (ii) 
other keys, and (iii) Tickets. 
3.5 Design Methodology 
In this section, we organise the terminologies, security properties, and 
techniques that facilitate the design, evaluation, and analysis of our security protocols 
throughout the chapter.  In the following section, we provide the notations that are 
used in the chapter.   
3.5.1  Notations and Symbols 
In this section, we provide the following notations and symbols that are used in 
the reminder of the chapter. 
Notations  Interpretations 
Token : a pair of username, password and session key. 
KwT : represents a specific key where w is d/c  
d stands for a Data Owner and  
c stands for a Cloud Service Provider or Service Provider. 
T : +/- ( + for Public Key and – for Private Key).  
Kd+ / Kd- : Data Owner’s  Public Key/ Private Key. 
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Kc+/ Kc- : Cloud Service Provider’s or Service Provider’s Public/Private Key.   
E(m) KwT : message is encrypted with KwT. 
S(m) KwT : message is signed with KwT.    
Skd : Secret Key generated randomly by a Data Owner.  
Skdc : Secret Key shared by a Data Owner and CSP.  
[d, c] : A Data Owner wants to communicate with CSP. 
d/c : Data Owner’s identity and s Cloud Service Provider’s identity. 
KDC : Key Distribution Centre. 
Kd,kdc : Session Key between a Data Owner and KDC. 
Kc,kdc : Session  Key between a CSP and KDC. 
 
3.5.2 Security Principles 
In this section, we provide security principles or properties. Security has main 
three properties. These properties include Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability 
[109, 110].  
Confidentiality refers to the mechanism whereby information is disclosed only 
to authorized party [109, 110]. In other words, confidentiality means keeping 
information or communication from being seen by an adversary [111].  
Integrity of data or information is the characteristics, and in the characteristics, 
changes can be made only by a Data Owner or Information Owner in an authorized 
way [110].  
Availability refers to timely response to the request of a service demanded 
[109, 110]. 
3.5.3  Encryption and Decryption Techniques 
Principle of Symmetric Cryptography (SC) employs the same key for 
encryption and decryption as shown in Fig. 3.2. 
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Figure 3.2. Symmetric Cryptography. 
Public Key Cryptography (PKC) is also referred to as Asymmetric 
Cryptography (AC) that has two keys Private Key denoted by d and Public Key 
denoted by e as opposed to single shared key in SC or Secret Key Cryptography.  
Cipher Text
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Encryption
Decryption
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Plain Text
Cipher TextPlain Text
 
Figure 3.3. Asymmetric Cryptography. 
Digital Signature, as shown in Fig. 3.4 is generated with PKC by someone 
knowing the Private Key. A Data Owner (DO) or Information Owner (INO) can sign 
its data or information by generating a signature with his or her Private Key, and 
other entity like CSP can verify that it is the signature of so and so Data Owner or 
INO, but it cannot modify the INO’s signature [111]. Public Key Cryptography is 
order of magnitude slower than Symmetric Cryptography; for performance, data is 
encrypted with a randomly generated Secret Key instead of Public Key. Then the 
Secret Key is encrypted with Public Key.  
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Figure 3.4. Digital Signature. 
The following Fig. 3.5, shows the significance of encryption and keys in the 
authentication and confidentiality of a message.  
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Figure 3.5. Authentication and Confidentiality through encryption and keys. 
The message in the above figure is exchanged between a Data Owner or a 
Service Provider or a Cloud Service Provider. In the above Fig. 3.5, Kd+ and Kd- are 
respectively the Public and Private Keys of a Data Owner; Kc+ and Kc- are 
respectively the Public and Private Keys of a Service Provider or a Cloud Service 
Provider.  
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3.5.4 Authentication Techniques 
Authentication is used to verify the claimed identity of an information owner 
or user or other entity [110]. Authentication proves “who you are” [111]. 
Authentication proves the secrecy without revealing the secrecy, and it becomes 
useful when two entities communicate in an un-trusted environment like the Cloud 
Computing one [111]. In the following figures, we show authentication techniques in 
Cloud Computing Environment. 
Data Owner
(DO/d)
Service Provider/
Cloud Service Provider
(CSP/c)
E(rd)Kdc : rd encrypted with Kdc
rc
E(rc)Kdc : rc encrypted with Kdc
rd and rc are random numbers chosen randomly by the Data Owner Owner and the CSP
(Cloud Service Provider) respectively. Each random number is known as a challenge. The
Session Key, Kdc is between the Data Owner and the CSP. A value x encrypted with the
Session Key, Kdc is called a response to the challenge x. Challenge response approach of
authentication between the Data Owner and the Cloud Service Provider.
rd
 
Figure 3.6. A Data Owner and a CSP use challenge-response authentication. 
The challenge response approach, in the above figure, is the main principle of 
authentication protocol between a Data Owner and a Cloud Service Provider. In the 
above authentication protocol technique, shared Secret Key and respective challenges 
from the Data Owner and the Cloud Service Provider are main functional elements. 
In the following figure, the authentication protocol technique is based on the 
Public Key and Secret Key. In this authentication, a Service Provider or a Cloud 
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Service Provider authenticates a Data Owner. There are risks and drawbacks in the 
authentication protocol and technique, and these risks and drawbacks are later 
elaborated in this section. The authentication protocol in Fig. 3.7 applies one-way 
Public Key; applying one-way Public Key has a limitation that is also elaborated in 
the remainder of this section.  
Data Owner
(DO/d)
Service Provider/
Cloud Service Provider
(CSP/c)
E(Token)Kc+
a challenge R: a random number, R
f(Skdc, R): CSP authenticates Data Owner
E(Token)Kc+ is an encryption in Public Key or Asymmetric Cryptography where Kc+ Is a
Public Key; Kc+ is known to the Data Owner. The Service Provider or Cloud Service
Provider decrypts this E(Token)Kc+ by using its Private Key, Kc-. A challenge R is a
random number, and R is from the CSP; this challenge is used to be sure of the Data
owner. The Data Owner sends back the R in the form of f(Skdc, R) with the shared
Secret Key, Skdc. f(Skdc, R) is a function expressing either R is encrypted with Skdc,
i.e., E(R)Skdc or R is hashed with Skdc, i.e., hash(Skdc, R). The CSP, in the above
manner, authenticates the Data Owner Based on Skdc.
 
Figure 3.7.  CSP authenticates a Data Owner based on the outcome of the encryption. 
With regard to the risks of the authentication protocol technique in the above or 
prior figure, an adversary oversees the pair, i.e., R and f(Skdc, R) to derive the Skdc. 
Although there are risks, there will be unique challenges in the successive 
interactions between a Data Owner and a Service Provider or a Cloud Service 
Provider. Since there will be unique challenges in the successive interactions, an 
adversary overseeing the exchange of messages cannot impersonate the Data Owner 
or the Cloud Service Provider or the Service Provider.  In the following, Fig. 3.8, a 
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Data Owner encrypts a challenge, R with the shared Secret Key; in this   
authentication protocol technique, the CSP authenticates the Data Owner.  
Data Owner
(DO/d)
Service Provider/
Cloud Service Provider
(CSP/c)
E(Token)Kc+
E(R)SKdc: encrypt the challenge R
R: challenge R sent to CSP
Public Key of the CSP, Kc+, is known to the Data Owner. E(Token)Kc+ is an encryption in
Asymmetric Cryptography; E(Token)Kc+ is decrypted by the CSP using its Private Key,
Kc-. In E(R)SKdc, the challenge R is encrypted with the shared Secret Key, SKdc. Upon
decryption, the Data Owner sends the R to the CSP in support of the fact that the Data
Owner is a known entity to the CSP. The CSP, in the above manner, authenticates the Data
Owner based on Skdc.
 
Figure 3.8.  CSP authenticates a Data Owner based on SKdc. 
The authentication protocol in Fig. 3.8 also applies one-way Public Key; the 
limitation of applying one-way Public Key is elaborated in the remainder of this 
section. Instead of mutual authentication, the authentication protocol in Fig. 3.8 is 
only for the authentication of a Data Owner by a Service Provider or a Cloud Service 
Provider.   
In another authentication protocol technique as shown in Fig. 3.9, the CSP 
authenticates the Data Owner based on the shared Secret Key. The authentication 
protocol in Fig. 3.9 also applies one-way Public Key; applying one-way Public Key 
has a limitation that is also elaborated in the remainder of this section. The 
authentication protocol technique as shown in Fig. 3.9 is based on synchronised 
clock between the Data Owner and the CSP. However, in his protocol technique, 
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there is a risk of an adversarial attack; an adversary uses a Data Owner’s information 
to impersonate the Data Owner by skewing the synchronised clock between the Data 
Owner and the CSP.  
Data Owner
(DO/d)
Service Provider/
Cloud Service Provider
(CSP/c)
E(Token)Kc+
E(timestamp)SKdc: current time encrypted
The Data Owner sends E(Token)Kc+ to the CSP where Public Key of the CSP, Kc+ is
known to the Data Owner. E(Token)Kc+ is decrypted by the CSP using its Private Key,
Kc-. In E(timestamp)Skdc, the challenge R is timestamp, and the timestamp is
encrypted with the shared Secret Key Skdc. Here, handshakes are shortened. The CSP, in
the above manner, authenticates the Data Owner based on synchronized clock and
shared Secret Key, SKdc. This authentication protocol technique is now more efficient by
saving additional exchanges. However, an adversary can use the Data Owner’s 
information to impersonate the Data Owner within acceptable clock skew.
 
Figure 3.9. CSP authenticates a Data Owner based on timestam and SKdc. 
 
The authentication protocol technique as shown in Fig. 3.10 is different from 
the ones in Fig. 3.8 and Fig. 3.9 from the perspective of using keys. In the 
authentication protocol technique in Fig. 3.10, the CSP authenticates the Data Owner 
based on the Private Key, Kd-. There is no mutual authentication between the Data 
Owner and the CSP in the authentication protocol in Fig. 3.10. Instead of mutual 
authentication, the authentication protocol in Fig. 3.10 also concentrates only on the 
authentication of the Data Owner by the Service Provider or the Cloud Service 
Provider. One-way Public Key, as applied in the following authentication protocol 
technique, has a limitation; the limitation is also elaborated in the remainder of this 
section.  
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Data Owner
(DO/d)
Service Provider/
Cloud Service Provider
(CSP/c)
E(Token)Kc+
R: a random number R is a challenge
S(R)Kd- : R is signed and sent to the CSP
With the Public Key of the CSP, Kc+ known to the Data Owner, the Data Owner sends
E(Token)Kc+. The CSP decrypts E(Token)Kc+ by using its Private Key, Kc-. A random
number R is a challenge. In S(R)Kd-, R is signed by the Data Owner using the Data
Owner’s Private Key, Kd-. The CSP verifies the Data Owner’s signature S(R)Kd- using
the Kd+; the CSP compares the R in the S(R)Kd- with the one already held in the CSP.
The CSP, thereby, recognizes or authenticates the Data Owner.
 
Figure 3.10. CSP authenticates a Data Owner based on the Data Owner’s Public Key, Kd+. 
 
The authentication protocol technique as shown in Fig. 3.11 is a different form 
of the authentication protocol in Fig. 3.10. In the authentication protocol technique in 
Fig. 3.11, the CSP authenticates the Data Owner based on the Data Owner’s Public 
Key, Kd+. There is also no mutual authentication between the Data Owner and the 
CSP in the authentication protocol in Fig. 3.11. Instead of mutual authentication, the 
authentication protocol in Fig. 3.11 is only on the authentication of the Data Owner 
by the Service Provider or the Cloud Service Provider.  
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Data Owner
(DO/d)
Service Provider/
Cloud Service Provider
(CSP/c)
E(Token)Kc+
E(R)Kd+: challenge R is encrypted
R: Data Owner decrypts the encrypted R with Kd-
In E(Token)Kc+, Public Key of the CSP, Kc+ is known to the Data Owner. The CSP decrypts
this by using its Private Key, Kc-. A random number R is a challenge, and the CSP encrypts
the R with the Public Key of the Data Owner, Kd+. Upon decryption of the E(R)Kd+ by the
Data Owner, the Data Owner sends R to the CSP in support of the fact that the Data Owner
is a known entity to the CSP. In this way, the CSP authenticates the Data Owner.  
Figure 3.11. CSP authenticates a Data Owner with one-way Public Key. 
Authentication protocols in the above figures apply one-way Public Key; 
applying one-way Public Key causes a potential problem. In the potential problem, 
an adversary tricks the Data Owner into signing something; impersonating the CSP’s 
network address, the adversary waits for the Data Owner to login, and the adversary 
gives the Data Owner a quantity as a challenge. The Data Owner signs the challenge 
using the Private Key of the Data Owner.  
The authentication protocol techniques as shown in the above figures are not 
mutual. The Data Owner, in the above protocol techniques, is authenticated by the 
CSP; however, the Data Owner does not authenticate the CSP. This one-way 
authentication causes an adversary to plot attacks; the adversary receives packets 
transmitted to a CSP’s network address through address spoofing, and the adversary 
traps the Data Owner into assuming that the adversary is the CSP. In the spoofing 
attack, the adversary convinces the Data Owner that the adversary’s address is the 
CSP’s address. The adversary sends an old random number, R as a challenge to the 
Data Owner, and the adversary ignores the Data Owner’s response.    
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In Fig. 3.12 and Fig. 3.13, the mutual authentication protocol technique between 
the Data Owner and the Service Provider or the Cloud Service Provider is initialised 
with the Public Key of the Cloud Service Provider. The mutual authentication 
protocol technique in Fig. 3.13 is an optimisation of the mutual authentication 
protocol technique in Fig. 3.13. Both authentication protocol techniques are based on 
the shared Secret Key between the Data Owner and the Service Provider or the Cloud 
Service Provider.  
Data Owner
(DO/d)
Service Provider/
Cloud Service Provider
(CSP/c)
E(Token)Kc+
R1: a challenge R1 is a random number
f(Skdc, R1): CSP authenticates Data Owner
The Public Key of the CSP, Kc+ is known to the Data Owner. The CSP decrypts the
E(Token)Kc+ by using its Private Key, Kc-. Random numbers R1, R2 are challenges. For a
challenge R, f(Skdc, R) is a function in which either R is encrypted with the shared Secret
Key, SKdc, i.e., E(R)SKdc or R is hashed with SKdc, i.e., hash(SKdc, R). In this manner,
mutual authentication between the CSP and the Data Owner is based on SKdc.
R2: a random number R2 is a challenge
f((Skdc, R2): Data Owner authenticates CSP
 
Figure 3.12. Mutual authentication between a CSP and a Data Owner based on Secret Key, SKdc 
While the mutual authentication technique in Fig. 3.13 has an edge over the 
prior one-way authentication protocol techniques, there is a replay attack as shown in 
the Fig. 3.14. In this attack as shown in Fig. 3.14,   the adversary (ADV) sends the 
Data Owner’s identity along with a challenge R2. The Cloud Service Provider returns 
a challenge R1 and the response  f(Skdc, R2); Skdc is the shared Secret Key between 
the Data Owner and the Cloud Service Provider. The adversary does not have Skdc, 
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and it sets up a new channel to trap the CSP into encrypting the challenge R1 for it 
(ADV) with Skdc.  
 
Data Owner
(DO/d)
Service Provider/
Cloud Service Provider
(CSP/c)
E(Token)Kc+ , R2: Data Owner’s credentials and R2
R1, f(SKdc, R2)
f(SKdc, R1)
The Public Key of the CSP, Kc+ is known to the Data Owner. The Data Owner sends the
E(Token)Kc+ and a challenge R2 to the CSP; the CSP decrypts E(Token)Kc+ using
its Private Key, Kc-. A function f(SKdc, R) is for either R is encrypted with shared
Secret Key, SKdc, i.e., E(R)SKdc or R is hashed with SKdc, i.e., hash(SKdc, R).
Mutual authentication between the CSP and the INO is based on SKdc.  
Figure 3.13. Optimised mutual authentication between CSP and a Data Owner based on Secret 
Key, SKdc. 
 
 
Data Owner
(DO/d)
Service Provider/
Cloud Service Provider
(CSP/c)
E(Token)Kc+, R2: Data Owner’s credentials and R2
R1, f(SKdc, R2)
Data Owner sends E(Token)Kc+ where Kc+ Public Key of the CSP, and Kc+ is known to
the Data Owner. The CSP decrypts this E(Token)Kc+ by using its Private Key, Kc-.
Random numbers R1 and R2 are challenges. f(Skic, R) is a function representing the
fact that either R is encrypted with shared Secret Key, Skic, i.e., E(R)SKdc or R is
hashed with SKdc, i.e., hash(SKdc, R). The adversary replays E(Token)Kc+ in the 1st
message of the 2nd session, and the adversary responds to the 2nd message of the 1st
session in the last interaction as labelled with “Reply to 2nd message of 1st Session”.
Here, the CSP terminates further interaction as soon as it receives R1 that is devoid of
encryption in the 1st message of the 2nd session.
Adversary
(ADV)
 
1st Session
ADV cannot proceed further as it cannot encrypt R1.
However, ADV gets the CSP to encrypt R1 for it (ADV).
E(Token)Kc+, R1: Data Owner’s credentials and R1
R3, f(SKdc, R1)
 
f(SKdc, R1)
2nd Session
Reply to 2nd
message of 1st
Session
 
Figure 3.14. Reflection attacks on optimised mutual authentication between CSP and a Data Owner. 
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In the 1st message of the 2nd session, the adversary repeats sending the Data 
Owner’s identity along with a challenge R1 instead of R2. The CSP responds to the 
1st message of the 2nd session; the response of the includes a new challenge R3 and 
f(Skdc, R1) at the end of the 2nd session. The adversary receives f(Skdc, R1), and it 
finalises the 1st  session by sending the last message as shown in Fig. 3.14. The last 
message contains the response f(Skdc, R1). In response to the 2nd message of the 1st 
session, the Cloud Service Provider originally wanted the Data Owner to perform the 
f(Skdc, R1) with the shared Secret Key Skdc, and the Cloud Service Provider wanted 
the Data Owner to send  f(Skdc, R1) to the Cloud Service Provider ; however, the 
adversary captures and replays the Data Owner’s identity, and the adversary traps the 
Cloud Service Provider into performing the f(Skdc, R1) for the adversary. 
The above reflection or replay problem is resolved by employing different keys 
and challenges. Different keys for authentication mean if one key is used to 
authenticate a Data Owner, another key is used to authenticate a Cloud Service 
Provider. At the cost of additional configuration and storage, the three ways to derive 
different keys to authenticate a Cloud Service Provider and a Data Owner is to make 
numeric or binary calculation on the keys. For example, a Cloud Service Provider’s 
key is Skdc. A Data Owner’s key is Skdc+1 or Skdc [XORed] with 
F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F016.  Different challenges mean if the challenge with a long odd 
number is initiated by a Data Owner, the challenge responded by a responder Cloud 
Service Provider is long even number. On receiving a long even number, if an 
adversary responds with the even one, then responder Cloud Service Provider 
recognises that there exists something malicious.  
In the following Fig. 3.15 and Fig. 3.16, there are two forms of optimised 
mutual authentication protocol technique. In the first optimised mutual authentication 
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protocol technique in Fig. 3.15, the mutual authentication between the Data Owner 
and the Cloud Service Provider is based on each other’s Public Key.  
Data Owner
(DO/d)
Service Provider/
Cloud Service Provider
(CSP/c)
E(Token)Kc+, E(R2)Kc+
R2, E(R1)Kd+
R1
The CSP decrypts this E(Token)Kc+ by using its Kc-, and Public Key, Kc+ is known to the
Data Owner. A random number R2 is a challenge and encrypted with Kc+. The CSP decrypt
E(R2 )Kc+ using its Private Key, Kc-. The CSP encrypts R1 with the Data Owner’s Public Key,
Kd+, i.e., E(R1)Kd+. Mutual authentication between the CSP and the Data Owner is based on
each other’s Public Key.
 
Figure 3.15.  Optimised mutual authentication between a Data Owner and a CSP based on each 
other’s Public Keys. 
 
In the second optimised mutual authentication protocol technique Fig. 3.16, the 
mutual authentication between the Data Owner and the Cloud Service Provider is 
based on each other’s Public Key; the Session Key between the Data Owner and the 
Cloud Service Provider also supports each other’s Public Key in the optimised 
mutual authentication in Fig. 3.16 to avoid pitfalls found and presented in prior one-
way and mutual authentication protocol techniques. 
The authentication protocol techniques in the above figures have huge keys to 
be managed with. However, there is no visible mechanism in above authentication 
protocol techniques to handle huge keys. In the following figure, Fig. 3.17, the 
mediated authentication provides a visible mechanism to handle huge keys in a 
centralized approach by means of a Key Distribution Centre (KDC).  
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E(Tokend, Rd)Kc+
E( Rd, Rc, Kdc)Kd+ Kdc is session key
E(Rc)Kdc
The Session Key, Kdc supports mutual authentication between the CSP and the Data
Owner, the mutual authnectication is based on each other’s Public Key. CSP’s Public Key 
is Kc+. The Data Owner having Public Key, Kd+ decrypts E(Rd, Rc, Kdc)Kd+ using the
Data Owner’s Private Key, Kd-. The Data Owner encrypts the CSP’s challenge using the 
Session Key, Kdc, i.e., E(Rc)Kdc. This response is in support of the Data Owner’s secure
channel with the CSP.
Data Owner
(DO/d)
Service Provider/
Cloud Service Provider
(CSP/c)
 
Figure 3.16.  Optimised mutual authentication between a Data Owner and a CSP based on each 
other’s Public Keys supported by the Session Key. 
 
      
Data Owner
(DO/d)
Service Provider/
Cloud Service Provider
(CSP/c)
The Data Owner wishing to communicate with the CSP approaches the KDC with [d,c].
This authentication protocol has a drawback. This drawback becomes evident when the
Data Owner’s sending a message to the CSP precedes the CSP’s receiving the key
(Kdc) from the KDC. Session Key between the CSP and the KDC is Kc,kdc; Session Key
between the Data Owner and the KDC is Kd,kdc.
Key Distribution Centre
(KDC) generates
Session Keys:
Kdc; Kc,kdc; and Kd,kdc
[d, c]
E(Kdc)Kd,kdc E(Kdc)Kc,kdc
 
Figure 3.17.  Authentication between a Data Owner and a CSP based on the operation of the Key 
Distribution Centre.  
For dealing with huge keys, a centralized approach by means of a Key 
Distribution Centre manages n keys instead of n(n-1)/2 [110]. As shown in Fig. 3.17, 
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a Data Owner registered with the Key Distribution Centre maintains a secure channel 
with the Key Distribution Centre [110, 111]. 
This above protocol has a drawback. This drawback becomes evident when a 
Data Owner, immediately after receiving the Shared Key (Kdc), sends a message to 
the CSP based on the Kdc.  This drawback becomes evident because the Data Owner 
sends the message before the Cloud Service Provider receives the Kdc from the Key 
Distribution Centre. This problem puts the Key Distribution Centre into immediately 
initiating a connection with the Cloud Service Provider. This drawback is 
circumvented with a message, E(Kdc)Kc,kdc from the Key Distribution Centre to the 
Data Owner, as shown in Fig. 3.18.  
Ticket
Data Owner
(DO/d)
Service Provider/
Cloud Service Provider
(CSP/c)
The authentication problem, with regard to sharing Session Key, is resolved with the Key
Distribution Centre (KDC) passing the E(Kdc)Kc,kdc back to the Data Owner. Session Key
between the CSP and the KDC is Kc,kdc; Session Key the Data Owner and the KDC is
Kd,kdc. The E(Kdc)Kc,kdc to the Data Owner is called Ticket. The Ticket is the
information that will allow the Data Owner to access the CSP. The Data Owner sends this
Ticket to the CSP while communicating with the CSP.
Key Distribution Centre
(KDC) generates
Session Keys:
Kdc; Kc,kdc; and Kd,kdc
[d, c]: d approaching KDC for c
E(Kdc)Kc,kdc
E(Token)Kc+ E(Kdc)Kc,kdc
 
 
E(Kdc)Kd,kdc E(Kdc)Kc,kdc
 
Figure 3.18.  KDC operation using Ticket, and allowing the Data Owner to setup a connection with 
the CSP. 
This message containing the E(Kdc)Kc,kdc  to the Data Owner is called Ticket. 
The Ticket is information that allows a Data Owner to access the Service Provider or 
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the Cloud Service Provider.  The Data Owner passes this Ticket, E(Kdc)Kc,kdc  to the 
Cloud Service Provider while communicating with the Cloud Service Provider as 
shown in Fig. 3.18.   
In the following section, we provide the secure channel between a Data Owner 
and a Service Provider. This secure channel is also an end-to-end trusted path 
between a Data Owner and a Service Provider   
3.6 Secure Connection between a Data Owner and a CSP 
In this section, we present our proposed end-to-end trusted path protocol. We 
derive the protocol by  
x Extracting the features of one-way authentication protocol techniques. 
x Analysing the drawbacks of one-way authentication protocol techniques. 
x Extracting the features of mutual authentication protocol techniques. 
x  Extracting the features of optimised mutual authentication techniques. 
x Extracting the features of mediated mutual authentication techniques. 
x Applying the extracted features in establishing an end-to-end trusted 
path between a Data Owner and a Service Provider or a Cloud Service 
Provider.    
We provide our proposed mechanism as shown next in Fig. 3.19. 
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Data Owner
(DO/d)
Browser
Application Server
(AS)
Ticket Granting Server
(TGS)
SaaS Transmission Server
(STS)
Elastic Load Balancing and Auto Scaling Group
(ELB-ASG)
Servicer Provider/Cloud Service Provider
(CSP/c)
1. Data Owner ID (DOid)
and Password (Pass)
2. E( Kd, TGS
E( DOid , Kd,TGS
) KAS, TGS
)Kd, AS
2i. Same as the 2 above.
2j. E( DOid , Kd,TGS
) KAS, TGS
3. E( DOid , Kd. TGS
) KAS, TGS, E (t)Kd, TGS
4. E( DOid , Kd, c
) Kc, TGS
5. E( c, Kd, c
) Kd, TGS, E( DOid , Kd, c
) Kc, TGS
6. E( DOid , Kd, c
) Kc, TGS, E (t)Kd, c
7. E( c, Kd, c
) Kd, TGS, E (t+1)Kd, c,
E(tagtime_limited )Kd, c
8. E(DOid , tagtime_limited)Kc-
9. DOid , tagtime_limited
10. ELB-ASG creates
A1. Virtual Machine (VMz) on c,
A2.  Web Server (WSz) on VMz  on   
              successful   verification of 
                                 (i) DOid   and 
                                 (ii) tagtime_limited. 
11. EBS transfers application source
to WSz.
12. Application running on the WSz
becomes available to the Data
Owner.
Elastic Block Store
(EBS)
11
12
2i 2j
10
2
5 5
66 6
77 7
8
99
12
11
3 3 4 4
10
Notation for E(x)Kw, z : x is encrypted with Kw, z; Kw, z is a Session Key or Secret Key between the entities W/w and Z/z.
i. Secret Key between the Data Owner (DO/d) and the Ticket Granting Server (TGS) is : Kd, TGS.
ii. Secret Key between the Application Server (AS) and the TGS is : KAS, TGS.
iii. Secret Key between the Data owner and the AS is : Kd, AS.
iv. Session Key between the Data Owner and the Service Provider/Cloud Service Provider (CSP/c) is : Kd, c.
v. Secret Key between the CSP and the TGS is : Kc, TGS.
For links between
i. the Data Owner and the TGS, a Ticket prepared by the AS is : E( DOid , Kd,TGS ) KAS, TGS.
ii. the Data Owner and the CSP, a Ticket prepared by the TGS is : E( DOid , Kd, c ) Kc, TGS.
For authentication, current timestamp, t is encrypted with is : Kd, c or Kd, TGS.
For confidentiality, encryption is with : Kd, AS.
Public and Private Keys of the CSP are : Kc+ and Kc-.  
Figure 3.19. An End-to-End Trusted Path. 
Our proposed mechanism delegates the authentication of a Data Owner or a user 
to the Application Server (AS) and the Ticket Granting Server (TGS). The 
Application Server is designated for handling a login request from a Data Owner or a 
Chapter 3 An End-to-End Trusted Path between a Data Owner and a CSP 
98 
 
user. It authenticates a Data Owner or a user, and it provides the Data Owner or the 
user with a Session Key and a link or Ticket; the link or Ticket is used to set up a 
secure channel in association with the Ticket Granting Server. The Ticket Granting 
Server is a Key Distribution Centre (KDC). The Ticket Granting Server is designated 
for setting a secure channel. In the following figure, we present the components, 
structures, and interactions among the components of our proposed protocol. 
The Application Server accepts request from a registered client. A registered 
client is a Data Owner or a user with ID and password.  A Data Owner (DO) with the 
ID being the DOid and Password being the Pass approaches the Application Server. 
The Application Server authenticates the Data Owner, and it provides the Data 
Owner with the Key, Kd, TGS and  the link or the Ticket  E(DOid, Kd,TGS)KAS, TGS as 
shown in the steps 2 and 2i of Fig. 3.19. The Application Server maintains 
confidentiality by encrypting the Key and the link with the key Kd, AS. In the 
encryption, the Kd, AS is a Session Key between the Data Owner and the Application 
Server. The Application Server links the Data Owner with the Ticket Granting Server 
by replicating and sending the Ticket, E(DOid, Kd,TGS)KAS, TGS to the Ticket Granting 
Server as shown in the step 2j of Fig. 3.19. The mediated mutual authentication 
becomes evident with the Data Owner sending the Ticket to the Ticket Granting 
Server, as seen in the step 3 of Fig. 3.19. The step 3 is the continuity of the steps 2, 
2i, and 2j of Fig. 3.19. With the steps 2, 2i, and 2j from the Application Server and 
the step 3 from the Data Owner, the Application Server performs the mediated 
mutual authentication between the Data Owner and the Ticket Granting Server.  
The Ticket Granting Server also performs mediated authentication between the 
Data Owner and the Service Provider or the Cloud Service Provider. The mediated 
authentication starts with the step 4 in Fig. 3.19. In the step 4, the Ticket Granting 
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Server sends the Ticket, E( DOid , Kd, c ) Kc, TGS to the Service Provider or the Cloud 
Service Provider through the  Software as a Service Transmission Server (STS). In 
the step 5, the Ticket Granting Server sends the Tickets to the Data Owner. These 
Tickets include  E( c , Kd, c ) Kd, TGS and E( DOid , Kd, c ) Kc, TGS. In all the Tickets, 
DOid and c respectively stand for the Data Owner and the Service Provider or the 
Cloud Service Provider. The key Kd, TGS is the Secret Key between the Data Owner 
and the Ticket Granting Server. The Key Kc, TGS is the Secret Key between the 
Service Provider or the Cloud Service Provider and the Ticket Granting Server. In 
the continuation of the mediated authentication by the Ticket Granting Server, the 
Data Owner uses the Ticket E( DOid , Kd, c ) Kc, TGS, and the Data Owner approaches 
the Service Provider or the Cloud Service Provider. In support of further 
authentication, the Data Owner also encrypts the current timestamp on top of sending 
the foregoing Ticket to the Service Provider or the Cloud Service Provider. With the 
steps 7 and 8 of the proposed mechanism in Fig. 3.19, the Service Provider or the 
Cloud Service Provider authenticates the Data Owner, and the outcome of the 
authentication becomes available to the Data Owner and the Elastic Load Balancing 
and Auto Scaling Group. In the step 7, the mutual authentication between the Data 
Owner and Service Provider or the Cloud Service Provider takes place through the 
Session Key, Kd, c. The mutual authentication is the mediated mutual authentication 
under the support of the Ticket Granting Server. The Data Owner uses the Kd, c  to 
decrypt the time limited tag, tagtime_limited.  Using the tagtime_limited, the Data Owner 
approaches the Service Provider or the Cloud Service Provider through the Software 
as a Service Transmission Server and the Elastic Load Balancing and Auto Scaling 
Group, as seen in the steps 9 and the 10 of Fig. 3.19. The Elastic Load Balancing and 
Auto Scaling Group of the Service Provider or the Cloud Service Provider verifies 
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the Data Owner’s ID and the tagtime_limited to create a virtual machine on one of the 
physical machines on the Service Provider or the Cloud Service Provider. The 
Elastic Block Storage transfers the application source code to a web server created on 
the virtual machine, as seen in the step 11. The application becomes available to the 
Data Owner, as shown in the step 12 of Fig. 3.19. 
3.7 Experiment 
In this section, we present the experimental setup, criteria, and outcome of the 
proposed end-to-end trusted path protocol. In the experimental setup section, we 
provide the procedure that we will follow to complete the experiment. In the section 
detailing experimental criteria and parameters, we provide the conditions and 
variables that we will associate with the experiment.  
3.7.1 Experimental Setup 
In this section, we provide the details of our experimental setup. We have 
compared our work with the SSL/TLS. We have compared the features of our work 
with those of the SSL/TLS.  The SSL/TLS are illustrated in [112, 113] with the 
features and limitations. I. Dacosta, et al. in [112] have more specifically illustrated 
the twelve interactions in Fig.1 at page 202 of  [112]. Each feature is associated with 
each interaction. We have used Java Programming Language to compare the features 
of our work with that of the SSL/TLS, and we provide a Protection Level at each 
interaction; a Protection Level is a metric showing the strength of a protocol 
contributed through features. We will provide the experimental criteria and 
parameters in the next section. 
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3.7.2 Experimental Criteria and Parameters 
In this section, we provide the details of our experimental criteria and 
parameters. We have already mentioned that we have compared our work with the 
SSL/TLS; the features and limitations are illustrated more specifically in [112]. In 
our proposed protocol, there are twelve interactions. We have taken into account the 
first, second, and seventh interactions of the SSL/TLS. These three interactions of the 
SSL/TLS are vulnerable to attacks compared to those of ours because the nature of 
these interactions is more exposed than that of the interactions in ours. In these three 
interactions of the SSL/TLS, we are uncertain about the Protection Level that is 
defined as the strength of a protocol to resist an attack. Protection Level of each 
interaction is one of our criteria. We set the Protection Level ranging from 150 to 
120. The maximum or high value of Protection Level is 150 as opposed to the 
minimum or low value that is 120. The average or mid Protection Level is 135. The 
setting of high, mid, and low Protection Levels is based on the investigative insight 
into the features of each interaction of our protocol and the SSL to be experimented 
and analysed.   In order to offset the uncertainty in Protection Level, we generate a 
random value ranging from 0 to 9 to be applied to the Protection Level of these three 
interactions.  
We ran the experiment in two stages. In first stage, the experiment has 
completed 2000 iterations, and the experiment has completed 20000 iterations in the 
second stage. In the both stages, we have set the offset value that ranges from 0 to 9 
as a one of the parameters. In both stages, we have made the parameter fixed and 
variable. We present the details of the experiment in the following Table 3.1.  
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In the situation of the first stage in which the experiment has run 2000 times and 
the parameter, i.e., the offset value is fixed, we have found that 9 full iterations with 
complete 12 interactions have appeared in the output file; the 10th iteration is 
incomplete, and the 10th iteration has only 3 interactions out of the 12 interactions 
that have appeared in the output file.   However, in the case of variable offset value, 
we find that the number of complete iterations with full 12 interactions is 10 which is 
more than the case of fixed offset value. With the same experiment run in broader 
scale for 20000 times, we find that the case of fixed offset value is less than that of 
variable offset value, as shown in the Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1. Experimental Details. 
Total 
iterations 
by the 
Experiment 
Offset 
value 
(Fixed/ 
Variable) 
Number of 
complete 
iterations  
associated with  
full 
interactions 
(A) 
Number of full 
interactions 
associated 
with each  
complete 
iteration. 
(B) 
The last 
incomplete 
iteration. 
(C ) 
Associated 
interactions 
with the last 
incomplete 
iteration. 
( D) 
A and B are related C and D are related 
2000 Fixed 9 12 10th First 3 out of 12. 
2000 variable 10 12 11th First 9 out of 12. 
20000 Fixed 99 12 100th  First 7 out of 12. 
20000 variable 103 12 104th  First 10 out of 12. 
 
In the following section, we provide the graphical representation of our 
experimental outcome. 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 An End-to-End Trusted Path between a Data Owner and a CSP 
103 
 
3.7.3 Experimental Outcome 
In this section, we provide the experimental outcome. We provide the outcome 
of the experiment run for 2000 times and 20000 times. During each iteration of the 
experiment, we take into account the cases of each fixed offset value and variable 
offset value that we have already outlined in the prior section.  
During the experiment run for 2000 times, the experimental outcome for fixed 
offset value generates data for 10 graphs.  Upon running the experiment for 2000 
times with variable offset value, we obtained data for 11 graphs.   
In the case of the experiment run for 20000 times with fixed offset value and 
variable offset value, the experimental outcome generated data respectively for 100 
and 104 graphs. In the next section, we discuss some of the representative graphs 
from each experimental outcome.  
3.8 Discussion on Experimental Outcome 
In this section, we discuss the experimental outcome with reference to the 
figures presented below. We provide the outcome of the experiment run for 2000 
times and 20000 times with fixed and variable offset values to adjust the uncertainty 
in interactions. 
Experiment run for 2000 times with fixed offset value provides the following 
representative graphs taken out of the 10 graphs:  
In the following figures, we provide the outcome of the experiment run for 2000 
times with fixed offset value. The fixed offset value randomly generated is 5 in the 
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following figures, and this offset value adjusts the uncertainty, as already elaborated 
in the prior section. 
  
 
Figure 3.20. Experiment run with fixed 
offset value generates Protection Level 
during iteration 1 out of 10. 
 
 
Figure 3.21. Experiment run with fixed offset value 
generates Protection Level during iteration 2 out of 
10. 
  
 
 
Figure 3.22. Experiment run with fixed 
offset value generates Protection Level 
during iteration 3 out of 10. 
 
Figure 3.23. Experiment run with fixed offset value 
generates Protection Level during iteration 5 out of 
10. 
 
With the experimental outcome, we observe that the Protection Level in each 
interaction in our protocol is almost more than the average Protection Level 135; in 
some situations, the Protection Level is almost close to the maximum, as evident in 
Fig. 3.22, Fig. 3.23, and Fig. 3.24. The Protection Level in the protocols differs from 
one figure to another figure; this variation is due to the changing nature of the 
computing environment in which the protocols operate.   
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Figure 3.24. Experiment run with fixed 
offset value generates Protection Level 
during iteration 7 out of 10. 
 
Figure 3.25. Experiment run with fixed offset 
value generates Protection Level during iteration 
8 out of 10. 
  
 
 
Figure 3.26. Experiment run with fixed 
offset value generates Protection Level 
during iteration 9 out of 10. 
 
Figure 3.27. Experiment run with fixed offset 
value generates Protection Level during iteration 
10 out of 10. 
 
As pointed out in the Table 3.1, the 10th iteration in Fig. 3.27 has 3 interactions 
as opposed to 7 interactions in Fig. 3.41. Both figures are the representation of the 
experiment run with a fixed offset value for 2000 and 20000 times.  3 interactions in 
Fig. 3.27 and 7 interactions in Fig. 3.41 are caused by the exhausted ending iteration 
series. However, with variable offset values, we observe that the Protection Level of 
each interaction is beyond the average value of Protection Level, and the average 
value is 135, as shown in the following figures, Fig. 3.28 through Fig. 3.35.    
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Experiment run for 2000 times with variable offset value represents the  
following graphs that are taken out of the 11 graphs:  
In the following figures, we provide the outcome of the experiment run for 2000 
times with variable offset value, and a variable offset value copes with a changing 
situation. 
  
Figure 3.28. Experiment run with variable 
offset value generates Protection Level 
during iteration 1 out of 11. 
 
Figure 3.29. Experiment run with variable offset 
value generates Protection Level during iteration 
2 out of 11. 
  
 
 
Figure 3.30. Experiment run with variable 
offset value generates Protection Level 
during iteration 3 out of 11. 
 
Figure 3.31. Experiment run with variable offset 
value generates Protection Level during iteration 
5 out of 11. 
 
For the experiment run for 2000 times with variable offset value, the Protection 
Level is more than the experiment run with the fixed offset value, as shown in the 
above and following figures. In the case of variable offset value, the factor that 
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increases the Protection Level is the adjustment of changing circumstances addressed 
by the variable offset values.      
  
Figure 3.32. Experiment run with variable 
offset value generates Protection Level 
during iteration 7 out of 11. 
 
Figure 3.33. Experiment run with variable offset 
value generates Protection Level during iteration 
8 out of 11. 
  
  
Figure 3.34. Experiment run with variable 
offset value generates Protection Level 
during iteration 9 out of 11. 
 
Figure 3.35. Experiment run with variable offset 
value generates Protection Level during iteration 
11 out of 11. 
In the following figures, we provide the experimental outcome found by 
running the experiment for 20000 times with fixed offset value. We found 100 
graphs, and we provide 6 graphs that represent the nature of our proposed protocol. 
 
Experiment run for 20000 times with fixed offset value provides the following  
Representative graphs that are taken out of the 100 graphs:  
In the following figures, we present 6 graphs that show the functionality of our   
Proposed mechanism in larger number of iterations. 
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Figure 3.36. Experiment run with fixed offset 
value generates Protection Level during 
iteration 1 out of 100. 
 
Figure 3.37. Experiment run with fixed offset value 
generates Protection Level during iteration 20 out of 
100. 
  
  
Figure 3.38. Experiment run with fixed offset 
value generates Protection Level during 
iteration 40 out of 100. 
Figure 3.39. Experiment run with fixed offset value 
generates Protection Level during iteration 60 out of 
100. 
  
Figure 3.40. Experiment run with fixed offset 
value generates Protection Level during 
iteration 80 out of 100. 
Figure 3.41. Experiment run with fixed offset value 
generates Protection Level during iteration 100 out 
of 100. 
The above experimental outcome in Fig. 3.36 through Fig 3.41, with 20000 
iterations, provides more insight into our proposed protocol in Fig 3.19, and this 
more insight supports the outcome achieved through 2000 iterations in Fig. 3.20 
through Fig. 3.27.   
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Experiment run for 20000 times with variable offset value has the following  
representative graphs that are taken out of the 104 graphs:  
We find that Protection Level increases with the variable offset values for 
adjusting the changing circumstances addressed by our mechanism in Fig 3.19.      
 
 
Figure 3.42. Experiment run with variable 
offset value generates Protection Level 
during iteration 1 out of 104. 
Figure 3.43. Experiment run with variable offset 
value generates Protection Level during iteration 
20 out of 104. 
 
 
  
Figure 3.44. Experiment run with variable 
offset value generates Protection Level 
during iteration 40 out of 104. 
Figure 3.45. Experiment run with variable offset 
value generates Protection Level during iteration 
60 out of 104. 
 
 
   
Figure 3.46. Experiment run with variable 
offset value generates Protection Level 
during iteration 80 out of 104. 
 
Figure 3.47. Experiment run with variable offset 
value generates Protection Level during iteration 
104 out of 104. 
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3.9 Security Analysis for the Claims Countering the Attacks 
In this section, we provide the security analysis in support of realizing the 
Claims and overcoming the attacks.  
We compare our work with SSL. SSL provides communication on top of 
transport layer [9-10]. A Data Owner requests for a secure session using HTTPS of 
application layer in SSL. SSL, if employed in the Cloud Computing Environment, 
makes the Service Provider or the Cloud Service Provider issue x.509 certificates 
(from trusted third party certificates authorities (CAs)). The response of the Service 
Provider or the Cloud Service Provider contains the Public Key of the Service 
Provider’s server. The Data Owner accepts or rejects the response by comparing the 
response with the list of trusted certificates stored in the repository of the Data 
Owner.  Upon successful matching, the Data Owner accepts the Public Key of the 
Service Provider. The Data Owner generates a random Symmetric Key that is sent to 
the Service Provider by encrypting it with the Public Key of the Service Provider. 
Both the Data Owner and the Service Provider know the Symmetric Key at the end 
of the generation and the sharing of the Symmetric Key. The Data Owner encrypts 
data using Symmetric Key, and the Data Owner sends the encrypted data to the 
Service Provider so long as the session exists. Man-in-the-middle attacks, session 
hijacking [32-34] are the pitfalls in SSL or TLS. An adversary, in our proposed 
protocol scheme, needs to receive the Session Key and the Ticket by overcoming 
cryptographic protections; however, if the Symmetric Key is detected in SSL by an 
adversary, the adversary causes replay attacks in the form of man-in-the-middle 
attacks. However, our protocol scheme, as shown in Fig. 3.19 provides the handling 
the Session Key, the other Keys, and the Tickets through cryptographic manoeuvres. 
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The handling of the Session Key, the other Keys, and the Tickets through 
cryptographic manoeuvres paves the way for a secure channel in the interaction 
among entities.   
Our protocol scheme regarding a secure channel proposes a trusted path 
between a Data Owner and a Service Provider. For our protocol scheme to ensure a 
trusted path, an adversary must not receive the other Keys to decrypt and access the 
Tickets, as seen in Fig. 3.19.  In order to receive the other Keys, the adversary needs 
to observe and dissolve handshaking features among the entities, such as the Data 
Owner, the Service Provider, the Application Server, and Ticket Granting Server. 
After observing and dissolving the handshaking features, the adversary needs to 
participate in the interactions among the foregoing entities. We claim that the 
adversary cannot dissolve the handshaking features, the adversary cannot receive 
keys by interacting with the foregoing entities, and the adversary cannot break the 
secure channel to hamper the trusted path. In support of the trusted path, we claim 
that our protocol scheme provides the secure handling of the Session Key, the 
Tickets, and the other Keys to prevent an adversary from (a) interfering with 
legitimate interactions among entities during an ongoing session and (b) causing 
man-in-the-attacks; we regard the claim as the Claim 1. We substantiate the Claim 1 
in the following deliberation.  
Claim 1: The secure handling of the Session Key, the Tickets, and the other keys 
prevent an adversary from interfering interactions among entities for man-in-the-
middle attacks. 
Proof: We prove the validity of the Claim 1 by concentrating on the following game 
or attack.    
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Game 1: An adversary interferes with the interactions by taking an advantage of the 
mishandling of the Session Key.    
Game 2: An adversary interferes with the interactions by taking an advantage of the 
mishandling of the other Keys. 
Game 3: An adversary interferes with the interactions by taking an advantage of the 
mishandling of the Tickets.    
In connection with the Game 1 of the Claim 1, the Session Key, Kd, c exists 
between the entities, such as the Data Owner, the Service Provider or the Cloud 
Service Provider. The Session Key, Kd, c becomes available in the interactions 
through the Ticket Granting Server, as seen in the steps 4 of Fig. 3.19. The Data 
Owner and the Service Provider or the Cloud Service Provider perform 
authentication based on timestamps, as seen in the steps 6 and 7 of Fig. 3.19; in the 
timestamp based authentication, the Session Key, Kd, c plays a role in the authenticity 
of the interactions; in these two interactions, the Data Owner and the Service 
Provider or Cloud Service Provider become further mutually authenticated on the 
basis of the Tickets. The first Ticket that is seen in the step 6 of Fig. 3.19 is informed 
to the Service Provider and the Data Owner respectively in the steps 4 and 5 of Fig. 
3.19 by the Ticket Granting Server. The second Ticket that is seen in the step 7 of 
Fig. 3.19 is informed to the Data Owner in the step 5 of Fig. 3.19 by the Ticket 
Granting Server. In all of the above interactions, the Session Key remains encrypted 
within the Tickets in the steps 4, 5, 6, and 7 of Fig. 3.19. An adversary observes the 
encrypted contents during the interactions in the steps 4, 5, 6, and 7 of Fig 3.19; for 
the completion of the attacks, the adversary needs to obtain the Secret Keys, such as  
Kc, TGS and Kd, TGS.  Kc, TGS is the Secret Key between the Service Provider and the 
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Ticket Granting Server. Kd, TGS is the Secret Key between the Data Owner and the 
Ticket Granting Server. However, the foregoing keys are created and shared among 
the entities in closed box environment beyond the vicinity of an adversary. By closed 
box environment, we refer to the environment in which the legitimate entities, such 
as the Data Owner, Application Server, and the Ticket Granting Server participate in 
the challenge response protocols for the Secret Keys. Since the adversary is oblivious 
of the creation and share of the Secret Keys, the adversary has the opportunity to 
make the least interference in the interactions for obtaining the Session Key, Kd, c.  
In connection with the Game 2 of the Claim 1, the other Keys include the Secret 
Keys among entities, such as the Data Owner, the Service Provider, the Application 
Server, and Ticket Granting Server. The Secret Key, KAS, TGS is between the 
Application Server and Ticket Granting Server. The Secret Key,  KAS, TGS hiding 
another Secret Key,  Kd, TGS as seen in  the step 2 of Fig. 3.19 is shared in closed box 
environment beyond the vicinity of an adversary. The Secret Key, Kd, TGS is used to 
encrypt the current timestamp from the perspective of authentication; this Secret Key, 
Kd, TGS follows the same closed box process as the prior Secret Key, KAS, TGS. An 
adversary attempts to access the contents encrypted with the foregoing Secret Keys; 
since the adversary remains unaware of the foregoing Secret Keys, the adversary 
remains unsuccessful in plotting and executing the man-in-the-middle attack. 
Possible options for the adversary to initiate the man-in-the-middle-attack are to 
obtain the Ticket, E(DOid, Kd,TGS)KAS, TGS as in the step 2 of Fig. 3.19, obtain the 
Secret Key, KAS, TGS, break the Ticket with the Secret Key, KAS, TGS, obtain the Secret 
Key, Kd, TGS, and manipulate the Ticket and the Secret Key, Kd, TGS. However, the 
adversary remains unaware of the content of the Ticket because the adversary has no 
access to the Secret Key, KAS, TGS. Since the adversary has no access to the Secret 
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Key, KAS, TGS, there is no possibility for the adversary to break the Ticket and obtain 
the Secret Key, Kd, TGS. Since the adversary remains unaware of the content of Ticket 
and the Secret Key, Kd, TGS, there is no possibility for the adversary to manipulate the 
Ticket and use the Secret Key, Kd, TGS to encrypt the timestamp for justifying the 
authentication of the adversary. Since the adversary cannot encrypt the timestamp 
with the Secret Key, Kd, TGS, and the adversary cannot justify the authentication, the 
adversary cannot initiate the man-in-the-middle attacks.       
With regard to the Game 3 of the Claim 1, the Tickets become components in 
linking one entity with the other. We find the first Ticket in step 2 of Fig. 3.19 in 
which the Application Server links the Data Owner with the Ticket Granting Server. 
We further observe that the Ticket Granting Server, in the step 4, links the Data 
Owner with the Service Provider in response to the Data Owner’s Ticket in the step 
3, and the Ticket that the Data Owner responds in the step 3 was received in the Step 
2i. The process of linking entities with Tickets proceeds until the Elastic Load 
Balancing and Auto Scaling Group receives the instruction of the Service Provider 
about the Data Owner. The instruction includes the time limited information about 
the Data Owner for creating a virtual machine. Since the flow of the Tickets proceeds 
in the controlled collaborative interactions between the participating entities, the 
adversary finds no means to interfere with the interactions to perpetrate the man-in-
the-middle attacks. 
The secure channel in the foregoing deliberation is for the Data Owner to retain 
the control over data and maintain the confidentiality of the data; the Data Owner’s 
control over data with the confidentiality of the data ensures the Data Owner’s trust.  
The protocol scheme as depicted in Fig. 3.19 is an insight into a looking ahead 
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approach to intelligent innovation in instantaneous security in the Cloud Computing 
Environment. 
3.10 Chapter Summary 
We have put the secure channel or the trusted path into the focus of minute 
exploration in this chapter. The secure channel or trusted path is between a Data 
Owner and a Service Provider in a Cloud Computing Environment. As a derivative 
of the explorative thought, we have taken the cryptographic authentication into 
consideration based on the literature and texts surveyed. With the deep focus on the 
literature review of the underlying architectural and operational mechanism of the 
Cloud Computing, we, to the best of our knowledge, are the first to propose the 
protocol for the secure trusted path that befits the Cloud Computing Environment. In 
proposing the protocol, we have successively explored and refined the cryptographic 
manoeuvres towards finding a suitable protocol for the underlying mechanism of the 
Cloud Computing. While refining the manoeuvres, we have kept the dynamic nature 
of the Cloud Computing or Cloud Computing Environment in perspective. We have 
provided the experimental evaluation in support of the robustness of our protocol 
over the SSL or TLS. Furthermore, we have provided a thorough security analysis of 
our claim in articulation with the relevant games or attacks.  
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Chapter 4 
A Data Owner-Controlled Users’ Access to 
Data 
In this chapter, we introduce a new mechanism of ensuring trust and security in 
Software as a Service (SaaS) Cloud Computing. Trust Ticket, with the supporting 
protocols, is our mechanism, and the new mechanism helps a Data Owner in 
establishing a link between a Service Provider or a Cloud Service Provider and a 
registered user. There is a difference between a time limited tag, tagtime_limited in the 
prior chapter and a Trust Ticket in the chapter. A time limited tag, tagtime_limited  is 
created by a Service Provider or Cloud Service Provider and used by a Data Owner 
or a user; a tagtime_limited  is used by a Data Owner or a user for an Elastic Load 
Balancing and Auto Scaling Group to create a virtual machine on one of the physical 
machines in the Service Provider or the Cloud Service Provider. However, Trust 
Ticket is created by a Data Owner for a user of the Data Owner; the user of the Data 
Owner uses the Trust Ticket to become authenticated in the Service Provider for 
accessing the data and the service designated for the user of the Data Owner. 
In our mechanism in the chapter, a user first becomes registered with a Data 
Owner before receiving a Trust Ticket and a Secret Key from the Data Owner. Each 
Trust Ticket is unique, encrypted, and specific to a user. On completing the 
registration of each user, the Service Provider or the Cloud Service Provider is 
apprised of the Trust Ticket by the Data Owner. The registered user becomes 
accepted to the Service Provider or the Cloud Service Provider for the Data Owner’s 
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data through the authentication based on the Trust Ticket. The registered user 
accesses the Data Owner’s data through the Secret Key. We have done our 
experiment in Java network programming by creating a framework in an emulated 
Cloud Computing environment, and this environment is under the VMware ESXi 4.1 
hypervisor based platform. Using the framework, we have evaluated our algorithmic 
protocol for Trust Ticket. We have also compared our work with prior work, and we 
have provided experimental evaluation. The overall performance of our work is 
better. We argue that our proposed algorithmic protocol for Trust Ticket deployment 
establishes a Data Owner’s trust. This trust is established through a Data Owner’s 
control over data and a registered user because the registered user is linked with a 
Service Provider or a Cloud Service Provider by the Data Owner through Trust 
Ticket.   
In the following sections, we provide the relevant aspects of our new 
mechanism of Trust Ticket and its associated protocols by   
x Illustrating the context of establishing a Data Owner’s control over data and a 
user accessing the data. The data is outsourced to a Service Provider or a 
Cloud Service Provider, and the user accesses the data from the storage of the 
Service Provider or the Cloud Service Provider. 
x Elaborating ideal scenarios or the best case scenarios that show the features of 
an environment in which a user accesses a Data Owner’s data from the 
storage of a Service Provider. 
x Elaborating the worst case scenarios or attack scenarios that show the 
prominent limitations of an environment in which a user accesses a Data 
Owner’s data from the storage of a Service Provider. 
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x Specifying the claims achieved by the new mechanism. 
x Justifying the claims through experimental evaluation and security analyses.  
4.1 Introduction 
Cloud Computing provides cost-effective and on-demand facilities to meet 
changing business needs by outsourcing data. However, a Data Owner outsourcing 
data to the Cloud incurs a loss of control over data [1, 29, 114]. The prominent 
reasons for the loss of control are that the physical resources holding the outsourced 
data and access mechanisms to that data are typically not known to a Data Owner. 
The physical resources belong to a Service Provider or a Cloud Service Provider. A 
Data Owner, due to the loss of control, cannot ensure whether anyone other than 
registered users accesses the data. This loss of control causes lack of trust. In our 
mechanism, this lack of trust is balanced with a unique Trust Ticket generated by a 
Data Owner, and the Data Owner generates the Trust Ticket after a user has 
completed registration with the Data Owner. We have devised algorithmic protocols 
for Trust Ticket generation and its deployment.  
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Figure 4.1. A Generalised Scenario of Cloud Computing. 
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A Data Owner, a user, and a Cloud Service Provider are important parts of 
Cloud Computing. A Data Owner outsources data to a Service Provider or a Cloud 
Service Provider for users as shown in a typical scenario of Software as a Service 
(SaaS) Cloud Computing in Fig. 4.1.  SaaS is one of the three service models in 
Cloud Computing. In Cloud Computing, all outsourced data are replicated at multiple 
locations that are unknown to Data Owners and users [4, 115]. A Data Owner’s 
control over data is a prime priority in Cloud Computing from a Data Owner’s 
perspective [4]; this control over data is the Data Owner’s sense and ability to 
enforce the security and monitoring of  the data in the Data Owner’s own premises.  
This control over data is achieved by conducting users’ registration and ensuring 
authenticated users’ access to the data for data confidentiality.  Therefore, control 
and confidentiality are linked with a Data Owner’s trust over Cloud Computing. This 
trust evolves with the assurance received by the Data Owner and the confidence felt 
by the Data Owner about the expected functionality of the entities or processes in 
Cloud Computing  [4]. Trust is established between parties through challenge-
response protocol [116, 117]. However, there are challenges in building trust by 
ensuring a Data Owner’s control over data, conducting users’ registration, and 
allowing users to access to that data.  
The Data Owner, as in Fig. 4.1, handles the users’ frequent requests for 
accessing that data. For the Data Owner’s control over data and users’ frequent 
access to that data, the Data Owner has to be in service round-the-clock. From a 
practical perspective of Cloud Computing, it is infeasible for a Data Owner to be in 
service round-the-clock. In the following problem statement, we outline the question 
solved in this chapter. 
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With a Data Owner being not online, how can a Data Owner-generated Trust 
Ticket between a Cloud Service Provider and a registered user be deployed as a 
notion of Trust from a Data Owner’s perspective? 
In our Trust Ticket approach, a Data Owner issues Trust Ticket as per the 
mutual authentication mechanism in [116] between a Data Owner and a CSP. Trust 
Ticket is formulated as TrustUIDTicket (Udo, UID, DID, AR, TTExp)SKdo,csp. In the 
formulation, Udo stands for the identity of a registered user’s Data Owner (DO). UID, 
DID, AR, and TTExp respectively stand for a registered user’s identity, data identity, 
access right, and expiration of Trust Ticket. SKdo,csp  is symmetric key between a 
Data Owner and a Cloud Service Provider. We will detail our Trust Ticket in the 
remainder of the chapter.  
Rationale of our work is in the realisation of a Data Owner’s trust which is the 
core problem. After the Data Owner has completed the registration of a user, the  
Data Owner distributes Trust Ticket to the registered user and the Cloud Service 
Provider. The Data Owner establishes the Trust Ticket as a link between a registered 
user and a Cloud Service Provider. This link reduces the further interaction time 
between a registered user and a Cloud Service Provider (CSP) to become introduced. 
Experiments, done in Java network and cryptographic programming, reveal the 
simplicity and practicality of our work over the prior [118] work. 
Contributions of the chapter include exploring: 
x A mechanism for users’ registration with a Data Owner. 
x A Data Owner-generated Trust Ticket for a link between a user and a CSP. 
x A mechanism for deploying Trust Ticket between a user and a CSP. 
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4.2 Ideal Representative Scenarios 
In ideal or best case scenarios, we envisage that a Data Owner connects with a 
Service Provider or a Cloud Service Provider, and the Data Owner outsources data 
for the Data Owner and the users. The Service Provider makes the services available 
to the Data Owner or the user by using its own infrastructure or the infrastructure of 
the Cloud Service Provider for the Data Owner and users to access the outsourced 
data. The difference between a Service Provider and a Cloud Service Provider is that 
a Service Provider is a provider that offers Software as a Service with the 
infrastructure of a Cloud Service Provider. A Service Provider and a Cloud Service 
Provider become analogous when a Service Provider executes and offers services on 
its own infrastructure, for example, physical machines. Physical machines represent 
computation servers and storage servers, virtual machines on the physical servers, 
and network connectivity among the machines. With regard to our proposed 
mechanism, we present the following scenarios. 
Ideal Scenarios of a Data Owner interacting with a Service Provider for 
outsourcing data and the information of the legitimate users for the outsourced 
data 
In the first ideal scenario, there are two entities, and the entities are a Data 
Owner and a Service Provider or a Cloud Service Provider. A Data Owner is an 
individual or an enterprise to outsource the data and updates the process of handling 
users’ access to the data; the Data Owner or the enterprise interacts with a Service 
Provider or a Cloud Service Provider to outsource data. The Service Provider or the 
Cloud Service Provider maintains the Data Owner’s data into multiple servers 
located in many locations. The Data Owner or the enterprise frequently updates the 
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data. Users access the data fetched the Service Provider or the Cloud Service 
Provider. In the best case scenario, all entities are ideal to a Data Owner, and all 
entities perform up to the expectation of the Data Owner without breaching the 
confidentiality. However, in the worst case scenario, the there is a risk that entities 
may become malicious, as illustrated in the section of worst case scenario.  
Ideal Scenarios of a user interacting with a Service Provider for a Data Owner’s 
outsourced data 
In the second ideal scenario, a user interacts with a Service Provider for Cloud 
Services. The purpose of the interaction is to access a Data Owner’s data. The 
Service Provider running its services in the form of Software as a Service receives 
the user’s credentials. On receiving the credentials, the Service Provider 
authenticates the user and allows the user to access the Data Owner’s data in the 
absence of the Data Owner. In the best case scenario, we envisage that there is no 
risk for the Data Owner’s data to be exposed to an adversary. However, in the attack 
scenario, there is a risk for the Data Owner’s data to be accessed by anyone other 
than the legitimate users.  
4.3 Vulnerabilities and Attacks  Scenarios 
With regard to the prior ideal scenarios, we point out the following 
vulnerabilities and attacks. In attack scenarios, we envisage attacks from possible 
aspects that deserve consideration.  
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Vulnerable and attack scenarios of a Data Owner interacting with a Service 
Provider for outsourcing data and the information of the legitimate users for 
the outsourced data 
As regards the prior ideal scenario, a Data Owner is an individual or an 
enterprise to outsource the data and updates the process of handling users’ access to 
the data; the Data Owner or the enterprise interacts with a Service Provider or a 
Cloud Service Provider to outsource data. While the Data Owner outsources data and 
updates the process of handling users’ access to data, there is a risk of an attack. This 
risk is evident when a Data Owner does not  
x Specify a user who is eligible for data.  
x Initialise the user’s attributes on which the authentication will be done.  
x Provide a unique mechanism that certifies the validity of a user for data.  
x Provide the attributes in which any one of the attributes is used to revoke the 
user.   
The Service Provider maintains the Data Owner’s data into multiple servers in 
multiple locations. The Data Owner or the enterprise frequently updates the data. 
However, lack of information about the location of the data raises concerns about the 
data. Lack of specific attributes to identify a user and allow the user for accessing 
data is used by an attacker to access the data by camouflaging the identity of a user. 
This camouflaging attack becomes evident when a Service Provider deals with a user 
on ad hoc attributes that are not set and endorsed by the Data Owner for that user. 
There is a lack of revoking a user, as there are no specific attributes endorsed and 
reserved by the Data Owner for the user.  When a malicious user is not revoked, 
there is a risk of attacks perpetrated by the malicious user to access the data.  
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Vulnerable and attack scenarios of a User interacting with a Service Provider 
for a Data Owner’s outsourced data 
As regards the ideal scenario, a user interacts with a Service Provider for Cloud 
Services. The purpose of the interaction is to access a Data Owner’s data. The 
Service Provider running its services in the form of Software as a Service receives 
the user’s credentials. On receiving the credentials, the Service Provider 
authenticates the user and allows the user to access the Data Owner’s data in the 
absence of the Data Owner. However, lack of users’ registration with a Data Owner 
becomes impediment to authentication; lack of users’ attributes set by the Data 
Owner in the registration also becomes impediment to authentication for accessing 
the Data Owner’s data. In the worst case scenario, we envisage that illegitimate users 
become prominent when a Data Owner does not  
x Conduct a user’s registration for making the user a legitimate one. 
x  Create link between a legitimate user and a Service Provider for eliminating 
the time for becoming reintroduced over challenge response protocols. 
4.4 Claims 
In this section, we provide the claims of our proposed mechanism. The claims 
include establishing a Data Owner’s control over: 
x the outsourced data by encrypting the data. 
x a user by specifying the user’s attributes through the user’s registration with 
the Data Owner. 
x data and a user by introducing a link between the user and a Service 
Provider or a Cloud Service Provider.  
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4.5 Design Methodology 
In this section, we provide the terminologies, security properties, and techniques 
for our security protocols throughout the chapter.  In the following section, we 
provide the notations that are used in the chapter 
4.5.1 Notations and Symbols 
In this section, we provide the following notations and symbols that are used in 
the reminder of the chapter. 
Notations Interpretations 
CSP/csp : Cloud Service Provider. 
CapList : Capability List (UID, DID, AR for user) by Data Owner,  
where UID, DID, and AR stand for User ID, Data ID, and  
Access Right respectively. 
data,  DbkID : Data Owner’s data, Data backup Id. 
DbkID : Data backup Id. 
DO/do : Data Owner.  
K : Session key generated by Data Owner. 
KO : Secret Key between Data Owner and registered user. 
KP+csp, KP-csp  : CSP’s  Public Key, Private Key.   
KP+do, KP-do  : Data OWner’s  Public Key, Private Key.   
KP+user, KP-user  : User’s  Public Key (UserPK), Private Key.   
Loc : Location of data. 
nx : Unique random numbers by x to avoid replay attack. 
SKdo, csp : Symmetric key between Data Owner and CSP.    
TTicket : Trust Ticket. 
TTExp : Expiration of Trust Ticket. 
U/user, UDO : Registered user, Identity of a registered user’s Data Owner. 
UID, DID, AR : Registered user Identity, Data Identity, Access Right. 
E(z)Kx : Data z is encrypted with key Kx. 
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4.5.2 Security Principles 
In this section, we follow the same security Principles that we have outlined in 
the previous chapter. In this chapter, we focus on the confidentiality aspect of 
security principles. 
4.5.3 Authentication Techniques 
In this section, we follow the same authentication techniques as the ones that we 
have discussed in the previous chapter. In this chapter, we focus on the 
authentication of a user based on the user’s attributes that a Data Owner organises in 
Trust Ticket. We will detail the Trust Ticket based authentication in the remainder of 
the chapter. 
4.5.4 Encryption and Decryption Techniques 
In this section, we follow the same encryption and decryption techniques as the 
ones that we have outlined in the previous chapter. 
4.5.5 Database Techniques 
In this section, we provide the database techniques. We follow these techniques 
to organise the information about data. The information about data includes the ID of 
a Data Owner who outsources the data; ID of a user that uses the data of the Data 
Owner; backup ID of the data; location of the data outsourced; date and time when 
data is backed up. These techniques include a primary and foreign key based 
relationship between tables. A table, for example, M has a three attributes with a 
primary attribute that uniquely identifies each row or record of the table, M. Another 
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table, for example, N has four attributes including the primary key of the table M. 
Another concrete example is as follows: 
Table: Data Owner  
Data Owner  
DOID 
Name Address 
A11 Alice 21Jones ct., 
NSW, AUS 
 
Table: Data 
Data ID 
DID 
DOID Data 
Content 
D1101 A11 ***** 
D2101 A11 ** 
 
Data Owner has three attributes with DOID is the 
primary key. DOID uniquely identifies a row in the 
table, Data Owner; it means that there is no other 
row that has the same value as the one contained 
by the DOID. More specifically, A11 is the only 
value of DOID in the table, Data Owner. 
Data has three attributes; its primary key is with 
the combination of DID and DOID; The foreign key 
is the DOID. For the DOID to be a foreign key in the 
table, Data, DOID has to pre-exist in another table, 
Data Owner.  
Figure 4.2. Database Techniques. 
4.6 Cloud Data Handling Mechanism 
In this section, we provide the components and feature that are related to our 
proposed mechanism; our proposed mechanism focuses on the management of 
secure Cloud data from the perspective of Software as a Service. This section 
illustrates the management of encrypted data and users’ capability with insight into 
novel idea of Trust Ticket and associated protocols. 
4.6.1 Managing Encrypted Data and Users’ Capability 
In this section, we provide the approach taken by a Data Owner towards the data 
and the users’ capability; the Data Owner outsources the data and the users’ 
capability to the Cloud. Users’ capability is a list of activities to be performed by 
users regarding the access to the data.  
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A Data Owner encrypts the data with Secret Key, KO and sends the encrypted 
data to a Cloud Service Provider. The Data Owner also encrypts a capability list of 
existing users as shown in Fig. 4.3. The encryption of the capability list of existing 
users is performed for authentication and confidentiality with the Private Key of the 
Data Owner (KP-do) and the Public Key of the Cloud Service Provider (KP+csp) 
respectively. In section 4.5.1 above, we have provided the notations used throughout 
the chapter for the clarity of discussion in the chapter. 
    
Data Owner
(DO/d)
Service Provider/
Cloud Service Provider
(CSP/c)
User
1
2
1. DO sends encrypted data and capability
list denoted by CapList (UID, DID, AR).
{ {CapList
{ data
}KO
}KP-do
}KP+c
DO keeps a record of the above CapList in
DB_CLdo.Tab1 as in Fig. 3(a).
2. CSP decrypts (1) using KP-csp and KP+do and updates
{data}KO in DB_Datacsp.Tab2 of Fig. 3(b) followed by
DB_BkUpDatacsp.Tab2.2 of Fig. 3(d). CSP updates CapList
for existing users in DB_CLcsp_Tab2.1 of Fig. 3(c).
 
Figure 4.3. Data Owner updates data and users’ capabilities. 
In the following block of figures, Fig. 4.4 (a) through Fig. 4.4 (d), we have 
provided the tabular arrangement of attributes and functionalities. These attributes 
and functionalities are used in the illustration and discussion of our protocols in the 
remainder of the chapter. In the tabular form of Fig. 4.4 (a), we provide the following 
functionalities that belong to the attributes of data and a user stored by a Data Owner 
on authentication: 
x Storing the information of the data for a user’s access to the data. 
x Storing a user’s identity that is allowed to access the data. 
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x Storing the status of the access right that belongs to a user who is allowed 
to access the data. 
x Storing the Trust Ticket that a Data Owner distributed to a user who is 
allowed to access the data. 
Data ID
(DID)
User ID
(UID)
Access Right
(AR) User Public KeyUserPK
Trust Ticket
TTicket
 
(a) DB_CLdo.Tab1: database table by a Data Owner for user’s capabilities. 
User’s 
Data Owner
(Udo)
Data ID
(DID) Data Date Time
Data
backup ID
DbkID
 
(b) DB_Datacsp.Tab2: database table by a CSP for Data Owner’s encrypted data. 
User’s 
Data Owner
(Udo)
Data ID
(DID)
User ID
(UID)
Access Right
(AR) User Public KeyUserPK
Trust Ticket
TTicket
 
 
(c)  DB_CLcsp.Tab2.1: database table by a CSP for users’ capabilities. 
Data
backup ID
DbkID
Data Location
Loc Date Time
 
 
(d)  DB_BkUpDatacsp.Tab2.2: database table by a CSP for a Data Owner’s data backup.  
Figure 4.4. All relevant database tables. 
 [ 
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In the tabular form of Fig. 4.4 (b), we provide the following functionalities that 
belong to the attributes of a Data Owner, encrypted data, and user stored by a Cloud 
Service Provider: 
x Storing the information about a Data Owner who has users for the data to 
be accessed on authentication. 
x Storing the information about the outsourced data for a user who is 
allowed to access the data on authentication. 
x Storing the content of the data with regard to the identity of the data. 
x Storing the date and time regarding the backup of the data. 
With regard to the tabular form in Fig. 4.4 (c), we provide the following 
functionalities that belong to the attributes of a user’s capabilities stored by a Cloud 
Service Provider: 
x Storing the information about a Data Owner who has users for the data to 
be accessed on authentication. 
x Storing the information about the outsourced data for a user who is 
allowed to access the data on authentication. 
x Storing a user’s identity that is allowed to access the data on 
authentication. 
x Storing the status of the access right that belongs to a user who is allowed 
to access the data on authentication. 
x Storing the Trust Ticket that a Data Owner distributed to a user who is 
allowed to access the data on authentication. 
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As regards the tabular form in Fig. 4.4 (d), we provide the following 
functionalities that belong to the attributes of the data backup stored by a Cloud 
Service Provider: 
x Storing the information of data backup with a unique identity. 
x Storing the date and time regarding the backup of the data. 
x Storing the information of the location wherein the backup is made. 
As illustrated in the prior figures, a Data Owner sends the encrypted data and a 
capability list, and the Data Owner and the Cloud Service Provider records the 
encrypted data and a capability list in relevant database tables. For a registered user, 
a Capability List or CapList used interchangeably throughout the chapter is shown in 
section 4.5.1 above. A Capability List or CapList is created by a Data Owner, and it 
is denoted by Capability List (UID, DID, AR for user) in which UID, DID, and AR 
respectively stand for a registered user’s identity, data identity, and access right. As 
shown in Fig. 4.4, the database table belonging to (a) is updated by a Data Owner 
and the tables belonging to (b) through (d) are by a Cloud Service Provider for 
referring to any activity as and when required on either side for auditing. A Data 
Owner shares the Secret Key, KO with users who become authenticated by a Cloud 
Service Provider through the Trust Ticket as illustrated in sections 4.6.2 through 
4.6.4. Once a user is authenticated, a Cloud Service Provider retrieves a Data Owner-
encrypted data for the authenticated user. On receiving the encrypted data, the user 
decrypts it with KO. A Data Owner does not have to be online during the phase of a 
user’s receiving a Data Owner-encrypted data. However, how can a Data Owner 
have control over a user and data without being online? This question is solved with 
a user’s registration, Trust Ticket generation, and Trust Ticket deployment in the 
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upcoming sections in the chapter. The Data Owner goes offline as soon as the 
registration is accomplished. During the registration process, the Data Owner 
receives a user’s credentials and generates Trust Ticket for the particular user in 
articulation with the CSP. In the registration, we have taken into consideration of the 
information provided by a user. The Trust Ticket has an expiration which is visible to 
a user. One purpose of our Trust Ticket is to introduce a user with a Cloud Service 
Provider. Another purpose of our Trust Ticket is to shorten the interactions with 
reference to previous interactions made during Trust Ticket generation. 
4.6.2 Idea of Trust Ticket 
In this section, we provide the main idea behind Trust Ticket. In order to ensure 
a Data Owner’s control over data and a user, a Data Owner generates a Trust Ticket 
for the user in articulation with a Cloud Service Provider. A Data Owner issues the 
Trust Ticket to a user after the user’s registration with the Data Owner is 
accomplished. Trust Ticket is denoted by TrustUIDTicket.  TrustUIDTicket  is used by a 
user to access a Data Owner’s encrypted data in a Cloud Service Provider.   
Internal structure of Trust Ticket or TrustUIDTicket  is an encrypted expression, 
and the expression is  (Udo, UID, DID, AR, TTExp)SKdo,csp where (Udo, UID, DID, 
AR, TTExp) is encrypted with SKdo,csp. In the Trust Ticket, Udo stands for the identity 
of a registered user’s Data Owner. UID, DID, AR, and TTExp respectively stand for a 
registered user’s identity, data identity, access right, and expiration of Trust Ticket. 
In the Trust Ticket, the identity of a user is included. The Data Owner, as an issuer 
and a controller of the Trust Ticket, includes the identity Udo. The Data Owner uses 
Symmetric Key, SKdo,csp for encryption. This Symmetric Key is shared between the 
Data Owner and the Cloud Service Provider. TTExp is visible to a user to renew the 
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Trust Ticket before expiry.  Upon generating the TrustUIDTicket,  the Data Owner sends 
the user’s Public Key (KP+user), Capability  List and the TrustUIDTicket  to the CSP and 
the user. 
4.6.3 Trust Ticket Generation during a User’s Registration 
In this section, we provide the inherent algorithmic protocol for Trust Ticket 
generated by a Data Owner during a user’s registration. 
4.6.3.1 Protocol for Trust Ticket and a User’s Registration   
The purpose of the Trust Ticket and a user’s registration is to ensure a Data 
Owner’s control over data and users through users’ registration. In the user’s 
registration, a Data Owner remains online, generates the Trust Ticket, issues it to the 
user, and links the user with the Service Provider by providing a copy of the Trust 
Ticket to the Service Provider as shown in Fig. 4.5.  
TrustUIDTicket  is used by a user to access a Data Owner-encrypted data in a 
Cloud Service Provider.  During a new user’s registration, a Data Owner receives a 
random number or a nonce nu from a user to avoid a replay attack. A user’s Public 
Key, his/her information and his/her choice for the Data Owner’s data service are 
used by the Data Owner to generate relevant identity for that user as shown in the 
first line of step 2 in the following Fig. 4.5.  
In the second and third lines of step 2 in Fig. 4.5, the idea of Trust Ticket is 
respectively introduced and updated in the Data Owner’s local database. Updating 
TrustUIDTicket  in the database for a particular user’s UID facilitates the Data Owner’s 
control over the user. The Data Owner retains the control over the user by changing 
the user’s access right denoted by AR and trust expiration denoted by TTExp.  
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Data Owner
(DO/d)
Service Provider/
Cloud Service Provider
(CSP/c)
User
2
1
3
4
5
6
7
1: {nu, KP+user and user’s info and choice of expected data service} KP+do
2 : DO generates UID, DID, AR for user in the ongoing registration and
TrustUIDTicket as { Udo, UID, DID, AR, TTExp }SKdo,csp for user.
DO stores TrustUIDTicket in DB_CLdo.Tab1 as in Fig. 4.6.1.2 (a).
3 : { { nd, KP+user, Udo, UID, DID, AR, TrustUIDTicket
{ { nu, Udo, UID, DID, AR, TrustUIDTicket, TTExp, ko
}KP-do
}KP+user
}KP-do
}KP+csp
4 : CSP stores UID, DID, AR, KP+user and
{Udo, UID, DID, AR, TTExp}SKdo,csp in DB_CLcsp.Tab2.1 as in Fig. 4.6.1.2 (c).
5 : { nd, {Udo, UID, DID, AR, TTExp
}KP-csp
}KP+do
6 : { { nu, Udo, UID, DID, AR, TrustUIDTicket, TTExp, ko
}KP-do
}KP+user
7 : User is aware of the Ko and userid, dataid and access right,
TrustUIDTicket, Expiration of Trust Ticket by decrypting (6).
Circle is a process n within an entity.
n
Rectangle is a process n between entities.
n
 
Figure 4.5. Protocol for a user’s registration and Trust Ticket generation. 
Chapter 4 A Data Owner-Controlled Users’ Access to Data 
 
135 
 
The lowest key in step 3 of Fig. 4.5 is the Public Key of the CSP (KP+csp) which 
indicates that step 3 is confidential to the CSP. The initial recipient of step 3 in the 
protocol is the Cloud Service Provider (CSP). The second key (Private Key of the 
Data Owner, KP-do) from the lowest signifies that step 3 is sent exclusively by the 
Data Owner as a sign of authentication. The third and the fourth key from the lowest 
respectively indicate that the user’s capability list, the user’s nonce (nu)¸ 
TrustUIDTicket, Trust Expiration and Secret Key KO are confidentially sent to the user 
by the Data Owner. This whole block encrypted by the third and the fourth keys from 
the lowest (step 3, Fig. 4.5) is forwarded by the CSP in step 6 of Fig. 4.5. In step 4, 
the CSP updates its database as shown in Fig. 4.4 (c) with the new user’s Capability 
List and the Trust Ticket. The CSP uses the database record to verify the user’s future 
request for the Data Owner’s encrypted data. The CSP also sends its signed copy of 
the Trust Ticket to the Data Owner in step 5. The user is aware of the Trust Ticket in 
step 7 as shown in Fig. 4.5. 
In the following section, we provide the deployment of the Trust Ticket. 
4.6.4 Trust Ticket Deployment 
In this section, we provide the protocol that is related to the deployment of the 
Trust Ticket. The Trust Ticket generated by a Data Owner during the end of a user’s 
registration with the Data Owner. 
4.6.4.1 Algorithmic Protocol for Trust Ticket Deployment 
At the end of a user’s registration with a Data Owner, the user receives the Trust 
Ticket. The Service Provider or the Cloud Service Provider also receives a copy of 
the Trust Ticket.  
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Based on the Trust Ticket, the Service Provider or the Cloud Service Provider 
authenticates a user approaching the Service Provider for a Data Owner-encrypted 
data. The user’s request to the Service Provider or the Cloud Service Provider about 
the Data Owner-encrypted data starts with the Trust Ticket as shown by step 1 in Fig. 
4.6. The Service Provider or the Cloud Service Provider verifies the attributes of the 
Trust Ticket sent by the user. A nonce nu is used by the user to avoid replay attack.   
Step 2 in Fig. 4.6 makes the user’s credentials visible to the Service Provider or 
the Cloud Service Provider. Step 3 is split into four parts for the clarity of 
functionalities. The first part denoted by (3i) verifies Trust Expiration (TTEXP) of the 
user. If there is no deviation from TTExp, remaining steps are executed in order. At 
the end of the successful verification of (3i), the second part of step 3 denoted by 
(3ii) is executed. In this part, user id (UID) is verified. 
For a valid user, access right (AR) is verified at the third part (3iii) of step 3. 
The final part denoted by (3iv) is executed by successively verifying prior parts (3i) 
through (3iii). During the final part, the Data Owner-encrypted data is retrieved by 
the Service Provider or the Cloud Service Provider. On retrieving the Data Owner-
encrypted data, the Service Provider or the Cloud Service Provider further encrypts it 
with the Public Key of the user (KP+user) and the Private Key of the CSP (KP-csp).  
These further encryptions respectively ensure that the encrypted data is explicitly 
sent to the registered user by the Service Provider or the Cloud Service Provider. The 
user matches the received nonce with the nonce sent at step 1 as shown in Fig. 4.6.  
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Steps Codes Interpretations
1: { {nu, TrustUIDTicket
}KP-user
}KP+csp
2: CSP decrypts (1)
3i: If ( TTEXP at [TrustUIDTicket from user]
=
TTEXP at [TrustUIDTicket from CSP])
Then CSP invokes (3ii)
Else CSP ends by invoking (5)
3ii: If (UID at [TrustUIDTicket from user]
=
UID at [TrustUIDTicket from CSP])
Then CSP invokes (3iii)
Else CSP ends by invoking (5)
3iii: If (AR at [TrustUIDTicket from user]
=
AR at [TrustUIDTicket From CSP &&
CapList from CSP]
)
Then CSP invokes (3iv)
Else CSP ends by invoking (5)
3iv:
{ { nu, {data}KO
}KP-csp
}KP+user
4i: CSP sends (3iv) to user and invokes (6).
4ii: User receives and decrypts (3iv) and invokes (6).
5: CSP sends Error and invokes (6).
6: End.
CSP is aware of user with
Udo,UID, DID, AR, TTEXP by
decrypting Trust Ticket.
User encrypts inner part with
KP-user and outer part with
KP+csp for authentication and
confidentiality respectively.
For valid TTEXP at (3i), CSP
calls (3ii).
For valid AR at (3iii), CSP
retrieves {data}KO.
{data}KO was already
encrypted by DO. CSP
encrypts inner part with KP-csp
and outer part with KP+user for
authentication and
confidentiality respectively.
For valid UID at (3ii), CSP
calls (3iii).
2
Data
Owner
(DO/d)
Service Provider/
Cloud Service Provider
(CSP/c)
User
1
Else of if
3i
5
4
3ii
3iv
3iii
Else of if
5
Else of if
5
Circle is a process n
within an entity.
n
Rectangle is a process n
between entities.
n
KP-z/ KP-z : Private Key/Public Key of z.
nu and
TTExp
: Nonce and Trust
Ticket Expiration
AR, DID,
UID
: Access Right,
Data ID, User ID
Ko : Secret Key
Symbols
 
Figure 4.6. Protocol for a user’s data access and Trust Ticket deployment. 
At the end of step 4, the user receives the Data Owner-encrypted data.  The user 
received the KO, as shown in steps 6 and 7 of Fig. 4.5 in the previous section 4.6.3.1. 
The user uses the KO to decrypt the Data Owner-encrypted data. 
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4.7 Experimental Evaluation 
In this section, we provide the experimental evaluation in details. 
4.7.1 Experimental Environment Setup 
In our experiment setup, we have created an environment emulating a Cloud 
Computing environment. We have used a PC (A) with 18 GB RAM for VMware 
ESXi 4.1 hypervisor. On the hypervisor, we have created two virtual machines (VM1 
and VM2) from within another PC (B). The B is connected as a client to the 
hypervisor residing in A. We have run our framework and evaluated our algorithmic 
protocol with a sample input data file designated as a Data Owner-encrypted file. We 
have used  Ko to encrypt the sample data file. Our Java program emulating a Cloud 
user in Fig. 4.6 has been run on VM1. Another Java program emulating a Service 
Provider or the Cloud Service Provider in Fig. 4.6 has used VM2. We have presented 
the overall interactions according to our algorithmic protocol in Fig. 4.6. We have 
found the result as shown in Table 4.2. For prior work [118], with the same input file 
designated as a Data Owner-encrypted file, we have found that our algorithm 
performs better in overall functionality. We have shown the result of our finding in 
Table 4.3. We have further presented the propagation of trust in the form of trust 
value. The trust value ranges from 0 to 1. In the trust value propagation, we have 
four programs. The first Java program running as a Data Owner encrypts data in the 
Data Owner’s side. The second program running in the Data Owner’s side creates 
Trust Ticket. The Third Program running as the Service Provider or the Cloud 
Service Provider waits for a registered user having the Trust Ticket. The fourth 
program running as the registered user presents the Trust Ticket to the Service 
Provider. We have also extracted the feature from each stage of the protocols in Fig. 
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4.5 and Fig. 4.6. For each feature, we assign a trust value through our program. Each 
trust value is randomly generated. Each trust value ranges from 0 to 1. For optimal 
record and adjustment of trust value, we have generated 2000 iterations for a trust 
value at each stage. We have taken average trust value out of the 2000 iterations at 
each stage of trust value propagation. We have provided the simulation results in Fig. 
4.7. We have extracted the features of our work and the prior work [118] for a user’s 
data access to a Data Owner-encrypted data in a Service Provider. We present the 
extracted features in Table 4.1 with regard to the role of the Data Owner, the user, 
and the Service Provider.  
Table 4.1. Categorizing  interactions with respect to Fig. 4.6 of our work and Fig. 7 of prior work for a 
user’s access to a Data Owner-encrypted data. 
Category 
Protocol in  
Fig. 4.6 of 
Our Work 
Features 
Protocol 
in Fig. 7 
of Prior 
Work 
[118]. 
 
Features 
 
1 1 Initiated by a user. 1 Initiated by a user. 
2 2 Processed by the Service 
Provider. 
2 Processed by the Service 
Provider. 
3 3i, 3ii, 3iii 
For a Data Owner-
encrypted data to the user, 
x interactions between 
the user and the 
Service Provider are 
based on the Data 
Owner-endorsed Trust 
Ticket. 
x decision making of the 
Service Provider is 
based the Data Owner-
endorsed Trust Ticket 
and Capability List or 
CapList. 
 
3, 4, 5, 6 
For Data Owner-encrypted 
data to the user, 
 
x interactions between 
the Service Provider 
and the user are devoid 
of any mechanism 
endorsed by the Data 
Owner. 
x Session Key generated 
in the foregoing 
interactions is not 
indicative of the 
authentication of the 
user that receives the 
data. 
4 3iv, 4i 
The Service Provider sends 
the Data Owner-encrypted 
data to the user. 
7, 8 
The Service Provider sends 
the Data Owner-encrypted 
data to the user. 
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We conduct the experimental evaluation of our work and the prior work [118] in 
regard to the aforementioned Table 4.1. In the third category or class of interactions, 
there are uncertainties and lack of confidence on the part of the Data Owner because 
of the Data Owner’s apparent and evident disengagement from the endorsement 
process, and compliance with the endorsement process plays a pivotal role on 
ensuring the Data Owner’s confidence in the interactions between the user and the 
Service Provider. 
In the experiments, we set the Trust Perception Levels as 0 representing the 
lowest level and 4 representing the highest level of the Data Owner’s trust 
perception. This Trust Perception Level belongs to the Data Owner’s perception 
about the trust, and the trust is the Data Owner’s feeling about the expected 
functionalities of the Service Provider while allowing a user to access the Data 
Owner-encrypted data. We run the experiment for 4000 times, and we take 8 
representative outcomes from 403 iterations. In each iteration, all the four 
interactions take place except the 403rd iteration that has only 3 interactions.  We 
present the eight experimental outcomes in the figures, Fig. 4.8 through Fig. 4.15 in 
the following section. 
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4.7.2 Experimental Outcome 
In this section, we provide the experimental outcomes in the following tables 
and Fig. 4.7. 
Table 4.2.  Elapsed Time for each step in our work. 
 
Steps of our algorithmic protocol 
 
Elapsed Time (ms) 
Completion of step 1 in Fig. 5. (User side) 416 
Completion of step 2 in Fig. 5. (CSP side) 412 
Completion of step 3 in Fig. 5. (CSP side) 105 
Completion of step 4i in Fig. 5. (CSP side) 1 
Completion of step 4ii in Fig. 5. (User side) 250 
 
 
Table 4.3.  Elapsed Time of our work and prior work with the same data. 
Work Completion Time User side (ms) CSP side (ms) Total Time (ms) 
Ours 666 518 1184 
Prior [118] 605 599 1204 
 
   
Figure 4.7. Trust Value during the propagation of trust in the protocols of Fig. 4.5 and Fig. 4.6  
participated by a Data Owner, a user, and a CSP. 
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Experiment run for 4000 times provides the following 6 representative graphs 
out of the 403 graphs for a Data Owner’s Trust Perception Level: 
In continuation with the introduction to the following experimental results from 
prior section, we elaborate the experimental outcome in the next section. 
  
Figure 4.8. Experiment run 4000 times 
generates a Data Owner’s Trust Perception 
Level during iteration 2 out of 403. 
 
Figure 4.9. Experiment run 4000 times 
generates a Data Owner’s Trust Perception 
Level during iteration 4 out of 403. 
  
 
  
Figure 4.10. Experiment run 4000 times 
generates a Data Owner’s Trust Perception 
Level during iteration 50 out of 403. 
 Figure 4.11. Experiment run 4000 times 
generates a Data Owner’s Trust Perception 
Level during iteration 52 out of 403. 
  
   
Figure 4.12. Experiment run 4000 times 
generates a Data Owner’s Trust Perception 
Level during iteration 100 out of 403. 
 Figure 4.13. Experiment run 4000 times 
generates a Data Owner’s Trust Perception 
Level during iteration 204 out of 403. 
 
Chapter 4 A Data Owner-Controlled Users’ Access to Data 
 
143 
 
 
  
Figure 4.14. Experiment run 4000 times 
generates a Data Owner’s Trust Perception 
Level during iteration 300 out of 403. 
 Figure 4.15. Experiment run 4000 times 
generates a Data Owner’s Trust Perception 
Level during iteration 402 out of 403. 
 
In the following section, we discuss the experimental outcome. 
4.8 Discussion on Experimental Outcome 
In our work, Trust Ticket is a logical outcome of a user’s registration with a 
Data Owner. During a user’s registration, a Data Owner generates a Trust Ticket for 
that user through mutual authentication. Mutual authentication between a Data 
Owner  and a CSP is elaborated in [116]. In our work, a user’s registration by a Data 
Owner  is more transparent than prior work [118] since a Data Owner in our work 
keeps record of each user through the registration. In the prior work, there is no clear 
logical sequence of tasks performed by the Data Owner and the Cloud Service 
Provider at their sides respectively.   
In our work, with reference to Fig. 4.4, Fig. 4.5, and Fig. 4.6, we have arranged 
a logical sequence of tasks in the protocol structure. In the Table 4.2, we have 
presented the execution time of each step in our work pertaining to Fig. 4.5 and Fig. 
4.6.  
The Data Owner and the CSP record their activities regarding users and data in 
relevant database tables. Protocols showing  the activities of a Data Owner and a 
CSP, and the functionalities of a Trust Ticket generation and distribution are 
transparent over prior work [118].  
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Deployment of a Trust Ticket illustrated in Fig. 4.6 reduces the cryptographic 
interactions. Prior work [118] is based on passing a user’s credential and utilizing 
Diffie-Hellman  protocol for a session key generation. Our Trust Ticket   deployment 
has eliminated the computation involved in session key generation, as presented in 
the Table 4.3.  We have shown further two encryptions of the Data Owner-encrypted 
data at step (3iv) of Fig. 4.6 with the Public Key of the user (KP+user) and the Private 
Key of the CSP (KP-csp).  However,  there is a single encryption with session key in 
prior work [118]. These further encryptions in our work have given more insight of 
security and confidence than prior work.  
With regard to the protocols in Fig. 4.5 and Fig. 4.6 and experimental result in 
Fig. 4.7, the Data Owner’s trust value in the Data Owner side is almost close to the 
maximum value of 1 as seen in Fig. 4.7; the Data Owner’s trust value is almost close 
to the maximum because the Data Owner encrypts the data. In the second stage, the 
Data Owner creates the Trust Ticket, and the Data Owner distributes the Trust Ticket 
to the registered user and the Service Provider or the Cloud Service Provider. The 
purpose of distributing the Trust Ticket is to link the registered user with the Service 
Provider or the Cloud Service Provider. The Data Owner’s trust value at the stage of 
creating and distributing the Trust Ticket is also almost close to the maximum value 
of 1 because the Data Owner is the creator, issuer, and the controller of the Trust 
Ticket. The third stage is in a user’s side. In the third stage, the registered user 
receives the Trust Ticket, and the registered user sends the Trust Ticket to the Cloud 
Service Provider. The Data Owner’s trust value in the third stage also approaches 
almost to the maximum value of 1 as seen in Fig. 4.7. The reason behind the Data 
Owner’s high trust value of as maximum as 1 is that the Trust Ticket is an encrypted 
container to a registered user, and the user presents the Trust Ticket to the Service 
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Provider or the Cloud Service Provider to become authenticated and accepted for the 
Data Owner-encrypted data. In the fourth stage, the Data Owner’s trust value is little 
less than the trust value in the third stage because the Trust Ticket sent from the user 
moves into the Service Provider or the Cloud Service Provider, and the Data Owner 
is sceptical about the handling of the Trust Ticket in the Service Provider or the 
Cloud Service Provider for making decision about the user. In addition to the Data 
Owner, the Service Provider or the Cloud Service Provider decrypts the Trust Ticket  
to make decision whether or not the  user legitimate for receiving the Data Owner-
encrypted data in the Service Provider or the Cloud Service Provider. The Data 
Owner’s trust value is high in the fifth stage, as the Service Provider or the Cloud 
Service Provider reveals the Trust Ticket, makes decision about the user’s access to 
the Data Owner-encrypted data, and maintains the log. The decision is about the user 
that presented the Trust Ticket. The sixth stage is as sceptical as the fourth one, as the 
Data Owner remains sceptical about the outcome of the decision made by the Service 
Provider or the Cloud Service Provider about the user’s receiving the data. The sixth 
stage takes place in the user’s side. On successful evaluation of the prior stage based 
on the interaction log, the Data Owner’s trust value remains almost as high as the 
maximum value of 1, as seen in Fig 4.7.   
With regard to figures, Fig. 4.8 through Fig. 4.15, we observe that the Trust 
Perception Level in the case of the prior work [118] changes frequently without any 
uniformity, and the reasons for changes are the uncertain features as presented in 
Table 4.1.  
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4.9 Security Analysis for the Claims Countering the Attacks 
We provide the security analysis in justification of our claims that overcome the 
attacks. With regard to attacks or games, we prove our claims that are embedded in 
the approach and methodologies of our work.      
In our work, the Data Owner encrypts the data with the Secret Key, KO as shown 
in Fig. 4.3. The Data Owner outsources the encrypted data to the Service Provider or 
the Cloud Service Provider. We claim that   insiders in the Service Provider or the 
Cloud Service Provider cannot access the Data Owner-encrypted data in the Service 
Provider or the Cloud Service Provider, and we regard this claim as the Claim1.  
Claim 1:  Insiders in the Service Provider or the Cloud Service Provider cannot 
access the Data Owner-encrypted data in the Service Provider or the Cloud Service 
Provider. 
Proof: We show the validity of the Claim1 by means of games or attacks.    
Game1: Insiders in the Service Provider capture the Secret Key, KO that is sent to a 
registered user by a Data Owner through a Service Provider.   
Game2: Insiders in the Service Provider access the Data Owner-encrypted data.  
With regards to the Game 1, the Data Owner conducts the registration of a user. 
At the end of the registration as shown in step 6 of the Fig. 4.5, the Data Owner 
sends the Secret Key, KO to the registered user through the Service Provider. The 
Service Provider sends the Secret Key, KO to a registered user. The Service Provider 
finds the Secret Key, KO encrypted with the Public Key of the user. The insiders in 
the Service Provider cannot access the Secret Key, KO, as the insiders do not have the 
Chapter 4 A Data Owner-Controlled Users’ Access to Data 
 
147 
 
Private Key of the registered user. The registered user having the Private Key 
receives the Secret Key, KO.  
In connection with the scenario of the Game 1, the Game 2 proceeds when 
insiders in the Service Provider receives the Secret Key, KO. Since the Data Owner 
encrypts the data with the Secret Key, KO, and the Data Owner shares the Secret Key, 
KO with registered users, and the insiders in the Service Provider cannot receive the 
KO as elaborated in countering the Game 1, the insiders in the Service Provider 
cannot access the Data Owner-encrypted data that is outsourced to the Service 
Provider. One way to collect the Secret Key, KO is from a user who is registered with 
the Data Owner. In this chapter we assume that a registered user does not share the 
Secret Key, KO with the Service Provider. However, in chapter 6, we present a 
mechanism to debar a user from sharing the Secret Key, KO with the Service 
Provider.  
The Data Owner updates a user’s Capability List and the encrypted data in the 
Service Provider or the Cloud Service Provider. A user’s Capability List is denoted 
by CapList as shown in Fig. 4.3. The CapList contains the attributes, such as User 
ID, Data ID, and Access Right (AR). Access Right is used to determine the 
legitimacy of a user’s access to the data in the Service Provider. The Data Owner and 
the Service Provider or the Cloud Service Provider separately maintain database 
records of the CapList as shown in the steps 1 and 2 of Fig. 4.3. These database 
records are used for the verification of a registered user. Since the Data Owner 
updates a registered user’s CapList in the Service Provider or the Cloud Service 
Provider, we claim that the Data Owner controls a registered user and also the data 
that the registered user accesses from the Service Provider; we regard this claim as 
the Claim 2.  
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Claim 2: The Data Owner controls a registered user and the outsourced data that the 
registered user accesses. 
Proof: We validate the Claim 2 with the focus on the following games or attacks.    
Game1: The Access Right held in a registered user is maliciously changed.    
Game2: A registered user’s Access Right held in the Service Provider is maliciously 
changed.    
As regards the Game 1 of the Claim 2, the Data Owner as shown in the step 6 of 
Fig. 4.5 provides the Access Right to the registered user through the Service 
Provider. The Data Owner updates Access Right anytime in the CapList as shown in 
Fig. 4.3. The Data Owner sends the updated Access Right to the Service Provider or 
the Cloud Service Provider, as shown in Fig. 4.3. For any malicious change in the 
Access Right held in a registered user, the verification or filtering process with 
respect to the updated Access Right in the Service Provider prevents the user from 
receiving the data. This filtering process observes if the updated Access Right in the 
Service Provider is different from the Access Right held by a registered user; if both 
the Access Rights do not match, the Service Provider or the Cloud Service Provider 
debars the registered user from receiving the Data Owner-encrypted data. This 
process of verification is done by the Service Provider or the Cloud Service Provider 
on the basis of the Data Owner’s updated Access Right, and the process is shown in 
step (3iii) of Fig. 4.6. While a registered user possesses the Secret Key, KO and the 
Data Owner remains offline, that user’s access to the data is controlled by the Data 
Owner through the Service Provider or the Cloud Service Provider. The Service 
Provider or the Cloud Service Provider, on the other hand, cannot view the content of 
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the data as this data is encrypted by the Data Owner with the Secret Key, KO as 
established under the Claim 1. 
With regard to the Game 2 of the Claim 2, a registered user approaching the 
Service Provider is prevented by the Service Provider from obtaining the Data. This 
verification process is the result of the scenario in which the Access Right with the 
registered user is not maliciously changed, and the Access Right in the Service 
Provider is maliciously changed. Due to the malicious change in the Access Right, 
the registered user is prevented from receiving the data. However, the issue is 
resolved by cross matching the Access Rights; these Access Rights are the ones held 
in the Data Owner, the Service Provider, and the log file. The log file is the one 
preserved during the registered user’s interaction with the Service Provider, and the 
log file contains the Access Rights compared during the interaction. The Cross 
matching reveals the mismatch of the Access Rights in the Data Owner, the Service 
Provider, and the log file that contain the Access Rights compared during the 
interaction with the registered user and the Service Provider.   
In our work, a Data Owner is the issuer and the controller of the Trust Ticket. 
During a new user’s registration by a Data Owner, the Data Owner employs steps to 
generate the Trust Ticket as detailed in Fig. 4.5.  Trust Ticket is an encrypted 
container of a user’s attributes, such as Access Right (AR) and Trust Expiration 
(TTExp). The same Access Right is in the user’s Capability List denoted by CapList 
as shown in Fig. 4.3. The Data Owner distributes the Trust Ticket to the Service 
Provider or the Cloud Service Provider and the newly registered user.  The Service 
Provider or the Cloud Service Provider (CSP) sends a signed copy of the Trust Ticket 
to the Data Owner as shown in the step 5 of Fig. 4.5. The signed copy is used for the 
audit of the activities performed by a CSP in connection with the data and a user. The 
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user passes the respective Trust Ticket to the Service Provider or the Cloud Service 
Provider for accessing the Data Owner-encrypted data in the Service Provider or the 
Cloud Service Provider. The Service Provider or the Cloud Service Provider 
becomes aware of the user and relevant attributes, such as AR and TTExp of that user 
through the Trust Ticket. These relevant attributes are used by the Service Provider 
or the Cloud Service Provider to verify the user during the user’s requests for the 
Data Owner-encrypted data. The Data Owner does not need to remain online during 
the user’s request for the Data Owner-encrypted data in the Service Provider or the 
Cloud Service Provider. The Data Owner’s generation and distribution of the Trust 
Ticket establishes two things. The first thing is the Data Owner’s trust on the Service 
Provider or the Cloud Service Provider through Trust Ticket. The second thing is the 
Data Owner’s control over data and a registered user by making the Service Provider 
follow the Trust Ticket to allow a user to access the designated data. We claim that 
Trust Ticket generation and distribution establishes a Data Owner’s control over data 
and a user; we regard this claim as the Claim 3. Details of the claim with regard to 
the Data Owner’s control over data and a user are presented below.  
Claim 3: Trust Ticket generation and distribution establishes a Data Owner’s control 
over data and a user. 
Proof: We prove the validity of the Claim 3 with the focus on the following games or 
attacks.    
Game 1: The Access Right held in a registered user is maliciously changed.    
Game 2: A registered user’s Access Right held in the Service Provider is maliciously 
changed.    
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Game 3: Data is maliciously updated in the Service Provider and Transferred to a 
user. 
 In connection with the Game 1 of the Claim 3, the deployment of Trust Ticket 
in our work ensures the Data Owner’s control over data and a user; the   Data Owner 
specifies the Access Right that is verified by the Service Provider to allow the user to 
access the data. The Access Right about the user’s data remains in the Trust Ticket; 
the Trust Ticket is an encrypted container, and the user has no access to the encrypted 
container, as the Trust Ticket is encrypted with the Secret Key between the Data 
Owner and the Service Provider or the Cloud Service Provider. The malicious 
change of the Accesses Right in the Trust Ticket belonging to a user is detected in the 
filtering process, and the filtering process is in the Service Provider. As part of the 
filtering process, the Service Provider receives the updated Capability List and the 
Trust Ticket from the Data Owner. As shown in the step (3iii) of Fig. 4.6, the Access 
Right in the Trust Ticket belonging to a user is matched with the Access Rights in the 
updated Capability List and the Trust Ticket that belong to the Service Provider.   
With regard to the Game 2 of the Claim 3, the malicious change of the Access 
Right in the Service Provider is identified by comparing the Trust Tickets. One Trust 
Ticket is in the Service Provider. The other Trust Ticket is signed by the Service 
Provider, and the signed copy is sent to the Data Owner by the Service Provider. The 
signed copy of the Trust Ticket to the Data Owner is generated at the end of the 
registration of a user, as shown in Fig. 4.5.  
As regards the Game 3 of the Claim 3, the Data Owner changes Trust Ticket and 
the Secret Key, KO   shared with users. By updating the Trust Ticket, the Data Owner 
changes a user’s Access Right and Trust Ticket Expiration. The Data Owner updates 
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encrypted data in the Service Provider; this update performed by the Data Owner 
provides the Data Owner’s control over data, as the Service Provider does not have 
the Secret Key, KO to view the content of the data. This control is linked with the 
Data Owner’s trust on the Service Provider holding the data in multiple locations. 
Moreover, the deployment of the Data Owner’s Trust Ticket make the Service 
Provider encrypt the Data Owner’s encrypted data twice with Public Key of user 
(KP+user) and Private Key of the CSP (KP-csp). A Data Owner’s Trust Ticket 
deployment ensures three layers of security for data. The inner most layer is by a 
Data Owner with the Secret Key, KO   and outer layers are by a Service Provider or a 
Cloud Service Provider with   KP+user and KP-csp,   as shown in step (3iv) of Fig. 4.6. 
Before the triple encrypted data is available to a user, the deployment of Trust Ticket 
also provides three layers of verification from (3i) to (3iii), as shown in Fig. 4.6. As a 
Data Owner is the issuer and the controller of a Trust Ticket, triple verifications of a 
user at steps (3i) through (3iii) of Fig. 4.6 and triple encryptions of the data at step 
(3iv) of Fig. 4.6 establish a notion of trust on a Data Owner’s part. 
The Data Owner links a registered user with the Service Provider or the Cloud 
Service Provider through the logical sequences of tasks, and these tasks are shown in 
Fig. 4.5 of our work. We claim that cryptographic manoeuvres and keys used in the 
logical sequence of tasks ensure authentication and confidentiality, and 
authentication and confidentiality lead to transparency in the interactions, and 
transparency ensures a Data Owner’s trust; we regard the claim as the Claim 4. 
Authentication is ensured by encrypting content with the Private Key of a sender; 
confidentiality is achieved by encrypting content with the Public Key of a recipient.  
Claim 4: Authentication and confidentiality lead to transparency and trust. 
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Proof: We show the validity of the Claim 4 by focussing on the following game or 
attack.    
Game 1: Malicious breaches of authentication and confidentiality in tasks cause the 
lack of a Data Owner’s trust in the Service Provider or Cloud Service Provider.    
With regard to the Game 1 of the Claim 4, we take a user’s request, in step 1 of 
Fig. 4.5, to the Data Owner; the request is responded by the Service Provider or the 
Cloud Service Provider at the end of step 6. During the intervening steps, interactions 
between the Service Provider or the Cloud Service Provider and the Data Owner 
ensure authentication and confidentiality. The Data Owner confidentially sends the 
content in step 3 of  Fig. 4.5  to the Service Provider or the Cloud Service Provider. 
The Service Provider or the Cloud Service Provider having the respective Private 
Key reveals that the content that is sent by the Data Owner. The inner part of step 3 
sent by the Data Owner is confidential to the user; at the end of step 6, this inner part 
is forwarded to the user by the Service Provider or the Cloud Service Provider;  the 
inner part is revealed by the user having the respective Private Key. These 
authentication and confidentiality are achieved through the encryption respectively 
with Private and Public Keys; these authentication and confidentiality ensure the 
transparency of the interactions. This transparency ensures the Data Owner’s trust.   
In our work, the verification of a registered user is based on the updated Trust 
Ticket and Capability List as shown in steps (3i) through (3iii). During these triple 
verifications, the Data Owner does not have to be online.  Any deviation from the 
user’s Trust Ticket Expiration (TTExp) in step (3i) results in the immediate 
termination of the algorithmic protocol as shown in Fig. 4.6, and the detection of a 
deviation ensures that the Data Owner can update TTExp in the CSP at any time. Any 
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deviation caused by the updated TTExp debars a registered user from accessing the 
Data Owner-encrypted data. We claim that the verification of a registered user based 
on the updated Trust Ticket ensures a Data Owner’s control over data and a user; we 
regard this claim as the Claim 5.  
Claim 5: The Verification of a registered user based on the updated Trust Ticket 
establishes a Data Owner’s control over data and a user. 
Proof: We prove the validity of the Claim 5 by concentrating on the following game 
or attack.    
Game 1: A user’s Trust Ticket Expiration (TTExp) is maliciously changed.    
In connection with the Game 1 of the Claim 5, the Trust Ticket is an encrypted 
container that has Trust Ticket Expiration. The Data Owner sends the Trust Ticket to 
a registered User and the Service Provider as shown in Fig. 4.5, and the Service 
Provider sends its signed copy of the Trust Ticket to the Data Owner. Any deviation 
of the Trust Ticket Expiration is identified by comparing the Trust Ticket Expiration 
in the Trust Tickets.    
We claim that the deployment of Trust Ticket shortens the interactions between 
a Service Provider or a Cloud Service Provider and a user; we regard this claim as 
the Claim 6. A Data Owner generates Trust Ticket in step 2 of Fig. 4.5 and distributes 
it to a Service Provider and a user in steps 3 and 6 of Fig. 4.5 respectively. During 
these steps, interactions are based on authentication and confidentiality. Unless a 
Data Owner updates Trust Ticket, these interactions at steps 3 and 6 of Fig. 4.5 are 
not repeated further between a user and a CSP due to existing Trust Ticket. The 
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overall computation time in our algorithm is less than that of prior work [118] as 
shown in Table 4.3.     
4.10 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, we have devised an algorithmic protocol for the deployment of a 
Data Owner-generated Trust Ticket. This Trust Ticket is a notion of trust from the 
perspective of a Data Owner’s control over data and a registered user. We have 
argued that Trust Ticket is a link between a Service Provider or a Cloud Service 
Provider and a registered user through a Data Owner. A Data Owner encrypts the 
data with Secret Key, KO and outsources the encrypted data   to a Service Provider. A 
Data Owner also updates that data. A Data Owner shares KO with a user at the end of 
that user’s registration. A Data Owner is the issuer and distributor of the Trust Ticket 
during a user’s registration. A Data Owner remains online only during a user’s 
registration. In the algorithmic protocol for Trust Ticket deployment, triple 
verifications of a registered user and triple encryptions of data establish a Data 
Owner’s notion of trust. Unless a Data Owner makes any changes, a registered user 
uses the Trust Ticket and KO for a Data Owner’s data service from a Service 
Provider. 
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Chapter 5 
Propagating a Data Owner’s Control to Handle 
Insiders’ Threats 
In this chapter, we present our mechanism for the trust problem in Software as a 
Service or SaaS Cloud Computing from a Data Owner’s perspective. The trust 
problem arises from the insiders’ threats in SaaS Cloud Computing. The perception 
of the insiders’ threats is that insiders cause a Data Owner’s data confidentiality 
breach. Insiders in Cloud Computing are entities that are involved in executing 
computation on Data Owners’ data. This chapter provides a mechanism to 
authenticate entities that are involved in executing computation on Data Owners’ 
data. A Data Owner’s data propagate from the Data Owner to the Service Provider, 
and insiders in the Service Provider execute computing tasks on the data. 
Propagating a Data Owner’s trust provides a perception of trust from the Data 
Owner’s perspective. Propagating a Data Owner’s trust is in the form of propagating 
the Data Owner’s control into the authentication of the entities. In this chapter, we 
achieve a Data Owner’s control into the authentication of the entities by 
incorporating an External Trusted Entity and designing associated protocols.  We 
have done experiments in Java programming   language by classifying interactions 
among entities into four groups. The experiment results show Trust Perception Level 
(TPL) of a Data Owner and Insiders’ Threats Appearance (ITA). TPL is defined as 
the perception that provides a Data Owner with the sense that insiders’ threats 
become offset through the regulated Cloud environment, and our proposed security 
protocols and the security protocols of the prior work contribute to the regulated 
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Cloud environment through the inherent arranged activities among the entities. ITA 
is defined as the numerical value that shows the presence or occurrence of a threat 
with regard to a functional stage of our proposed protocols and the protocols of the 
prior work [11].  TPL and ITA show the prominence of our work over the prior one. 
With the experimental results and security analyses, our proposed mechanism is ideal 
for propagating a Data Owner’s control to handle insiders’ threats in SaaS Cloud 
Computing. 
5.1  Introduction 
 While Cloud Computing is a new way of computing with utility features [22], 
it introduces a new frontier of risks and challenges [10, 83, 119]. These risks arise 
from the fact that Data Owners or Cloud Computing users are unaware of remote 
machines, and the remote machines hold the data and execute the computation on the 
data. Cloud Computing virtually requires the Data Owners to relinquish the control 
of their data and computation to a Service Provider or a Cloud Service Provider 
(CSP). Virtual Machines (VMs) and Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM) are key 
components of a multi-tenant shared environment [21, 120] in which computation 
takes place. In Software as a Service (SaaS) Cloud Computing, a Cloud Computing 
user interacts with an application through browser for outsourcing their data. For the 
availability of the Cloud Computing user’s requested application on the browser, the 
insiders become involved in relevant activities. These relevant activities include 
overseeing the arrangement of a physical machine, a virtual machine on the physical 
machine, preparing the virtual machine as a webserver, launching the application on 
the webserver, making the application available to the Cloud Computing user. 
Further, the insiders oversee the computation on the data and the storage of the data 
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in remote machines. Cloud Computing insiders are entities that are involved in the 
execution of Cloud Computing services. Cloud Computing services include 
computation of the data and storage of the data on the machines that are under a 
Service Provider or a Cloud Service Provider. Cloud Computing users are not aware 
of the insiders and the machines. Cloud Computing insiders can inspect a Data 
Owner’s data and computation. These insiders’ threats are prominent for data 
confidentiality breaches. Since the Cloud Computing users have no direct 
involvement in overseeing the computation and storage of their data in the Cloud, the 
Cloud Computing users’ lack of confidence exists on the computation and storage of 
the data in the Cloud. The Cloud Computing users’ lack of confidence becomes their 
lack of trust in the Cloud. The lack of confidence or trust also more specifically 
arises from unclear security situations, lack of transparency, and loss of control over 
the computation and the data in the Cloud. Security situations are unclear because 
they are beyond the Cloud Computing users’ monitoring capability. Transparency is 
absent because the Cloud Computing users or the Data Owners remain unaware 
regarding the real facts, and the real facts include all transactions and interactions 
that take place irrespective of their presence. Cloud Computing users have loss of 
control over the computation and the storage of the data in the Cloud because the 
computation and the storage take place on the machines that are beyond the reach of 
the Cloud Computing users. Consequently, the foregoing propositions regarding the 
Cloud Computing users’ lack of confidence converge into the trust problem in the 
SaaS Cloud Computing.   
Cloud Computing users’ or Data Owners’ control over data and computation is 
an important issue in Cloud Computing [4, 29]. The predominant reason for the 
foregoing fact is that the more control Data Owners will have over the data and 
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computation outsourced to the Cloud, the more they will trust the Cloud.  Control 
over data to Data Owners is to ensure that no one other than Data Owners can access 
data and do computation.  Propagating a Data Owner’s control over data empowers a 
Data Owner in handling insiders’ threats. Control over data and confidentiality of 
data converge into Data Owners’ trust [4]. One approach to solving the trust problem 
is to propagate Data Owners’ control into the authentication of entities, and these 
entities are involved with the computation and storage of the data. In this chapter, we 
explore  
Towards handling insiders’ threats, how can we propagate a Data Owner’s 
control into the authentication of entities that are involved with the Data Owner’s 
data in a remote machine?  
While the prior work [11] has shown the top-down notion of trust, there is no 
clear algorithmic protocol to handle insiders’ threats. D. Zissis et al. in [11]  have 
engaged a Trusted Third Party to ensure top-down notion of trust. The top-down 
notion highlights that each layer trusts the layer that immediately follows it. 
However, a detailed consistent mechanism illustrating the inherent activities of trust 
and security is absent in the paper. Furthermore, it is not clear how SaaS Cloud 
Computing in particular can use the certificates up to a virtual machine. For Data 
Owners’ trust, it is not clear how a Trusted Third Party tackles encryption, 
decryption, computation, and storage issues by overcoming insiders’ threats in SaaS 
Cloud Computing.  Besides, it is unclear how a Trusted Third Party prevents Data 
Owners’ data from being inspected and/or modified by an unauthorized entity or an 
administrator or an insider having control over computation node. The computation 
server runs virtual machines that serve as webservers for applications. Cloud 
Computing users or Data Owners interact with these applications over browsers for 
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their data.  From the perspective of trust and virtualization, D. Zissis et al. in [11] 
have not taken into consideration relevant interactions among entities, such as  
computation servers, virtual machines, web servers, applications, a Trusted Third 
Party, and Data Owners. They have neither given these interactions among Data 
Owners, a Trusted Third Party, and computation servers nor they have given 
protocols in support of the solution in [11]. These interactions are important for the 
registration of computation servers with a Trusted Third Party and the handling of 
virtual machines in the registered computation servers. These interactions are also 
used to reveal the trustworthy status of the registered computation servers and the 
virtual machines that are run on the registered computation servers by the Trusted 
Third Party. However, for Data Owners’ control over data to handle insiders’ threats, 
D. Zissis et al. in [11] have not provided  any mechanism for a Trusted Third Party to 
place the virtual machines on the registered computation servers. In this chapter, we 
delve into  SaaS Cloud Computing functionalities and relevant interactions, and these 
functionalities and relevant interactions are missing in [11]. Delving into 
functionalities and relevant interactions is important from the perspective of 
propagating a Data Owner’s trust or control over data and computation to handle 
insiders’ threats. 
Under the context and scenario of a Data Owner using SaaS Cloud Computing 
to outsource data and computation, the prime condition is to get rid of insiders’ 
threats. The assumption in our chapter and the prior work is the use of Trusted Third 
Party (TTP). Our chapter proposes Trust Enhanced Security (TES) mechanism with 
transparent protocol to handle insiders’ threats. The reason for the Trust Enhanced 
Security mechanism is that the mechanism proposes a notion of trust that enhances 
security. The protocol in our mechanism shows the propagation of trust into the 
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authentication of entities that are involved in the execution of data and computation. 
The propagation of trust ensures a Data Owner’s control over data, and handles 
insiders’ threats. Contributions of the chapter are as follows: 
x Delving into the functionalities of entities in SaaS Cloud Computing to 
handle insiders’ threats. Understating the functionalities of entities is an 
important step towards understanding the interactions among entities to 
handle insiders’ threats. 
x Delving into the interactions among entities in SaaS Cloud Computing. 
Understanding the features of the interactions among the entities provides 
the basis of devising protocols to handle insiders’ threats. 
x Setting the two criteria, such as the Trust Perception Level (TPL) and 
Insiders’ Threats Appearance (ITA). TPL is a Data Owner’s perception 
about each interaction or each interaction class that is prone to insiders’ 
threats. TPL being the highest is indicative of a Data Owner’s confidence 
about the least insiders’ threats. ITA is a scaling of the occurrence or 
emergence of insiders’ threats. ITA being the lowest indicates that the 
threats will not occur.     
x Formulating and experimentally evaluating the protocol with the feature to 
propagate a Data Owner’s trust. Propagating a Data Owner’s trust leads to 
the Data Owner’s control into the functionalities of entities to handle 
insiders’ threats. 
x Formulating and experimentally evaluating the protocols with the feature 
to propagate a Data Owner’s trust. Propagating a Data Owner’s trust leads 
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to the Data Owner’s control into the interactions among the entities to 
handle insiders’ threats. 
x Formulating and experimentally evaluating the protocols with the feature 
to propagate a Data Owner’s trust. Propagating a Data Owner’s trust leads 
to the Data Owner’s control into the authentication of the entities to handle 
insiders’ threats. 
5.2  Ideal Representative Scenarios 
In the ideal or best case scenarios, we envisage that all data outsourcing and 
accessing related activities of a Data Owner take place up to the expectation of the 
Data Owner.  The data outsourcing and accessing related activities comprise 
interactions among the Data Owner and a Service Provider or a Cloud Service 
Provider.  The Service Provider makes the services available to the Data Owner or 
the user. The Data Owner uses the services to outsource the data. The Data Owner or 
a user uses the services to access the outsourced data. In the ideal scenarios, there is 
no risk that the data provided by the Data Owner is compromised in physical and 
virtual machines where the data is processed. The Data Owner assumes that the data 
is processed in an uncompromised virtual machine, and the uncompromised virtual 
machine is created in an uncompromised physical machine. Throughout an ideal 
scenario based process of having a Data Owner outsource the data to a Service 
Provider and also having the Data Owner or a user access the outsourced data, the 
physical machine and the virtual machine remain uncompromised. With regard to 
our proposed mechanism, we present the following scenarios. 
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Ideal Scenarios of having a Data Owner outsource the data to a Service 
Provider and also outsourcing the information of the legitimate users to access 
the outsourced data 
In the ideal scenario, a Data Owner is an individual or an enterprise that 
outsources the data to a Service Provider. The Data Owner also outsources the 
information of the legitimate users to access the outsourced data, and the Data Owner 
updates the information of the users in the Service Provider to access the data. The 
Data Owner or the enterprise interacts with a Service Provider or a Cloud Service 
Provider to outsource data. The Service Provider or the Cloud Service Provider 
maintains the Data Owner’s data into multiple servers irrespective of their locations. 
The Data Owner or the enterprise frequently updates the data. Users access the data 
fetched by the Service Provider or the Cloud Service Provider. In the best case 
scenario, all interactions between a Data Owner and a Service Provider for data 
outsourcing and access take place in an uncompromised environment. 
Uncompromised physical machines and uncompromised virtual machines comprise 
the uncompromised environment. In the uncompromised environment, all entities 
execute the computation and storage of the data without breaching the data 
confidentiality. However, in the worst case scenario, there are risks that the 
computing environment executing the computation and storage of the data becomes 
malicious or compromised. The environment becomes compromised because the 
physical machines and the virtual machines comprising the environment become 
compromised, and the impact of compromised environment is detailed in the section 
of worst case scenarios.  
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5.2.1 Single Cloud Perspective 
In a single Cloud perspective, a computing environment is composed of 
physical machines and virtual machines that remain limited to the data centres of a 
single Service Provider or Cloud Service Provider. Since a single Service Provider or 
a Cloud Service Provider is the source of a physical machine and a virtual machine, 
the single Service Provider or the Cloud Service Provider remains in the authority of 
the physical machine and the virtual machine. Since the single Service Provider 
remains in the authority of the virtual machines and the physical machine on which 
the virtual machine is created, there is a risk that any processing performed with the 
virtual machine is likely to be inspected or compromised, and we will highlight the 
compromising issues in the next section detailing the worst case scenarios. In this 
chapter, we provide the mechanism to handle insiders’ threats from the perspective 
of a Single Cloud.    
5.2.2 Multi-Cloud Perspective 
In a multi-Cloud perspective, a computing environment is composed of physical 
machines and virtual machines that are from the data centres of multiple Service 
Providers or Cloud Service Providers. In a multi-Cloud perspective, one Service 
Provider leases virtual machine from another Service Provider or a Cloud Service 
Provider. In a multi-Cloud scenario, a computation initiated in a virtual machine of a 
Service Provider is worthy of being shifted to a new virtual machine, and the new  
virtual machine is created in a physical machine that belongs to another Service 
Provider or Cloud Service Provider. In the multi-Cloud scenario, a processing is 
initiated in a virtual machine of a primary or principal Service Provider from which 
the as usual service is received. During the prior processing, the critical part of the 
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computation is shifted to a virtual machine running on the physical machine of a 
secondary Service Provider, and the Secondary Service Provider is alien to the 
Primary Service Provider. The computed data in the secondary Service Provider is 
further processed in the primary Service Provider for outsourcing the data to the 
storages under the primary Service Provider. In the future work, we intend to explore 
the mechanism to handle insiders’ threats from the perspective of multi-Cloud by 
overcoming the limitations of a Single Cloud as articulated in the limitations of this 
chapter.    
5.3  Vulnerabilities and Attacks  Scenarios 
With regard to the prior ideal scenarios, we point out the following 
vulnerabilities and attacks.  
Vulnerable and attack scenarios of having a Data Owner outsource the data to a 
Service Provider and also outsourcing the information of the legitimate users to 
access the outsourced data  
With regard to the prior ideal scenario, a Data Owner is an individual or an 
enterprise that interacts with a Service Provider to outsource data and legitimate 
users’ information. While the interactions proceed as regards the Data Owner’s data 
and users’ information outsourcing, there is a risk of attacks. The risk remains 
dormant in the processing performed in the machines, and the machines include a 
virtual machine running on a physical machine of the Service Provider. The 
machines are in authority of the Service Provider, and the data and processing remain 
in the risk of being inspected by the insiders that work as privileged users and 
administrators. This risk becomes evident when a Data Owner’s data is  
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x Processed in a virtual machine that runs in a physical machine of the Service 
Provider. Instead of the Data Owner or an external trusted third party, 
insiders in the Service Provider monitor the trustworthiness of the physical 
machine and the virtual machine throughout the processing. 
x Processed in machines whose status of trustworthiness changes frequently 
due to influences of the Service Provider. The influences include the 
intervention in the processing by insiders of the Service Providers, insiders’ 
intentional or inadvertent transfer of the Data Owner’s messages to a 
machine of an untrustworthy status, and recording or inspecting any piece of 
data during the processing with or without prior knowledge of the Data 
Owner. 
  
When a Service Provider or a Cloud Service Provider receives a Data Owner’s 
data, the data is processed in a virtual machine that runs in a physical machine. There 
is a need for checking the trustworthiness of the physical and virtual machines. When 
insiders or privileged users or administrators remain in control of the physical 
machine and the virtual machine, the data being processed in the machines become 
intentionally or inadvertently inspected by the insiders, and this inspection by the 
insiders is threat to the data confidentiality. Since the processing on the data is 
beyond the sight of the Data Owner and the number of processing on the data is 
variable, one incidence of inspecting the data beyond the knowledge of the Data 
Owner is tantamount to multiple attacks. 
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5.4  Claims 
In this section, we provide the claims of our proposed mechanism. The claims 
include: 
x Improving a Data Owner’s trust perception by propagating the Data 
Owner’s control into the authentication of the entities that handle the data.  
x Establishing the computation and storage of a Data Owner’s data in a 
processing environment, and the environment provides the least presence of 
insiders’ threats because of propagating the Data Owner’s control into the 
authentication of the entities handling the data. 
5.5  Design Methodology 
In this section, we provide the terminologies and principles for our security 
protocols throughout the chapter.  In the following section, we provide the notations 
that are used in the chapter 
5.5.1 Notations and Symbols 
In this section, we provide the following notations and symbols that are used in 
the reminder of the chapter. 
Notation Interpretations 
CM : Cloud Manager, Cloud Service Provider 
CSP : Service Provider or Cloud Service Provider 
Data  : Data Owners’ data 
ETE  : External Trusted Entity 
EKPtz  : Endorsement Key of z. t= (+, -)=(public, private); z=(TC, SCS)  
K : Session key generated by a user or a Data Owner 
KVM : Session key for virtual machine 
nx : Unique random numbers by x to avoid replay attack 
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SCS : Computation Server or SaaS Computation Server 
STS : Transmission Server or SaaS Transmission Server 
TC : Trusted Coordinator 
TESEE : Trust Enhanced Secure Execution Environment 
TKPtZ,  : Trusted Key of Z. t= (+, -)=(public, private) 
TPM : Trusted Platform Module 
VM : Virtual Machine 
( y )Kx : Data y are encrypted with key Kx 
 
5.5.2 Trust and Trusted Computing Principles 
Trust revolves around assurance and confidence that entities or processes will 
function or behave in expected ways [4]. Trust is also a consequence of progress 
towards control, privacy, and confidentiality of security principles. Trust is 
established between parties through challenge-response protocol [116, 117].  
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1. Host (H) computes measurement list (ML)
at boot time.
2. Host stores ML in the Platform
Configuration Register (PCR) of Trusted
Platform Module (TPM).
ML consists of the sequence of hashes of
the softwares involved. These softwares
include the Basic Input Output System
(BIOS), the bootloader, and the software
implementing the platform of the host. The
measurement list is stored in the PCRs of
the TPM
3. Remote Entity (RE) sends nonce, nU.
4. Platform invokes TPM to create message
consisting of ML and nu in reply to the
Nonce, nu.
5. TPM creates the messages with
with the Private Endorsement Key, EKP-.
The message is (ML, nu) EKP-.
   Private Endorsement Key (EKP-) uniquely
identifies the TPM (therefore, the host
embedded with that TPM).
6. (ML, nu) EKP-
7. RE decrypts (ML, nu) EKP- with
Public Endorsement Key, EKP+ and
RE checks if the nu matches and ML
corresponds to the configuration
that the RE deems trusted.
Notations:
ML : Measurement List consists of the sequence of hashes of the softwares
involved. These softwares include the Basic Input Output System (BIOS), the
bootloader, and the software implementing the platform of the host. The
measurement list is stored in the PCRs of the TPM
PCR: A Platform Configuration Register is one of the registers in TPM. A PCR takes
part in the attestation process by holding sensitive policies and keys.
RE : Remote Entity is a Data Owner or a
user.
TPM: Trusted Platform Module is a
cryptographic component.
 
Figure 5.1.  TPM as a root of trust in trusted computing. 
Trusted computing, with a Trusted Platform Module (TPM), provides 
mechanisms to control the behaviour of computer systems. With details of the trusted 
computing and TPM in [121], we show the challenge-response interactions for 
remote attestation in Fig. 5.1. 
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TPM is a cryptographic component that provides root of trust for building 
trusted computing base. TPM stores cryptographic keys that can be used to attest the 
operating state of the platform. The keys are used to measure the platform. For 
example, Endorsement Private Key (EKP-) uniquely identifies the TPM (therefore, 
the host embedded with that TPM) and cryptographic functions that cannot be 
modified. 
The respective manufacturers sign the corresponding Public Key (EKP+) in 
support of the correctness of the TPM chip and the validity of the key. Attestation 
process allows clients to request Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs) of the 
TPM and verify the policy and the configuration of the platform. Based on the 
attestation from the TPM of the platform, clients determine whether they wish to use 
the service.   
As in Fig. 5.1, the remote attestation mechanism works with the host (H) 
computing the Measurement List (ML). ML consists of the sequence of hashes of the 
software involved, and these software include the Basic Input Output System 
(BIOS), the bootloader, and the software implementing the platform of the host. The 
measurement list is stored in the PCRs of the TPM as shown in the first message in 
Fig. 5.1. In order to attest to the platform running at the host, a remote entity with a 
nonce, nu challenges the platform as shown in the second message in Fig. 5.1. The 
remote entity uses the nonce nu to trace replay attack as shown in the last message 
from the host to the remote entity in Fig. 5.1. The platform invokes local TPM 
embedded in the host. TPM creates a message of measurement list, ML and nonce, 
nu, and the message is encrypted with   EKP-.  The host sends the encrypted message 
to the remote entity that decrypts the message with EKP+. The remote entity checks 
whether the second nonce matches with the first one.  The second nonce is sent by 
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the host in the 7th message in Fig. 5.1, and the first   nonce is the one that the remote 
entity sent in the second message in Fig. 5.1. If the first nonce matches with the 
second one, the remote entity verifies the received ML with the ML known and 
trusted to the remote entity. At the end of the verification, the platform on an 
untrusted host is identified to be trusted to the remote entity. 
5.5.3 System Components 
Trust covers the confidence of the Data Owners (or Cloud Computing users), 
and the confidence regarding a Service Provider or a Cloud Service Provider (CSP) 
is essential. In Cloud Computing, each host or node or Computation Server is 
embedded with TPM as shown in Fig. 5.2.  
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Trusted Coordinator (TC). TC maintains a
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3. Each Trusted Virtual Machine Monitor
(TVMM) runs inside a node that is registered
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4. Each TVMM communicates with the TC for
each virtual machine (VM).
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6. Each TVMM communicates with the Cloud
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Figure 5.2. Overview of the components of our proposed mechanism. 
   A Data Owner as a remote entity, as shown in Fig. 5.1, verifies a remote platform 
running in a host. The end result of the verification creates Data Owners’ confidence 
about the arrangement of security in that remote platform.  Data Owners need 
arrangements to have control over data and computation just as in-house facilities. 
To facilitate such arrangements, External Trusted Entity (ETE) having Trusted 
Coordinator and Cloud Manager are endorsed by Cloud Computing users and a 
Service Provider or a CSP. The External Trusted Entity is synonymously used as the 
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Trusted Third Party from now onwards. External Trusted Entity, on behalf of Data 
Owners or users, initiates a virtual machine (VM) of Trust Enhanced Secure 
Execution Environment (TESEE) in a node or server; the node handles the 
computation or processing in the Service Provider or the CSP. Prior to the launch of 
the virtual machine of the TESEE or VMTESEE on the foregoing node, the node or 
the server embedded with a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) runs Trusted Virtual 
Machine Monitor (TVMM). The TVMM runs under the Trusted Coordinator of the 
External Trusted Entity. For a node to be trusted, each node embedded with a TPM 
completes registration with the Trusted Coordinator before the TVMM is run and the 
VMTESEE is launched. In summary, the TVMM running in a node hosts a virtual 
machine, VMTESEE after the node has completed the registration process with the 
Trusted Coordinator.  
5.6  Single Cloud Approach to Handling Insiders’ Threats 
In this section, we consider a single Cloud into consideration, and we provide 
our mechanism to handle insiders’ threats. In our Thesis in general and in this 
chapter in particular, Trust Enhanced Security (TES) mechanism is a notion. In this 
notion, we put emphasis on establishing trust so as to enhance security.      
5.6.1 System Architecture of Trust Enhanced Security Mechanism 
In our proposed mechanism, we have represented entities of Software as a 
Service (SaaS) Cloud Computing. These entities include SaaS client for Cloud 
Computing users or Data Owners, SaaS Transmission Servers or Transmission 
Servers (STS), SaaS Storage Servers or Storage Servers (SSS), and SaaS 
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Computation Servers or Computation Servers (SCS).  Storage Servers and 
Computation Servers are available from data centres at different locations.  
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Figure 5.3. Our Proposed Trust Enhanced Secure Mechanism. 
Having extracted the methodologies in [18] , our proposed mechanism also involves 
the Trusted Coordinator (TC) and Cloud Manager (CM) of the External Trusted 
Entity (ETE). Our proposed mechanism, with the trusted computing principle, 
enforces the Trust Enhanced Secure Execution Environment (TESEE) on a 
Computation Server. The trusted computing base of our proposed mechanism 
includes Trusted Virtual Machine Monitor and Trusted Coordinator as in Fig. 5.2 
and Fig. 5.3.  The Computation Server embedded with a certified TPM chip proceeds 
with a secure boot process to install a Trusted Virtual Machine Monitor. Under the 
control of the Trusted Coordinator, the Trusted Virtual Machine Monitor running on 
the Computation Server hosts the virtual machine of TESEE. The Computation 
Server remains under the control of the External Trusted Entity, and the External 
Trusted Entity controls the Computation Server as long as the Trusted Virtual 
Machine Monitor runs on the Computation Server. Our proposed mechanism, as 
illustrated in section 5.6.2, prevents privileged users or insiders of the Computation 
Server from inspecting or modifying the memory of virtual machine of Trust 
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Enhanced Secure Execution Environment. In section 5.6.4, we will provide the 
analysis of the foregoing statement, and we will include experimental outcome in the 
analysis. The experimental outcome and discussion precede the security analysis. 
Privileged users or insiders include the administrators of the Service Provider. The 
Trusted Coordinator attests to the Trusted Platform Module of the Computation 
Server, and the attestation verifies that the Computation Server runs a Trusted Virtual 
Machine Monitor. The related protocol for Computation Server registration with the 
Trusted Coordinator is shown in Fig. 5.4. 
Trusted Virtual Machine Monitor hosts and protects the virtual machine of the 
Trust Enhanced Secure Execution Environment (TESEE), and Trusted Virtual 
Machine Monitor receives and executes the commands of the Cloud Manager. The 
commands include launch and terminate virtual machines. In  the  final  step  of the 
Computation Server registration, if the Computation Server is found to be trusted, the 
Trusted Coordinator  launches  the  virtual machine of  the TESEE  on  the  
Computation Server. The virtual machine of the TESEE is VMTESEE as denoted in 
our mechanism. This launch is done through the Cloud Manager that sends a 
command to the Trusted Virtual Machine Monitor. In that command, the information 
for launching the virtual machine of the TESEE includes an image file. This file is 
stored on the Cloud Manager before it is transferred to the Computation Server. This 
image file contains modules for computation, encryption, and decryption as in Fig. 
5.3. In our proposed mechanism, the computation module is provided by the Service 
Provider. With regard to prior work [11], there is an evident clarity in our proposed 
model. We discuss the clarity of our proposed mechanism in sections 5.6.2 through 
5.6.4, and in the discussion, we take the protocols in Fig. 5.4 and Fig. 5.5 into 
account. Components of our proposed mechanism are as follows: 
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Client 
Client is a component with a web browser and a portable device.  A Graphical 
User Interface (GUI) in the SaaS application (or Cloud App) runs on the web 
browser. The portable device provided by the External Trusted Entity include 
Private-Public Keys of an asymmetric cryptographic key pair, a public trusted key of 
Trusted Coordinator, decryption and encryption functions, and a uniform resource 
identifier of Trusted Coordinator. The keys and functions given in the portable 
device are utilized to encrypt the messages from SaaS client to SaaS Transmission 
Server or decrypt the messages from SaaS Transmission Server to SaaS client. 
Transmission Server 
The SaaS Transmission Server (STS) is a web server, and the Transmission 
Server interconnect SaaS client with the remaining part of the system.  
Computation Server 
The SaaS Computation Server (SCS) is a server that runs a VMTESEE. The VMTESEE 
is a virtual machine of Trust Enhanced Secure Execution Environment (TESEE) as 
shown in Fig. 5.2.  SCS involves a Trusted Virtual Machine Monitor (TVMM) and a 
Trusted Platform Module, and it registers with the Trusted Coordinator (TC) that 
belongs to the External Trusted Entity. With regard to a VMTESEE in Fig. 5.2, Fig. 5.4, 
and Fig. 5.5, the functionality of a TVMM includes: 
• Facilitating the creation of the VMTESEE on the SCS that runs the TVMM. 
• Maintaining the confidentiality of data and computations in the VMTESEE.  
• Following the protocol for the registration of a SCS with the TC. 
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Storage Server 
The SaaS Storage Server (SSS) is a server that handles the retrieval and storage 
requests.  
Trust Enhanced Secure Execution Environment 
The TESEE decrypts the data with the decryption module, processes them with 
the computation module, and encrypts the result of the computation module with the 
encryption module. In the TESEE, the encryption and decryption modules provided 
by the External Trusted Entity interact with the Computation Server. The 
computation module provided by the SaaS Service Provider interacts only with 
TESEE. 
External Trusted Entity 
The ETE hosts two components: Trusted Coordinator (TC) and Cloud 
Manager (CM). The TC attests to the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) of the 
Computation Server to verify the status of the Trusted Virtual Machine Monitor. The 
status of the Trusted Virtual Machine Monitor indicates that the Trusted Virtual 
Machine Monitor is in running mode in the registered Computation Server with the 
Trusted Coordinator. If the Trusted Virtual Machine Monitor is running, the 
Computation Server is deemed to be trusted. When the Trusted Coordinator finds the 
Computation Server to be trusted, the Trusted Coordinator launches the virtual 
machine of Trust Enhanced Secure Execution Environment or VMTESEE on the 
Computation Server. In launching the virtual machine of the TESEE, the Trusted 
Coordinator coordinates with the Cloud Manager to send a command to the Trusted 
Virtual Machine Monitor. The External Trusted Entity is maintained by a Trusted 
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Third Party with no conflict with the SaaS Service Provider. The administrators or 
insiders in the SaaS Service Provider are outsider to the External Trusted Entity; the 
administrators or insiders in the SaaS Service Provider have no privileges inside the 
External Trusted Entity. Since the administrators or insiders in the SaaS Service 
Provider are outsider to the External Trusted Entity, the administrators or insiders in 
the SaaS Service Provider cannot control the Trusted Coordinator and Cloud 
Manager of the External Trusted Entity. 
5.6.2 Algorithmic Protocols 
In this section, we describe the protocols that show interactions among entities. 
From the point of view of transparency, interactions among entities propagate trust in 
the authentication of entities handling Data Owners’ data. When performing 
operations on Data Owners’ data, our proposed mechanism in Fig. 5.3 guarantees 
that (i) data can be encrypted and decrypted in the virtual machine of Trust Enhanced 
Secure Execution Environment or VMTESEE on the Computation Server. (ii) Data 
encrypted by the VMTESEE always remain encrypted in the SaaS system i.e., in 
Computation Server, Transmission Server, and storage Server. In order to meet the 
foregoing requirements, the entities involved in performing operations on Data 
Owners’ data follow the protocol in Fig. 5.5. In these protocols, Data Owners or 
Cloud Computing users only trust the Trusted Coordinator as assumed in this 
chapter. In these protocols, we use the notations described in section 5.5.1 
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5.6.2.1 Registration of a Node with External Trusted Entity 
The Trusted Coordinator attests to the Trusted Platform Module of 
Computation Server, and this attestation verifies that the Trusted Virtual Machine 
Monitor is running.  
TC CM
ETE
Computation
Encryption
Decryption
TPM
Computation ServerVMTESEE
TVMM
1
2
3
4
8
1. challenge nSCS , where nSCS is a nonce from
the Computation Server
2. nTC, {MLTC, nSCS }EKP-TC
3. { { MLSCS, nTC
} EKP+SCS,TKP+SCS
}TKP+TC
4. {accepted, KVM
}TKP+SCS
5. Trusted Virtual Machine Monitor
(TVMM) communicates with the Trusted
Coordinator (TC) for a virtual machine (VM)
6. TC prepares the Virtual Machine of Trust
Enhanced Secure Execution Environment
(TESEE) denoted as VMTESEE
7. TC communicates with the Cloud Manager
(CM) to start the VMTESEE
8. { VMTESEE, # VMTESEE
} KVM
6
7
5
TPM: Trusted Platform Module is a cryptographic
component that is embedded in a
Computation Server
TVMM: Trusted Virtual Machine Monitor running in a
Computation Server hosts virtual
machines
VM: Virtual Machine
EKP+SCS/EKP-SCS: Public Private Endorsement Key of TPM in SCS
KVM : Session Key
TKP+SCS/TKP-SCS: Trusted Public/Private Key of SCS
TKP+TC/TKP-TC: Trusted Public/Private Key of TC
TKP+TESEE/TKP-TESEE:Trusted Public/Private Key of TESEE
nz: nonce with z={user, scs}
Notations:
CM: Cloud Manager
ETE: External Trusted Entity
TC: Trusted Coordinator
ML: Measurement List consists of the sequence of hashes
of the softwares involved. These softwares include
the Basic Input Output System (BIOS), the
bootloader, and the software implementing the
platform of the host. The measurement list is stored
in the PCRs of the TPM
MLz : Measurement List from an entity z
SCS: Computation Server
TESEE: Trust Enhanced Secure Execution Environment
 
Figure 5.4. Protocol for the registration of node (SCS) with TC. 
In order to be trusted, Computation Server or SCS registers with the Trusted 
Coordinator or TC by complying with the protocol depicted in Fig. 5.4.  
In step 1 and 2, SCS attests to the Trusted Coordinator or TC. The purpose of 
the attestation is to avoid an impersonation of the TC by an attacker.  The 
Computation Server or SCS  sends  a  challenge  nscs to  the  Trusted Coordinator. 
The Trusted Coordinator replies with its bootstrap measurement MLTC encrypted 
with Private Endorsement Key, EKP-TC. Encrypted reply with EKP-TC guarantees the 
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authenticity of the TC.  If the MLTC matches the expected configuration, the Trusted 
Coordinator is deemed to be trusted. The Trusted Coordinator also attests to 
Computation Server or SCS. The attestation is done by sending a challenge nTC in 
step 2 and checking if the SCS is running the expected configuration in step 3 of 
Fig. 5.4. 
  The Computation Server or SCS generates a Trusted Private (-) and Public (+) 
Key pair <TKP-SCS, TKP+SCS >. The SCS sends Public Trusted Key (TKP+SCS) to  the 
Trusted Coordinator in message 3. If both entities mutually attest successfully, the 
Trusted Coordinator adds TKP+SCS to its SCS database, and sends message 4 
containing a session key KVM. The Trusted Coordinator generates the KVM to confirm 
that the SCS is trusted. The Trusted Coordinator uses the Public Trusted Key 
TKP+SCS, in the database of Trusted Coordinator, to certify that the SCS is trusted. 
In the final step of the SCS registration, if the SCS is trusted, the TC sends message 
8 to the Trusted Virtual Machine Monitor through the Cloud Manager. The message 
8 contains a virtual machine of Trust Enhanced Secure Execution Environment or 
VMTESEE and hash of the VMTESEE encrypted with the session key KVM. This 
encryption is used to guarantee the confidentiality and integrity of the VMTESEE 
during transmission.  The Trusted Virtual Machine Monitor launches the VMTESEE 
with its initial state of the VMTESEE. The Trusted Virtual Machine Monitor 
coordinates with the Trusted Platform Module for KVM to decrypt the message 8. The 
initial state VMTESEE contains the virtual machine image file and a Trusted Private 
and Public Key pair <TKP-TESEE, TKP+TESEE > of the Trust Enhanced Secure 
Execution Environment. A copy of the Public Trusted Key of the Trust Enhanced 
Secure Execution Environment (TKP+TESEE) is preserved in the trusted TESEE 
database of the Trusted Coordinator (TC). The TKP+TESEE in the database of the TC 
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is linked to the trusted Computation Server or SCS, and this SCS hosts the 
VMTESEE through the Trusted Virtual Machine Monitor. By utilising the TKP+TESEE, 
the TC authenticates the identity of VMTESEE. When the SCS reboots, Trusted 
Private Key TKP-SCS of the SCS becomes lost. To avoid a malicious activity, the 
SCS is required to registers with the TC again to update the Trusted Public Key 
TKP+SCS. 
5.6.2.2 Propagating a Data Owner’s Control During Data Storage 
In this section, we present the protocols depicted in Fig. 5.5, Fig. 5.6, Fig. 5.7, 
and Fig. 5.8 to secure the data storage operation. Notations used in the figure are 
mentioned in section 5.5.1. In the following discussion, we explicitly and implicitly 
refer to Fig. 5.5 as anyone of the figures represented as Fig. 5.5, Fig. 5.6, Fig. 5.7, 
and Fig. 5.8. 
In the first step of the protocol, a message from, a Cloud Computing user or 
Data contains the three parts. We denote a Cloud Computing user as a Data Owner. 
The first part is encrypted with K which is a session generated by the Data Owner, 
and the encrypted part contains data, operation, a Cloud Computing user’s or Data 
Owner’s Public Trusted Key TKP+u, and the user identifier  Uuser provided by the 
user him(her)self. The second part is encrypted with the Public Trusted Key of 
Trusted Coordinator (TKP+TC), and the second part contains the session key K.  The 
third part, without encryption, is the WTC. The WTC indicates which Trusted 
Coordinator in the External Trusted Entity is to be addressed for acquiring the K. 
Encrypting  the  session  key  K  with  TKP+TC ensures  that only  the  Trusted 
Coordinator authorizes  someone  to  access  the  first part including the Cloud 
Computing user’s or the Data Owner’s data and operation. The Trusted Coordinator 
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only authorizes Trusted Computation Server or SCSes. Each trusted SCS is 
recorded and tracked by its Public Trusted Key in database of the Trusted 
Coordinator. On reboot, the SCS needs to update its Public Trusted Key through 
registration with the Trusted Coordinator.  
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1. {data, str_op, TKP+u, Uuser}K, { K, nuser}TKP+TC, WTC.
Str_op, Str_op_res are storage operation and its result
respectively.
2. {data, str_op, TKP+u, Uuser}K, { K, nuser}TKP+TC, WTC, USTS.
2.1. SaaS Computation Server or Computation (SCS) cannot
decrypt (2) due to no keys and cryptographic capability, and SCS
invokes TESEE for (2).
3. { { { K, nuser }TKP+TC, TESEE, nSCS
}TKP-SCS , SCS
}TKP+TC
3.1. Trusted Coordinator (TC) searches Public Key, TKP+SCS from its
(TC) trusted SCS database with the Private Trusted Key, TKP-SCS.
If found, then SCS is trusted.
3.2. TC verifies whether the Trust Enhanced Secure Execution
Environment (TESEE) exists and is running on the
corresponding trusted SCS. TC verifies the TESEE by
searching TKP+TESEE in its (TC) trusted TESEE database. If TC
is certain about running TESEE on the corresponding trusted
SCS, TC decrypts K from (3) and encrypts K in (4).
4. { { { K, nuser } TKP+TESEE , nSCS
}TKP+SCS
}TKP- TC
4.1. SCS cannot decrypt (4) and invokes TESEE to handle (4).
Under control of ETE, only TESEE of the SCS with its (TESEE)
decryption module can read Session Key, K.
5.1. TESEE invokes computation module to check whether Uuser
equals to USTS to prevent masquerade attacks. If equals, no
attack.
5.2. If no attack, TESEE forwards data, operation, TKP+u , Uuser to
encryption module to encrypt data with TKP+u and sends (5.3)
to SSS.
5.3. {data}TKPu , Uuser
6.1. SSS stores encrypted data associated with the user.
6.2. str_op_res contains the location of the data centre.
7. {str_op_res, nuser}K.
8. {str_op_res, nuser}K can only be decrypted by user.
Notations and Symbols:
CM: Cloud Manager
CSP/SP: Cloud Service Provider/Service Provider
EBS: Elastic Block Storage
ELB_ASC: Elastic Load Balancing and Auto Scaling Group
ETE: External Trusted Entity
DO : Data Owner
SCS: SaaS Computation Server or Computation Server
STS: SaaS Transmission Server or Transmission Server
TC: Trusted Coordinator
TESEE: Trust Enhanced Secure Execution Environment
TPM: Trusted Platform Module
TVMM: Trusted Virtual Machine Monitor
VM: Virtual Machine
Session Key, K
Trusted Public/Private Key of SCS: TKP+SCS/TKP-SCS
Trusted Public/Private Key of TC: TKP+TC/TKP-TC
Trusted Public/Private Key of TESEE: TKP+TESEE/TKP-TESEE
nz: nonce with z={ user, scs}
Uz: Identity of a user or a Data Owner
by z={Data owner, user, STS}
WTC: Identity of a TC
A process labelled with m.n is executed within
an entity
Two consecutive processes labelled with x.y and
w.z are executed within an entity
m.n
 
Figure 5.5. Protocol for propagating a Data Owner’s control to handle insiders’ threats. 
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In the following Fig. 5.6,   we replace the tools in a portable device, as shown in 
Fig. 5.5, with the tools from an application in another Cloud, denoted by Cloud2. The 
tools from Cloud2 include all keys, encryption mechanism, and decryption 
mechanism; the tools remove the need for carrying a portable device.  
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1. {data, str_op, TKP+u, Uuser}K, { K, nuser}TKP+TC, WTC.
Str_op, Str_op_res are storage operation and its result
respectively.
2. {data, str_op, TKP+u, Uuser}K, { K, nuser}TKP+TC, WTC, USTS.
2.1. SaaS Computation Server or Computation (SCS) cannot
decrypt (2) due to no keys and cryptographic capability, and SCS
invokes TESEE for (2).
3. { { { K, nuser }TKP+TC, TESEE, nSCS
}TKP-SCS , SCS
}TKP+TC
3.1. Trusted Coordinator (TC) searches Public Key, TKP+SCS from its
(TC) trusted SCS database with the Private Trusted Key, TKP-SCS.
If found, then SCS is trusted.
3.2. TC verifies whether the Trust Enhanced Secure Execution
Environment (TESEE) exists and is running on the
corresponding trusted SCS. TC verifies the TESEE by
searching TKP+TESEE in its (TC) trusted TESEE database. If TC
is certain about running TESEE on the corresponding trusted
SCS, TC decrypts K from (3) and encrypts K in (4).
4. { { { K, nuser } TKP+TESEE , nSCS
}TKP+SCS
}TKP- TC
4.1. SCS cannot decrypt (4) and invokes TESEE to handle (4).
Under control of ETE, only TESEE of the SCS with its (TESEE)
decryption module can read Session Key, K.
5.1. TESEE invokes computation module to check whether Uuser
equals to USTS to prevent masquerade attacks. If equals, no
attack.
5.2. If no attack, TESEE forwards data, operation, TKP+u , Uuser to
encryption module to encrypt data with TKP+u and sends (5.3)
to SSS.
5.3. {data}TKPu , Uuser
6.1. SSS stores encrypted data associated with the user.
6.2. str_op_res contains the location of the data centre.
7. {str_op_res, nuser}K.
8. {str_op_res, nuser}K can only be decrypted by user.
Notations and Symbols:
CM: Cloud Manager
CSP/SP: Cloud Service Provider/Service Provider
EBS: Elastic Block Storage
ELB_ASC: Elastic Load Balancing and Auto Scaling Group
ETE: External Trusted Entity
DO : Data Owner
SCS: SaaS Computation Server or Computation Server
STS: SaaS Transmission Server or Transmission Server
TC: Trusted Coordinator
TESEE: Trust Enhanced Secure Execution Environment
TPM: Trusted Platform Module
TVMM: Trusted Virtual Machine Monitor
VM: Virtual Machine
Session Key, K
Trusted Public/Private Key of SCS: TKP+SCS/TKP-SCS
Trusted Public/Private Key of TC: TKP+TC/TKP-TC
Trusted Public/Private Key of TESEE: TKP+TESEE/TKP-TESEE
nz: nonce with z={ user, scs}
Uz: Identity of a user or a Data Owner
by z={Data owner, user, STS}
WTC: Identity of a TC
A process labelled with m.n is executed within
an entity
Two consecutive processes labelled with x.y and
w.z are executed within an entity
m.n
Cloud1
 
Figure 5.6. With respect to Fig. 5.5, an improvement of propagating a Data Owner’s control by 
eliminating dependency on a portable device.  
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In the following Fig. 5.7, we present a more improved internal view of the tools 
than the one shown in Fig. 5.6. We present the tools from an application in another 
Cloud denoted by Cloud2. 
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1. {data, str_op, TKP+u, Uuser}K, { K, nuser}TKP+TC, WTC.
Str_op, Str_op_res are storage operation and its result
respectively.
2. {data, str_op, TKP+u, Uuser}K, { K, nuser}TKP+TC, WTC, USTS.
2.1. SaaS Computation Server or Computation (SCS) cannot
decrypt (2) due to no keys and cryptographic capability, and SCS
invokes TESEE for (2).
3. { { { K, nuser }TKP+TC, TESEE, nSCS
}TKP-SCS , SCS
}TKP+TC
3.1. Trusted Coordinator (TC) searches Public Key, TKP+SCS from its
(TC) trusted SCS database with the Private Trusted Key, TKP-SCS.
If found, then SCS is trusted.
3.2. TC verifies whether the Trust Enhanced Secure Execution
Environment (TESEE) exists and is running on the
corresponding trusted SCS. TC verifies the TESEE by
searching TKP+TESEE in its (TC) trusted TESEE database. If TC
is certain about running TESEE on the corresponding trusted
SCS, TC decrypts K from (3) and encrypts K in (4).
4. { { { K, nuser } TKP+TESEE , nSCS
}TKP+SCS
}TKP- TC
4.1. SCS cannot decrypt (4) and invokes TESEE to handle (4).
Under control of ETE, only TESEE of the SCS with its (TESEE)
decryption module can read Session Key, K.
5.1. TESEE invokes computation module to check whether Uuser
equals to USTS to prevent masquerade attacks. If equals, no
attack.
5.2. If no attack, TESEE forwards data, operation, TKP+u , Uuser to
encryption module to encrypt data with TKP+u and sends (5.3)
to SSS.
5.3. {data}TKPu , Uuser
6.1. SSS stores encrypted data associated with the user.
6.2. str_op_res contains the location of the data centre.
7. {str_op_res, nuser}K.
8. {str_op_res, nuser}K can only be decrypted by user.
Notations and Symbols:
CM: Cloud Manager
CSP/SP: Cloud Service Provider/Service Provider
EBS: Elastic Block Storage
ELB_ASC: Elastic Load Balancing and Auto Scaling Group
ETE: External Trusted Entity
DO : Data Owner
SCS: SaaS Computation Server or Computation Server
STS: SaaS Transmission Server or Transmission Server
TC: Trusted Coordinator
TESEE: Trust Enhanced Secure Execution Environment
TPM: Trusted Platform Module
TVMM: Trusted Virtual Machine Monitor
VM: Virtual Machine
Session Key, K
Trusted Public/Private Key of SCS: TKP+SCS/TKP-SCS
Trusted Public/Private Key of TC: TKP+TC/TKP-TC
Trusted Public/Private Key of TESEE: TKP+TESEE/TKP-TESEE
nz: nonce with z={ user, scs}
Uz: Identity of a user or a Data Owner
by z={Data owner, user, STS}
WTC: Identity of a TC
A process labelled with m.n is executed within
an entity
Two consecutive processes labelled with x.y and
w.z are executed within an entity
m.n
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Figure 5.7. A further improvement in presenting a more internal view of the Protocol for propagating 
a Data Owner’s control to handle insiders’ threats. 
In the following Fig. 5.8, we present a more improved internal view of 
interactions in respect of the Cloud 1 and the External Trusted Entity in Fig. 5.5, Fig. 
5.6, and Fig. 5.7. We present the tools from an application in another Cloud.  We 
present the internal view of the interactions among the entities in the Cloud 1 and the 
External Trusted Entity in Fig. 5.8 for the clarity of the operations, and these 
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operations are performed for establishing a Data Owner’s control over the entities in 
the Service Provider towards the Data Owner’s trust. 15 steps in the following figure 
present the internal interactions in our work. 
1d
15 1314
1b
1c
1a
12
7
9
211
Data Owner
(DO/d)
Browser
STS ELB_ASG EBS
Notation:
The first Data Centre of the first Service Provider has 8
Physical Servers, 25 Storage Servers. The K th Data
Centre of the n th Cloud Service Provider has 99 Physical
Servers and 99 Storage Servers. The first Service
Provider accesses resources from the n th Cloud Service
Provider depending on the demand of service offering
during peak hours.
CM: Cloud Manager
CSP/SP: Cloud Service Provider/Service Provider
EBS: Elastic Block Storage
ELB_ASC: Elastic Load Balancing and Auto Scaling
Group
ETE: External Trusted Entity
DO : Data Owner
SCS: SaaS Computation Server
STS: SaaS Transmission Server
TC: Trusted Coordinator
TESEE: Trust Enhanced Secure Execution Environment
TPM: Trusted Platform Module
TVMM: Trusted Virtual Machine Monitor
VM: Virtual Machine
WS: Web Server
1. A Data Owner (DO) initiates with a
Browser and an Uniform Resource Locator
link.
2. Data Owner’s request comes to Elastic  
Load Balancing and Auto Scaling Group
(ELB_ASG) for a Virtual Machine (VM).
3. The ELB_ASG finds Physical Server 1_4
for creating a Virtual Machine.
4. The ELB_ASG creates a Virtual Machine on
Physical Server 1_4.
5. The ELB_ASG and Elastic Block Storage
(EBS) prepares the Virtual Machine as a
Web Server (WS).
6. The EBS transfers the source code of a
designated application to the Web
Server.
7. The application from the WS appears on
the Browser used in 1.
8. The Data Owner finds the application on
the Browser.
9. The Data Owner interacts with the
application that is from the WS. The
WS is from the VM, and the VM is from the
Physical Server 1_4.
10. The Data Owner Places the data on the
Browser.
11. The Browser takes the Data Owner’s data 
packet to the SaaS Transmission Server
(STS).
12. The STS  places the Data Owner’s data 
packet in Physical Server 1_2 which is a
SaaS Computation Server (SCS). The
Physical Server 1_2 registers with the
External Trusted Entity (ETE)as shown in
1a, 1b, and 1c.
The STS has selected the Physical
Server 1_2 because the TC and CM of the
ETE have run the TVMM on the Physical
Server 1_2, and the TC and CM of the
ETE have created a VM of TESEE or
VMTESEE on the Physical Server 1_2.
13. The Physical Server 1_2 sends the Data
Owner’s message or packet to the  
VMTESEE.
14.The VMTESEE does not have the Trusted
Private Key K- TC to decrypt (K)K+ TC.
The VMTESEE sends (K)K+ TC to the TC.
Only the TC belonging to the ETE
possesses the Trusted Private Key K- TC,
and the TC decrypts (K)K+ TC.
15. The TC belonging to the ETE receives the
(K)K+ TC from The VMTESEE. The TC
checks the status of the Physical
Server1_2. The TC also checks if the
VMTESEE is running on the Physical
Server1_2. On verification of the status,
the TC sends the Session Key, K to the
VMTESEE.
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1a. Physical Server 1_2 having Trusted
Platform Module (TPM) registers with
the Trusted Coordinator (TC) where
TC belongs to the ETE.
1b. Cloud Manager (CM) runs Trusted
Virtual Machine Monitor (TVMM) on
Physical Server 1_2.
1c. TC runs virtual machine of TESEE or
VMTESEE on Physical Server 1_2. The TC
stores the Public Keys K+ SCS and
K+ TESEE of the Physical Server 1_2
and the VMTESEE on the TC’s SCS and 
TESEE databases respectively.
K+ SCS / K- SCS are the Public/Private
Key of the Physical Server 1_2.
K+TESEE / K- TESEE are the Public/
Private Key of the TESEE.
1d. Using the resources of the
Physical Server 1_2, the VMTESEE runs
under the TVMM, and the TVMM runs
inside the Physical Server 1_2.
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Figure 5.8. With respect to Fig. 5.5, Fig. 5.6, and Fig. 5.7, a more improved internal view of the 
protocol on the activities of Cloud1 and the ETE. 
 
Transmission Server (STS) forwards the message to a Computation Server or 
SCS. Since the SCS cannot decrypt message 2 outside the VMTESEE, the SCS uses 
the message 2.1 to invoke the VMTESEE for the message 2 as shown in Fig. 5.5.  
In order to access the data and operation in message 2, the decryption module of 
VMTESEE sends message 3 to the Trusted Coordinator.  Message  3  is  encrypted  
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with  TKP-SCS so  that  the  Trusted Coordinator  can  verify  whether  the  SCS  is  
trusted. If the corresponding Public Trusted Key or TKP+SCS is found in trusted SCS 
database of the Trusted Coordinator, the Trusted Coordinator decrypts K on behalf 
of VMTESEE and the Computation Server or SCS. If the corresponding Public Key is 
not found, the request is denied. The issue of denial occurs in the situation wherein 
the Transmission Server or STS transfers the message to an untrusted Computation 
Server or SCS. The Trusted Coordinator verifies whether the VMTESEE exists in 
running condition on the corresponding trusted Computation Server or SCS, and the 
verification is done by searching Public Trusted key, TKP+TESEE in its (TC) trusted 
TESEE database. If verification finds the VMTESEE is running on the corresponding 
trusted SCS, the Trusted Coordinator decrypts the K from message 3. The Trusted 
Coordinator encrypts the K with TKP+TESEE and TKP+SCS, and the Trusted 
Coordinator sends message 4 containing the encrypted K to the VMTESEE so that only 
the TESEE of the SCS can recovers the K. The decryption module of VMTESEE 
decrypts the message and receives the K. The VMTESEE invokes the computation 
module to process the data, operation, TKP+u, and Uuser.  
Since the operation is a storage operation in this section, the computation 
module in the VMTESEE checks whether the Uuser equals to USTS to prevent 
masquerade attacks.  The computation module in the VMTESEE forwards the data, 
operation, the Data Owner’s or Cloud Computing user’s Public Trusted Key TKP+u, 
and identity Uuser to the encryption module. Private Trusted Key, TKP-u is solely 
known to the Data Owner or Cloud Computing user. The Storage Server stores the 
encrypted data associated with the Data Owner or user and responds the operation 
result in message 6.2. The VMTESEE sends message 7 to Transmission Server or 
STS. As seen in Fig. 5.5, the Transmission Server transfers the message 7 as the 
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message 8 to the client, containing the operation result. From the perspective of 
transparency, the operation result contains the location of the datacentres holding the 
copies of the data. The Data Owner or the Cloud Computing user holding the session 
key, K receives the operation result at the end of message 8 in Fig. 5.5. 
5.6.3 Experimental Evaluation 
In this section, we provide procedure of our experimental evaluation. We have 
used programming language to setup the environment, and in the environment we 
compare the features of our work with that of the prior work [11].  
5.6.3.1 Experimental Environment Setup 
In this section, we provide the experimental environment setup for which we 
have used Java Programming Language. We have presented our mechanism in this 
chapter, and we have compared the extracted features of our mechanism with those 
of the mechanism in prior work [11]. Fig. 7 of the prior work [11] represents the 
main mechanism of the prior work.   In Table 5.1, we present the interactions and the 
features of our work and the prior one. 
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Table 5.1. Categorizing interactions with respect to Fig. 5.7 of our work and Fig. 7 of prior work for a 
Data Owner receiving Cloud service from a Service Provider. 
Class 
Protocol in  
Fig. 5.6  
of Our 
Work 
Features 
Protocol 
in Fig. 7 
of Prior 
Work 
[11]. 
 
Features 
 
1 1, 2, and 2.1 
This interaction class, 
from a Data Owner or a 
Cloud Computing user to 
a SaaS Cloud 
application, is in  
(i) authenticated 
coordination (ii) closed 
box environment  
between the Data Owner 
and the External Trusted 
Entity. 
1 
From a Data Owner or a user 
holding certificates from a Trusted 
Third Party approaches to a Service 
Provider. 
2 3 
interaction class 2 
applies from a SaaS 
Cloud application to a 
Trusted Third Party or 
an External Trusted 
Entity 
2 
With certificates from the Trusted 
Third Party and the other certificate 
from the Owner of the application in 
the Service Provider, this interaction 
class 2 takes the flow of 
coordination for a Data Owner up to 
virtual data centre. However, this 
interaction class lacks inherent 
structural interaction components 
that individually contribute to the 
coordination like the specific 
interaction that we have in our 
work.      
3 3.1, 3.2, 4, and 4.1 
Interaction class 3 is 
from the External 
Trusted Entity to a 
Server or node that hosts 
a virtual machine, and 
the virtual machine runs 
the SaaS Cloud 
application that becomes 
available to a Data 
Owner or Cloud 
Computing user through 
a browser.  
3 
This interaction class 3 involves the 
Trusted Third Party and a virtual 
datacentre. This interaction class 3 
does not provide inherent structural 
interaction components that 
individually and collectively 
contribute to the accomplishment of 
tasks like the specific interactions 
that we have in our work.      
4 5.1 through 8 
Interaction class 4 is 
applicable to data 
traveling towards 
Storage Servers and 
feedback of the SaaS 
Cloud to a Data Owner 
or Cloud Computing 
user regarding the data 
in the Storage Servers 
4 
This interaction class 4 involves a 
computation server and a storage 
server of a data centre with virtual 
certificates from the Trusted Third 
Party. This interaction class also 
does not present inherent structural 
interaction components that 
individually and collectively 
achieve objectives like the specific 
interactions that we have in our 
work.      
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5.6.3.2 Experimental Outcome  
In this section, we provide the experimental outcome.  
In the figures, Fig. 5.9 through Fig. 5.14, we see the outcome of the experiments 
regarding a Data Owner’s Trust Perception Level (TPL). Trust Perception Level is 
the Data Owner’s perception about insiders’ threats that become offset through the 
regulated Cloud environment, and our proposed security protocols and the security 
protocols of the prior work [11] contribute to the regulated Cloud environment 
through the arranged activities among the entities. 
From Fig. 5.15 to Fig. 5.22, we find the representative outcome of the 
experiment regarding Insiders’ Threats Appearance (ITA). ITA is a numerical value 
that shows the presence of a threat with regard to a functional stage of our proposed 
protocols and the protocols of the prior work [11]. In the following figures, we 
present a Data Owner’s Trust Perception Level (TPL) in connection with our work 
and the prior work [11].   
Experiment run for 4000 times provides the following 6 out of the 400 graphs 
representing a Data Owner’s Trust Perception Level in the arrangement of 
handling Insiders’ Threats: 
 
  
Figure 5.9. Experiment showing Trust 
Perception Level during iteration 1 out of 400 
in handling Insiders’ Threats. 
 
 Figure 5.10. Experiment showing Trust 
Perception Level during iteration 51 out of 
400 in handling Insiders’ Threats. 
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Figure 5.11. Experiment showing Trust 
Perception Level during iteration 101 out of 
400 in handling Insiders’ Threats. 
  Figure 5.12. Experiment showing Trust 
Perception Level during iteration 253 out of 
400 in handling Insiders’ Threats. 
  
   
Figure 5.13. Experiment showing Trust 
Perception Level during iteration 300 out of 
400 in handling Insiders’ Threats. 
  Figure 5.14. Experiment showing Trust 
Perception Level during iteration 399 out of 
400 in handling Insiders’ Threats. 
 
In the following figures, we present the Insiders’ Threats Appearance or 
Insiders’ Threats Appearance in connection with our work and the prior work [11].   
Experiment run for 4000 times provides the following 8 out of the 695 graphs 
representing Insiders’ Threats Appearance or Insiders’ Threats Occurrence: 
 
  
Figure 5.15. Experiment presenting Insiders’ 
Threats Occurrence during iteration 1 out of 
695 in tackling Insiders’ Threats. 
 
 Figure 5.16. Experiment presenting Insiders’ 
Threats Occurrence during iteration 101 out 
of 695 in tackling Insiders’ Threats. 
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Figure 5.17. Experiment presenting Insiders’ 
Threats Occurrence during iteration 204 out 
of 695 in tackling Insiders’ Threats. 
  Figure 5.18. Experiment presenting Insiders’ 
Threats Occurrence during iteration 309 out 
of 695 in tackling Insiders’ Threats. 
  
   
Figure 5.19. Experiment presenting Insiders’ 
Threats Occurrence during iteration 429 out of 
695 in tackling Insiders’ Threats. 
  
Figure 5.20. Experiment presenting Insiders’ 
Threats Occurrence during iteration 568 out 
of 695 in tackling Insiders’ Threats. 
    
 
 
  
 
Figure 5.21. Experiment presenting Insiders’ 
Threats Occurrence during iteration 609 out of 
695 in tackling Insiders’ Threats. 
  Figure 5.22. Experiment presenting Insiders’ 
Threats Occurrence during iteration 692 out 
of 695 in tackling Insiders’ Threats. 
 
5.6.3.3 Discussion on Experimental Outcome 
By synthesizing interactions in Fig. 5.6, we find four interactions classes. We 
also find the same interaction classes from the protocol in the prior work [11], and 
the protocol is in Fig. 7 of the prior work. With regard to our work and the prior 
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work, we have presented the experimental outcome, and the experimental outcome 
shows Trust Perception Level in Fig. 5.9 through Fig. 5.14 and Insiders’ Threats 
Appearance in Fig. 5.15 through Fig. 5.22. Interactions, as mentioned in Fig. 5.9 
through Fig. 5.14 and in Fig. 5.15 through Fig. 5.22, belong to interaction classes. 
Interaction class 1 for our work belongs to steps or messages 1, 2, and 2.1 of Fig. 5.6, 
and this interaction class is applicable from a Data Owner or a Cloud Computing 
user to a SaaS Cloud application. Interaction class 2 belongs to step or message 3 of 
Fig. 5.6; interaction class 2 applies from a SaaS Cloud application to a Trusted 
Third Party or an External Trusted Entity. Interaction class 3 is from the External 
Trusted Entity to a Server or node that hosts a virtual machine, and the virtual 
machine runs the SaaS Cloud application that becomes available to a Data Owner or 
Cloud Computing user through a browser. Interaction class 3 belongs to steps 3.1, 
3.2, 4, and 4.1 of Fig. 5.6.   Interaction class 4 belongs to steps 5.1 through 8 of Fig. 
5.6, and this class is applicable to data traveling towards Storage Servers and 
feedback of the SaaS Cloud to a Data Owner or Cloud Computing user regarding 
the data in the Storage Servers. Storage Servers are in data centres across many 
locations. We also extract four classes based on the Fig. 7 of the prior work [11]. For 
each limitation belonging to each interaction class of ours and the prior work, a Data 
Owner’s Trust Perception Level decreases dynamically and the reason for dynamic 
change is that the decrease depends on the changing circumstances about the 
arrangement of activities for accomplishing tasks. Upon experiment, we find the 
result as shown in Fig. 5.9 through Fig. 5.14. Trust Perception Level is better in our 
work than the prior one [11]. For an experimental purpose, we take an interval 
between 0 and 4 for Trust Perception Level that a Data Owner achieves regarding the 
activities performed by the participating entities. For insiders’ threats, we set criteria 
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based on the four interaction classes. We denote Insiders’ Threats Appearance as an 
interval between 0 and 1. In this experiment, we identify the number of limitations 
for each interaction class of ours and the prior work [11]. We also identify each 
limitation or a group of limitations from which insiders’ threats appear. The 
interaction class 1 is devoid of any limitation since it starts from a Data Owner at the 
front end of an application. In the interaction class 2 of the prior work, a Data Owner 
is not sure about (i) which of the entities deals with the data, (ii) how the data is dealt 
with, (iii) how the flow of data to the remaining entities remains as expected by the 
Data Owner, (iv) how the certificates are assessed in relation with the data, (v) how 
the certificates are assessed in relation with the processing on the data, and (vi) the 
authentication of the entity receiving the data in the  Service Provider. We assign an 
arbitrary decimal value of 0.1 for each limitation or a group of limitations for each 
limitation that occurs in each of the 4 interaction classes. In the interaction class 3, 
the Data Owner is unaware of (i) the location of a datacentre housing the servers, (ii) 
one of the servers handling the Data Owner’s tasks, (iii) trustworthiness of the server, 
(iv) creation of the virtual machines on the servers, (v) the application running on the 
virtual machine created on one of the servers, (vi) the entities that become involved 
in the intervening process of doing computation on the data that is passed through the 
application, and (vii) flow of the data to and from storage servers. In the interaction 
class 4, the Data Owner is unaware of (i) the processing of data in virtual datacentre, 
(ii) nature of the virtual datacentre, (iii) management of the entities in the virtual 
datacentre, (iv) flow of data to and from the virtual datacentre, (v) assessment of the 
virtual server certificates in the virtual datacentre, and (vi) assessment of hardware 
certificates in the remote datacentres .We calculate Insiders’ Threats Appearance by 
multiplying the decimal value of a limitation or a group of limitations with the 
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number of limitations, and these number of limitations in an interaction class causes 
Insiders’ Threats Appearance. Based on the interaction classes, we observe that 
Insiders’ Threats Appearance is minimum in our work with respect to the prior one 
[11]. In the following section, we present the security analysis of our mechanism, 
and the security analysis shows the propagation of a Data Owner or a Cloud 
Computing user’s control over entities to handle insiders’ threats.         
5.6.4 Security Analysis for the Claims Countering the Attacks 
In the security analysis, we emphasise on two aspects of our proposed 
mechanism. The first aspect is about a Data Owner or a Cloud Computing user’s 
Trust Perception Level, and the Data Owner achieves the Trust Perception Level for 
the arrangement of the activities through our proposed mechanism; the entities that 
handle the Data Owner’s data perform the activities through our mechanism in 
section 5.6.2. The second aspect is about Insiders’ Threats Appearance. In our 
mechanism, we have presented protocols to eliminate the limitations in a SaaS 
application delivery, and by eliminating the limitations, our proposed mechanism 
contributes in reducing the appearance or occurrence of insiders’ threats. We present 
the security analysis of our work by presenting a claim and a proof of the claim. Each 
proof is backed by a Game or an Attack, and we provide a commensurate 
deliberation in support of countering the Game through our proposed mechanism.    
We claim that a Data Owner or a Cloud Computing user controls a Computation 
Server and a virtual machine. The virtual machine hosted on the Computation Server 
runs a SaaS application with which the Data Owner interacts for data, request, and 
computation. In our mechanism, the Trusted Coordinator belonging to an External 
Trusted Entity empowers the Data Owner in executing the control over the entities – 
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the Computation Server and the virtual machine. We regard the foregoing claim as 
the Claim 1.  
Claim 1: A Data Owner achieves Trust Perception Level by becoming empowered in 
executing the control over the entities that handle the Data Owner’s data.  
Proof: We prove the validity of the Claim 1 by concentrating on the following games 
or attacks.   
Game1: A Data Owner empowered by the Trusted Coordinator controls the 
Computation Server is maliciously prevented from executing the control. 
Game1: A Data Owner empowered by the Trusted Coordinator controls the 
VMTESEE on Computation Server is maliciously prevented from executing the 
control. 
With regard to the Game1 of the Claim 1, The Trusted Coordinator is assumed 
to be trusted by a Data Owner. Trusted Coordinator, in Fig. 5.2 through Fig. 5.8, is 
under the control of the External Trusted Entity or ETE. The Trusted Coordinator 
launches a virtual machine of Trust Enhanced Secure Execution Environment or 
VMTESEE on a Computation Server or SCS, and it launches the VMTESEE after the 
Trusted Coordinator receives the full security posture of the Computation Server or 
SCS. The Trusted Coordinator controls the VMTESEE. The Computation Server and 
VMTESEE are entities in the SaaS Service Provider to handle the execution of a Data 
Owner’s or Cloud Computing user’s data, request, and computation on the data. The 
Trusted Coordinator ensures the verification of a Private Trusted Key of each 
foregoing entity against its corresponding Public Trusted Key. The Trusted 
Coordinator preserves the Public Trusted Keys of a Computation Server and a 
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VMTESEE in the databases of the Trusted Coordinator, and the Trusted Coordinator 
inserts the records of each Trusted Public Key after each Computation Server 
registers with the Trusted Coordinator and the VMTESEE is launched on the 
Computation Server. For the registration of the Computation Server and the launch 
of the VMTESEE on the Computation Server or the SCS, two components exist in the 
Computation Server. The first component is cryptographic one that is knows as a 
Trusted Platform Module or TPM. The first component facilitates the remote 
attestation.  The second component is a software component that is known as a 
Trusted Virtual Machine Monitor or TVMM. The second component facilitate in 
hosting a virtual machine of Trust Enhanced Secure Execution Environment, 
VMTESEE on the Computation Server. TPM embedded in the Computation Server 
provides the security posture of the Computation Server in the form of remote 
attestation. A Computation Server and the VMTESEE on the Computation Server are 
entities in a Service Provider. With the TPM and TVMM in the Computation Server, 
the Trusted Coordinator interacts with the Computation Server as shown in Fig. 5.4, 
and on completion of the interactions, the Trusted Coordinator maintains a trusted 
database of Public Trusted Keys related to the entities, and the entities are the 
Computation Server and the VMTESEE. A Data Owner interacts with an application 
that runs on the VMTESEE and the VMTESEE runs on the Computation Server. By 
delegating trust to the Trusted Coordinator, the Data Owner verifies the 
Computation Server prior to performing any operation under the Computation 
Server. The Trusted Coordinator, on behalf of the Data Owner, performs the 
authentication of the Computation Server based on the Trusted Public Key in its 
trusted database. When the Transmission Server transfers the Data Owner’s data and 
request to a Computation Server, the Trusted Coordinator on behalf of the Data 
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Owner verifies the Computation Server. This verification provides the Data Owner 
with the maximum Trust Perception Level regarding the activities expected from the 
Computation Server.  
As regards the Game2 of the Claim 1, the Trusted Coordinator assesses a 
Computation Server and runs a virtual machine, VMTESEE. All the activities regarding 
a Data Owner’s data, request, and computation are performed by the VMTESEE under 
the control of the Trusted Coordinator. For example, Session Key, K generated and 
encrypted by a Cloud Computing user or a Data Owner can only be decrypted by the 
Trusted Coordinator of the External Trusted Entity as shown in Fig. 5.5. In the first 
message, K is encrypted with the Public Key of Trusted Coordinator. In message 3.2, 
the Trusted Coordinator decrypts K. Prior to decrypting K, the Trusted Coordinator 
verifies VMTESEE along with the Computation Server or SCS as shown in the 
messages 3.1 and 3.2 of Fig. 5.5. This verification is essential to ensure transparency 
and control from a Data Owner’s or a Cloud Computing user’s perspectives because 
a Data Owner or a Cloud Computing user trusts only the Trusted Coordinator as 
assumed in the chapter. The Trusted Coordinator allows the VMTESEE to receive the 
Session Key, K; the VMTESEE receives the Session Key, K only after the verification 
of the Computation Server and the VMTESEE, and the verification is based on the 
records that the Trusted Coordinator maintains about the Computation Server and the 
VMTESEE.  Any deviation in the record found by the Trusted Coordinator prevents the 
VMTESEE   from receiving the Session Key, K and handling the Data Owner’s data, 
request, and computation. 
The Trusted Coordinator propagates a Data Owner’s or a Cloud Computing 
user’s control or trust by verifying the Computation Server and the virtual machine 
of Trust Enhanced Secure Execution Environment or VMTESEE. This propagation of 
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trust is into the control of the VMTESEE that uses the Data Owner’s Session Key, K in 
messages 4.1 and 7 as shown in Fig. 5.5. This Propagation of trust prevents insiders 
from interfering with the Data Owner’s data, request, and computation. We claim 
that the Trusted Coordinator propagates the Data Owner’s Trust for a processing 
environment that provides the least presence of insiders’ threats.  We regard this 
claim as the Claim 2.  
Claim 2: With the propagation of a Data Owner’s trust initiated and maintained by 
the Trusted Coordinator, there exists a processing environment for the Data Owner’s 
data, request, and computation; the processing environment provides the least 
presence of insiders’ threats.   
Proof: We prove the validity of the Claim 2 by concentrating on the following game 
or attack.   
Game1: Malicious insiders make a processing environment create insiders’ threats 
for a Data Owner’s data, request, and computation. 
In our proposed Trust Enhanced Security (TES) mechanism, the features that 
ensure a Data Owner’s or Cloud Computing user’s control over data are (i) the 
encrypted Session Key, K of the Data Owner or Cloud Computing user, (ii) the role 
of the Trusted Coordinator in authenticating the Computation Server and the virtual 
machine of Trust Enhanced Secure Execution Environment or VMTESEE to handle the 
K, data, and a Data Owner’s Public Key. A Data Owner delegates trust to Trusted 
Coordinator that keeps track of Computation Server and VMTESEE as shown in Fig. 
5.4. The Trusted Coordinator authenticates them on behalf of the Data Owner as 
shown in messages 3.1 and 3.2 of Fig. 5.5. The Trusted Coordinator stores and 
retrieves the record of the Computation Server and the VMTESEE in its database. With 
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the database of the Trusted Public and Private Keys, the Trusted Coordinator takes 
the security postures of the Computation Server and the VMTESEE into a Data 
Owner’s notice.   
Administrators of the SaaS Service Provider lack the right to log into the 
External Trusted Entity, as the External Trusted Entity is a separate entity beyond the 
periphery of the Service Provider. Therefore, SaaS administrators cannot control the 
Trusted Coordinator. The Trusted Coordinator controls the VMTESEE as illustrated in 
the deliberation of the Claim 1 and its proof. Since the administrator or insiders 
cannot control the Trusted Coordinator, they cannot control the VMTESEE. In order to 
support Data Owners or Cloud Computing users, the VMTESEE, under the control of 
the Trusted Coordinator, executes encryption and decryption functionalities provided 
by the External Trusted Entity. Computation part is provided by SaaS Service 
Provider or Cloud Service Provider. The VMTESEE executes computation module for 
Data Owners or Cloud Computing users, and the VMTESEE also applies encryption 
and decryption. As reiterated, the Trusted Coordinator controls the execution of 
VMTESEE in Computation Server or SCS. Administrators or insiders of SaaS Service 
Provider cannot control Trusted Coordinator; therefore, they cannot control 
VMTESEE. Therefore, insiders cannot inspect the execution of computation on a Data 
Owner’s or a Cloud Computing user’s operation on data by the VMTESEE.  
A  Data Owner trusts the Trusted Coordinator’s control over a VMTESEE. As 
assumed, a Data Owner or a Cloud Computing user trusts the Trusted Coordinator. 
The Trusted Coordinator’s control over the VMTESEE ensures the Data Owner’s 
control over data and the confidentiality of the Data Owner’s data and computation.  
A Data Owner’s or a Cloud Computing user’s trust first propagates to the Trusted 
Coordinator that handles the VMTESEE. From the Trusted Coordinator, the trust 
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propagates to the VMTESEE that handles Data Owner’s or a Cloud Computing user’s 
operation on data. With the propagation of a Data Owner’s trust initiated and 
maintained by the Trusted Coordinator, a processing environment represented by the 
VMTESEE exists for the Data Owner’s data, request, and computation, and the 
processing environment provides the least appearance or occurrence of insiders’ 
threats.  
5.6.5 Limitations of  Semi multi-Cloud Approach 
While we have made improvement in handling insider’s threats with respect to 
the mechanism in the prior work, we find the limitations of our semi multi-Cloud or 
single cloud Trust Enhanced Security mechanism. We mention our work as semi 
multi-Cloud because we have presented the encryption and decryption tools for a 
client (a Data Owner or a user) from another Cloud (Cloud2 in Fig 5.7), and the 
Cloud2 is unknown to the principal Cloud (Cloud1 in Fig 5.7), and the principal 
Cloud is the Cloud from which the client receives major services.  We provide the 
following limitation of our single cloud or semi multi-Cloud Trust Enhanced 
Security mechanism that we have presented so far in the chapter.  
x A Computation Server registers with the Trusted Coordinator long before the 
Computation Server is assessed. The Trusted Coordinator assesses the 
Computation Server later for any operation to be executed by virtual 
machines on the Computation Server. 
x There is no mechanism of a threshold time for the Computation Server to 
present to the Trusted Coordinator while it is being assessed for acceptance 
with the Trusted Coordinator.  
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x There is no mechanism for the Trusted Coordinator to select another 
Computation Server depending the expired threshold time of the Computation 
Server. 
x There is no mechanism to select another Computation Server on another 
Cloud without informing either of the Old and New Cloud Service Providers. 
The Old Cloud Service Provider is the Principal Cloud Service Provider from 
which a Data Owner receives continuous service. The New Cloud Service 
Provider is the one from which a Computation Server is selected for 
registration, and the registered Computation Server is set for carrying out the 
computation through a virtual machine on the Computation Server. This 
mechanism is so needed because an existing Computation Server, without a 
threshold time, may become compromised. While the existing Computation 
Server becomes compromised, its Trusted Public Key preserved with the 
Trusted Coordinator during its registration remains unchanged without 
reflecting its compromised status; lack of reflecting compromised status is a 
risk of malicious insiders’ threats.  
In the future work, we intend to present mechanisms by focussing on the limitations 
highlighted above. 
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5.7  Chapter Summary 
We have devised a semi multi-Cloud Trust Enhanced Security mechanism in the 
chapter. With this mechanism, we have made an effort to propagate a Data Owner’s 
control over data to handle insiders’ threats. The Data Owner’s control is initiated 
and maintained by the Trusted Coordinator, and the Trusted Coordinator belongs to 
an External Trusted Entity.  The Trusted Coordinator authenticates entities of a 
Service Provider on behalf of a Data Owner to execute a Data Owner’s operations. 
Our proposed Trust Enhanced Security mechanism, with the accompanying 
protocols, has shown the inherent interactions among entities in the protocols. The 
protocols have made improvement in reducing the insiders’ threats and increasing a 
Data Owner’s Trust Perception Level. The Data Owner’s Trust Perception Level is 
about the activities of the entities that deal with the Data Owner’s data. The 
experiment results and security analysis provide the insight into the interactions in 
our mechanism. These interactions propagate a Data Owner’s control in handling 
insiders that cause data confidentiality breaches.   
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Chapter 6 
Preventing a Malicious User from Sharing a 
Data Owner-Given Secret Key 
In this chapter, we introduce a new mechanism for Software as a Service Cloud 
Computing, and the new mechanism is in continuation with our effort to improve our 
prior work in chapter 4. In our new mechanism, we have proposed suspend and 
resume protocol for the authentication of a user, and the protocol allows a user to 
interact with a Data Owner and an External Trusted Entity for the user’s 
authentication. The protocol based on the credential policy tree allows a user to 
suspend the user’s interaction with the Data Owner and communicate with the 
External Trusted Entity for authentication. The External Trusted Entity authenticates 
the user through partial user Id of the user, and the Data Owner sends the External 
Trusted Entity the partial user ID of the user prior to the user’s interaction with the 
External Trusted Entity. The External Trusted Entity authenticates the user based on 
the credential policy tree that is held in the External Trusted Entity, and the 
credential policy tree is a structure to maintain, update, and verify credentials for 
generating a credential sequence and credential challenge questions. The External 
Trusted Entity uses credential sequence to inform a Data Owner about a user; the 
External Trusted Entity uses credential challenge questions to verify a user. The 
Data Owner distributes a unique and encrypted Trust Ticket to the user upon a 
feedback from the External Trusted Entity; the feedback is about the interaction 
between the user and the External Trusted Entity. The Data Owner shares the split 
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Secret Key with himself/herself, the user, the External Trusted Entity, and the Service 
Provider. On completing the registration of the user, the Data Owner apprises the 
Service Provider of the Trust Ticket. Trust Ticket and the part of the Secret Key are 
respectively for the registered user’s acceptance to the Service Provider and access to 
the data. Our experiment in Java Programming Language shows the inherent features 
of our new mechanism. Experimental results show a Data Owner’s high Trust 
Perception Level in our new mechanism. With experiment results and security 
analyses, we demonstrate that our algorithmic protocols in the new mechanism 
establish a Data Owner’s trust.  
6.1 Introduction 
Cloud Computing provides cost-effective and on-demand means to meet 
changing business needs by outsourcing data. However, outsourcing data to the 
Cloud causes a loss of control over data on a Data Owner’s part [1, 29, 114]. 
Physical machines holding the outsourced data and access mechanisms to that data 
are typically not known to a Data Owner. A Data Owner, due to the loss of control, 
cannot ensure whether anyone other than registered users accesses the data. This loss 
of control causes lack of trust. This lack of trust is balanced by preserving a user’s 
credentials in the External Trusted Entity and checking the credential with a 
credential policy tree. Generating credential challenge questions, credential 
sequence, and a unique Trust Ticket also balance the lack of trust. Upon conducting a 
successful registration of a user (U) with the Data Owner (DO), the Data Owner 
generates a Trust Ticket. We have improved the algorithm of Trust Ticket protocol to 
establish a Data Owner’s trust by monitoring a user and a Service Provider; the user 
and the Service Provider deal with a Data Owner’s data in the Cloud. In relation to 
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the details of the Cloud Computing in [1, 13] and its comprehensive overview in 
[12], we present  the concise concept of SaaS Cloud Computing in Fig. 6.1.   
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1 :: A Data Owner or a user from a browser approaches SaaS Transmission Server for SaaS application.t r r s r fr r s r r c s r s issi rv r f r a application.
2 :: SaaS Transmission Server interacts with Load Balancing and Auto Scaling Group for starting SaaS application.r s issi rv r i t r cts it l ci t c li r f r st rting aa application.
3 :: For SaaS application that is specific to a Data owner or a user of the Data Owner, following steps take place on Physical Server 1.r lic ti t t is s cific t t r r s r f t t r, follo ing steps take place on hysical erver 1.
4 :: Load Balancing and Auto Scaling Group interacts with Elastic Block Storage to transfer a Data Owner or a user of the Data Owner specificapplication source code on the web server that runs on the virtual machine.
Load alancing and uto Scaling roup interacts ith Elastic Block Storage to transfer a ata ner or a user of the ata ner specific 
application source code on the eb server that runs on the virtual achine.
s0s0 :: Load Balancing and Auto Scaling Group selects the Physical Server 1 for placing a hypervisor.l ci t c li r s l cts t ysic l rv r f r l cing a hypervisor.
s1s1 :: Load Balancing and Auto Scaling Group places a hypervisor on the Physical Server 1.l ci t c li r l c s y rvis r the hysical erver 1.
s2s2 :: Load Balancing and Auto Scaling Group creates a virtual machine on the Physical Server 1 with an Operating System (OS).Load alancing and uto Scaling roup creates a virtual achine on the Physical Server 1 ith an perating Syste  ( S).
s3s3 :: Load Balancing and Auto Scaling Group creates a web server (WS) on the virtual machine .Load alancing and uto Scaling roup creates a eb server ( S) on the virtual achine .
5 :: Elastic Block Storage transfers a Data Owner or a user of the Data Owner specific application source code on the web serverrunning on the virtual machine, and Elastic Block Storage performs the transfer in the following steps.
l stic l ck t r tr sf rs t r r s r f t t r s cific lic ti s urce code on the eb server
r i t virt l c i , l stic l ck t r rf r s t tr sf r i t e f llo ing steps.
t0t0 ::
Elastic Block Storage transfers the application source including graphical user interface (GUI.xml), menu (Menu.xml), data
base connection (dbConnection.xml), and role (Role.xml).
l stic l ck t r tr sf rs t lic ti s rc i cl i r ic l user interface ( I.x l), nu ( enu.x l), data
s c cti ( cti .x l), r l ( l .x l).
t1t1 ::
Elastic Block Storage, in articulation with Load Balancing and Auto Scaling Group and SaaS Transmission Server, makes
the SaaS application available to the Data Owner or the user of the Data Owner.
l stic l ck t r , i rtic l ti it l ci t c ling roup and aa rans ission erver, akes
t lic ti v il l t t t r r t s r f t t r.
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Figure 6.1. Concise Concept of SaaS Cloud Computing. 
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SaaS Cloud Computing is one of the three service models in Cloud Computing 
as elaborated in section 1.1.2 of chapter 1. In SaaS Cloud Computing, all outsourced 
data are backed up at multiple locations unknown to Data Owners and users [4, 115]; 
therefore, a Data Owner’s control over data is a prime priority in SaaS Cloud 
Computing from a Data Owner’s perspective [4]. This control over data is achieved 
by conducting users’ registration and ensuring authenticated users’ access to that data 
for data confidentiality.  Therefore, control and confidentiality are linked with a Data 
Owner’s trust over SaaS Cloud Computing. This trust revolves around the assurance 
that the entities or processes in SaaS Cloud Computing will function in expected 
ways, the Data Owner feels confidence regarding the expected function [4]. 
Challenge-response protocol  contributes to the establishment of trust [116, 117]. 
However, building a Data Owner’s trust in the form of the Data Owner’s control 
over data, users’ registration, and users’ access to the data remains mingled with 
challenging issues.  
The Data Owner, as in Fig. 6.1, handles the users’ frequent requests for 
accessing that data. For control over data and users’ frequent access to that data, the 
Data Owner has to be always online. A Data Owner’s remaining always online is not 
a feasible task from a practical perspective of SaaS Cloud Computing. In the 
following problem statement, we outline the question addressed by the chapter.  
With a Data Owner being not always online, how can we prevent a malicious 
user or a malicious insider in a CSP, or both from accessing a Data Owner’s data in 
a CSP? CSP stands for a Cloud Service Provider or a Service Provider. 
The aim of the chapter is to establish Trust Enhanced Secure mechanism of a 
Data Owner’s control over data, users’ registration, and user’ access to the 
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outsourced data in a SaaS Cloud Computing. The approach of the chapter is to 
explore and apply the cryptographic principles. The context of the mechanism is to 
handle a Data Owner’s data outsourcing, users’ registration, and users’ access to the 
data with the Data Owner being not always online. By online, we denote that a Data 
Owner’s service is active round-the-clock for responding to a user. The end result of 
the mechanism is to propose a transparent protocol showing the overall inherent 
activities and features in building a Data Owner’s trust.  
In this chapter, we extend our previous [122] work by improving the  Trust 
Ticket  protocol to deal with a malicious user and a malicious insider in a Service 
Provider. With lessons from the works in [123, 124], we extend our prior work [122] 
in this chapter. While the works [123, 124] spread across different domains of 
studies, we find their methodologies, with a major modification by us, being worthy 
of applying in a new area of research like ours. With the lessons of trust negotiation 
from [123, 124] and mutual authentication mechanism from [116], a Data Owner 
issues a Trust Ticket in this chapter. Trust Ticket is expressed in cryptographic 
format. The trust negotiation is also in cryptographic format. Trust Ticket, in our 
work, is formulated as TrustUIDTicket(Udo, UID, DID, AR, TTExp)SKdo,csp. In the 
formulation, Udo stands for the identity of a registered user’s Data Owner. UID, DID, 
AR, and TTExp respectively mean a registered user’s identity, data identity, access 
right, and expiration of Trust Ticket. SKdo,csp  is symmetric key between a Data 
Owner and a Service Provider or Cloud Service Provider.  
Rationale of our current work in this chapter is to improve our prior work [122] 
in addressing and solving the core problem of a Data Owner’s trust. A user updates 
his/her credential and check his/her credential with a credential policy tree, and the 
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credential policy tree is under an External Trusted Entity. With a user’s credential 
update and check with a credential policy tree under External Trusted Entity, a Data 
Owner completes the user’s registration. On completing the registration, the Data 
Owner distributes the split Secret Key and Trust Ticket. Our prior work presented in 
chapter 4 highlights the role of Trust Ticket that acts as a link; the links is established 
by a Data Owner between a registered user and a Service Provider or Cloud Service 
Provider. This link reduces the further interaction time of a registered user and a 
Service Provider or Cloud Service Provider to be introduced. Furthermore, the 
External Trusted Entity verifies a user through a credential policy tree and credential 
challenge questions. For transparency, the External Trusted Entity shares the 
credential sequence with the Data Owner.  Experiments done in Java Programming 
Language, and security analyses reveal the practicality of our work over prior works 
[118, 122]. 
Contributions of the chapter are as follows: 
x Deploying an External Trusted Entity for a user’s credential update and 
verification prior to a user’s registration with a Data Owner. 
x Splitting and distributing a Data Owner-generated Secret Key. 
x Distributing a Data Owner-generated Trust Ticket as a link between a user 
and a Service Provider. 
x Deploying Trust Ticket between a user and a Service Provider. 
x Combining split secrets upon verifying a user based on the credential policy 
tree and the credential challenge questions. 
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6.2 Ideal Representative Scenarios 
In an ideal or a best case scenario, we envisage that a Data Owner outsources 
data to a Service Provider or a Cloud Service Provider for the Data Owner and the 
users. The Service Provider makes the services available to the Data Owner or the 
user to access the outsourced data. The difference between a Service Provider and a 
Cloud Service Provider is that a Service Provider is a provider that offers Software as 
a Service with the infrastructure of a Cloud Service Provider. A Service Provider and 
a Cloud Service Provider become analogous when a Service Provider executes and 
offers services on its own infrastructure, for example, physical machines. Physical 
machines represent computation servers and storage servers, virtual machines on the 
physical servers, and network connectivity among the machines. With regard to our 
proposed mechanism, we present the following scenarios. 
Ideal Scenarios of a Data Owner outsourcing data to a Service Provider for the 
legitimate users to access the outsourced data 
In the first ideal scenario, there are two entities, and the entities are a Data 
Owner and a Service Provider or a Cloud Service Provider. A Data Owner is an 
individual or an enterprise to outsource the data and updates the process of handling 
users’ access to the data. The Service Provider or the Cloud Service Provider 
maintains the Data Owner’s data into multiple servers located in many locations. The 
Data Owner or the enterprise frequently updates the data. Registered users access the 
data in collaboration with the Service Provider. In the best case scenario, all entities 
are ideal to a Data Owner, and all entities perform up to the expectation of the Data 
Owner without breaching the confidentiality. However, in the worst case scenario, 
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there is a risk that entities, for example users by sharing Secret Keys with outsiders, 
may become malicious, as illustrated in the section of the worst case scenarios.  
Ideal Scenarios of a user interacting with a Service Provider for a Data Owner’s 
outsourced data 
In the second ideal scenario, a user interacts with a Service Provider for Cloud 
Services. The purpose of the interaction is to access a Data Owner’s data. The 
Service Provider running its services in the form of Software as a Service receives 
the user’s credentials. On receiving the credentials, the Service Provider 
authenticates the user and allows the user to access the Data Owner’s data in the 
absence of the Data Owner. In the best case scenario, we envisage that there is no 
risk for the Data Owner’s data to be exposed to an adversary. However, in the attack 
scenario, there is a risk for the Data Owner’s data to be accessed by anyone other 
than the legitimate users.  
6.3 Vulnerabilities and Attacks  Scenarios 
With regard to the prior ideal scenarios, we point out the following scenarios 
demonstrating vulnerabilities and attacks.  
Vulnerable and attack scenarios of a Data Owner outsourcing data to a Service 
Provider for the legitimate users to access the outsourced data 
With regard to the prior ideal scenario, a Data Owner is an individual or an 
enterprise to outsource the data and update the process of handling users’ access to 
the data. While the Data Owner outsources data and updates the process of handling 
users’ access to data, there is a risk of an attack. This risk is evident when a  
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x Data Owner shares a single Secret Key with a user to access the Data 
Owner’s outsourced data. 
x User shares the Data Owner-given single Secret Key with outsiders or 
insiders of a Service Provider.  
x User is solely authenticated by a Service Provider prior to the delivery of the 
Data Owner’s outsourced data to the user.  
x User becomes affiliated with a Data Owner prior to becoming verified by an 
External Trusted Entity, and the affiliation is for the user’s registration with 
the Data Owner and the user’s link with a Service Provider through the Data 
Owner for the outsourced data.  
The Service Provider or the Cloud Service Provider maintains the Data Owner’s 
data into multiple servers in multiple locations. The Data Owner or the enterprise 
frequently updates the data. However, lack of information about the location of the 
data raises concerns about the data. Furthermore, the Data Owner shares a single 
Secret Key with a user. However, without the prior authentication of the user by an 
External Trusted Entity, there is a risk of the single Secret Key to be disclosed to or 
shared with malicious insiders or outsiders in the Service Provider. The sole 
authentication of a user by the Service Provider leaves a risk of an unwanted data 
disclosure, as the user has the Data Owner-given single Secret Key and the user may 
be persuaded into sharing the single Secret Key with malicious insiders or outsiders 
of the Service Provider. Lack of prior verification of a user through an External 
Trusted Entity leaves a risk of a malicious user to be affiliated with a Data Owner for 
data.  
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Vulnerable and attack scenarios of a User interacting with a Service Provider 
for a Data Owner’s outsourced data 
In respect of the ideal scenario, a user interacts with a Service Provider for 
Cloud Services. The purpose of the interaction is to access a Data Owner’s data. The 
Service Provider running its services in the form of Software as a Service receives 
the user’s credentials. On receiving the credentials, the Service Provider 
authenticates the user and allows the user to access the Data Owner’s data in the 
absence of the Data Owner. However, lack of users’ further verification by an 
External Trusted Entity leaves a chance for the data to be disclosed to or shared with 
malicious insiders or outsiders in the Service Provider. The disclosure of data 
becomes materialised since a user is not authenticated with the verification of the 
user’s credential, the complete Secret Key given to the user is not split and not 
distributed to multiple parties, and the split secrets are not combined to generate a 
complete secret instead of leaving the complete Secret Key with the user.  
6.4 Claims 
In this section, we provide the claims of our proposed mechanism as follows: 
x Improving the algorithm for Trust Ticket generation introduced in chapter 4 
based on our prior work [122].  
x Improving a Data Owner’s Trust Perception Level in respect of generating 
the Trust Ticket for a registered user. 
x Improving a Data Owner’s Trust Perception Level in relation to a user’s 
access to the Data Owner’s data.   
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6.5 Design Methodology 
In this section, we provide the notations, symbols, terminologies, schemes, and 
techniques for our security protocols throughout the chapter.  In the following 
section, we provide the notations that are used in the chapter 
6.5.1 Notations and Symbols 
In this section, we provide the following notations and symbols that are used in 
the throughout the chapter. 
Notations Interpretations 
CSP/csp : Service Provider or Cloud Service Provider. 
CapList : Capability List (UID, DID, AR for user) by Data Owner,  
where UID, DID, and AR stand for User ID, Data ID, and  
Access Right respectively. 
data,  DbkID : Data Owner’s data, Data backup Id. 
DbkID : Data backup Id. 
DO/do : Data Owner.  
K : Session key generated by Data Owner. 
KO : Secret Key between Data Owner and registered user. 
KP+csp, KP-csp  : CSP’s  Public Key, Private Key.   
KP+do, KP-do  : Data OWner’s  Public Key, Private Key.   
KP+user, KP-user  : User’s  Public Key (UserPK), Private Key.   
Loc : Location of data. 
nx : Unique random numbers by x to avoid replay attack. 
SKdo, csp : Symmetric key between Data Owner and CSP.    
TTicket : Trust Ticket. 
TTExp : Expiration of Trust Ticket. 
U/user, UDO : Registered user, Identity of a registered user’s Data Owner. 
UID, DID, AR : Registered user Identity, Data Identity, Access Right. 
E(z)Kx : Data z is encrypted with key Kx. 
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6.5.2 Suspend and Resume Strategy 
In the suspend and resume strategy, multiple entities interact with one another. 
Let the set of entities interacting with one another be ܧ ൌ ሼܧͳǡ ܧʹǡ ܧ͵ǡ ǥ ǡ ܧ݊ሽ. ܧͳ 
is the principal entity, and this entity  has the main aim to receive a clear information 
about another entity, ܧʹ. The ܧʹ is the entity that is in search for receiving service 
from the entity, the ܧͳ. The ܧ͵  is another entity that is trusted to all in public. The 
ܧ͵has arrangements to verify any entity referred to the ܧ͵.  
During the interaction of the ܧʹwith theܧͳ, the ܧͳ requires the ܧʹ to be 
verified by the ܧ͵. The ܧͳ sends partial ID to the ܧʹ. On receiving the partial ID 
from theܧͳ, the ܧʹ suspends its interaction with the ܧͳ for becoming verified by the 
ܧ͵Ǥ The ܧͳ has a set of attributes of the ܧʹ, and the set of the attributes is 
ܧʹሼʹǤ ͳǡ ʹǤ Ǥ ሽ. The ܧͳ sends the ܧ͵ the attribute set 
ܧʹሼʹǤ ͳǡ ʹǤ Ǥ ሽof the ܧʹ. The  ܧ͵ maintains the set of attributes of the  
ܧʹ. The ܧʹapproaches the ܧ͵ with the ܧʹሼʹǤ Ǥ ሽ. The ܧ͵performs the 
Cartesian Product of the attribute set received from the ܧʹ  with the attribute sets 
that are with the E3. For example, a set of the form ሼܽǡ ܾǡ ܿǡ ݀ሽ is with the ܧ͵where 
ܾstands for ʹǤ Ǥ Ǥ The ܧʹ sends the ܧ͵  a set of the from ሼܾሽ where 
ܾstands for ሼʹǤ Ǥ ሽ. Let the set ሼܾሽsubmitted by the ܧʹto the  ܧ͵be  
ܧʹ௦௨௕௠௜௧௙௢௥௩௘௥௜௙௬ሼሽor ܧʹ௦௨௕௠௜௧௙௢௥௩௘௥௜௙௬ሼʹǤ Ǥ ሽ. Let the set ሼܽǡ ܾǡ ܿǡ ݀ሽ 
preserved with the ܧ͵ be ܧ͵௣௥௘௦௘௥௩௘ௗሼܽǡ ܾǡ ܿǡ ݀ሽ. The Cartesian Product presented 
below finds the following set of ordered pairs. 
ܧ͵௣௥௘௦௘௥௩௘ௗ ൈ ܧʹ௦௨௕௠௜௧௙௢௥௩௘௥௜௙௬ ൌ  ሼۃܽǡ ܾۄǡ ۃܾǡ ܾۄǡ ۃܿǡ ܾۄǡ ۃ݀ǡ ܾۄሽ 
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The ordered pair represented as ۃܾǡ ܾۄ is the one that is used by the  ܧ͵to 
identify and verify the ܧʹǤ The first element, ܾin the ordered pair is of the form 
ܾ א ܧ͵௣௥௘௦௘௥௩௘ௗ. ܧ͵௣௥௘௦௘௥௩௘ௗ ك ݈݈ܽݏ݁ݐݏ݉ܽ݊݅݊ݐ݁݀ܾݕܧ͵. The second element, 
ܾin the ordered pair is of the form ܾ א ܧʹ௦௨௕௠௜௧௙௢௥௩௘௥௜௙௬. ܧʹ௦௨௕௠௜௧௙௢௥௩௘௥௜௙௬ ك
݈݈ܽݏ݁ݐݏ݉ܽ݅݊ݐܽ݅݊݁݀ܾݕܧʹ. 
6.5.3 Secret Sharing Scheme 
In a secret sharing scheme, a secret is distributed among a group of participants. 
Each of the participants is allocated a share of the secret. We follow (݇ǡ ݊ሻ secret 
sharing scheme [125] in which a secretܵ is split into n partial secrets; out of n 
partial secrets,  only݇ partial secrets, where ݇ ൏ ݊, reconstructܵ. The scheme is as 
follows: 
x ሺ݇ െ ͳሻ random coefficients are chosen from ԺȀԺ, where   
  ԺȀԺ is a set of non-zero prime integer,  
 ݌ is a prime number, and  
 the random coefficients areሼܽ଴ǡ ǥ ǡ ܽ௞ିଵሽ 
x A polynomial generated is of the form as given in equation 1. 
                   ݂ሺݔሻ ൌ ܽ଴ ൅ ܽଵݔ ൅ ܽଶݔଶ ൅ ڮ൅ ܽ௞ିଵݔ௞ିଵ ǥǥǥǥǥሺͳሻ 
                     where 
 ܽ଴ ൌ ܵǡ   
 ܵ is the Secret, and 
 ݂ ሺݔሻ is the polynomial of degree less than ݇.     
Chapter 6 Preventing a Malicious User from Sharing a Data Owner-Given Secret Key 
  
214 
 
x A trusted third party computes ݂ሺ݅ሻ for each of the ݊shares based on ݂ሺݔሻ, 
and each of the shares is of the form denoted as ሺ݅ǡ ݂ሺ݅ሻሻ. In the foregoing 
form, 
  ݅is the input to the polynomial and 
 ݂ሺ݅ሻis the output. 
 For any ݇ subset of the pairs, i.e., ሺͳǡ ݂ሺͳሻሻ.,…., ሺ݇ǡ ݂ሺ݇ሻሻ, the 
coefficient of the polynomial can be evaluated using interpolation. 
The secret, i.e., ܽ଴ ൌ ܵǡ is determined by interpolation. 
 A classical algorithm known as Lagrange Interpolation provides the 
construction of the ሺ݇ǡ ݊ሻthreshold secret sharing scheme by Shamir.   
x Lagrange Interpolation, with the following variables, determines the 
polynomial ݂ሺݔሻ given in equation 1 above. 
  ݇ distinct points ሺݔ௜ǡ ݕ௜ሻǤ 
  Each of the k distinct points ሺݔ௜ǡ ݕ௜ሻ is of the form  ሺݔ௜ǡ ݂ሺݔ௜ሻሻ                   
݂ሺݔሻ ൌ෍ݕ௜
௞
௜ୀଵ
 ෑ ݔ െ ݔ௝ݔ௜ െ ݔ௝ଵஸ௝ஸ௞
௜ஷ௝
ǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥ Ǥ ሺʹሻ 
      
x Since the secret is the constant term, ܽ଴ ൌ ܵ ൌ ݂ሺͲሻǡ the equation 2 becomes  
݂ሺͲሻ ൌ෍ݕ௜
௞
௜ୀଵ
 ෑ  ݔ௝ݔ௝ െ ݔ௜ଵஸ௝ஸ௞
௜ஷ௝
ǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥሺ͵ሻ 
                
Example:  
Secret sharing scheme by Shamir has prime number,  ݌ ൌ ͵ͳ, threshold, ݇=3, 
and the secret ܵ ൌ ͹ǡ where  S א ԺȀԺ͵ͳǤA trusted party choses coefficients in 
random from ԺȀԺ͵ͳǤ  The coefficients are  ܽଵ ൌ ͳͻand  ܽଶ ൌ ʹͳ.  
The trusted party sets the polynomial as  ݂ሺݔሻ ൌ ͹ ൅ ͳͻݔ ൅ ʹͳݔଶǤ    
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The trusted party generates as many shares as required, and the trusted party 
destroys the polynomial upon distributing the shares to the participants. Some of the 
shares distributed to the participants are as follows: 
൫ͳǡ ݂ሺͳሻ൯ ൌ  ሺͳǡ ሺሺ͹ ൅ ͳͻ ൈ ͳ ൅ ʹͳ ൈ ͳሻ݉݋݀͵ͳሻሻ ൌ  ൫ͳǡ ሺͶ͹݉݋݀͵ͳሻ൯
ൌ  ሺͳǡ ͳ͸ሻ     
൫ͳǡ ݂ሺʹሻ൯ ൌ  ሺͳǡ ሺሺ͹ ൅ ͳͻ ൈ ʹ ൅ ʹͳ ൈ Ͷሻ݉݋݀͵ͳሻሻ ൌ  ൫ͳǡ ሺͳʹͻ݉݋݀͵ͳሻ൯ 
ൌ  ሺʹǡ ͷሻ     
൫ͳǡ ݂ሺ͵ሻ൯ ൌ  ሺͳǡ ሺሺ͹ ൅ ͳͻ ൈ ͵ ൅ ʹͳ ൈ ͻሻ݉݋݀͵ͳሻሻ ൌ  ൫ͳǡ ሺʹͷ͵݉݋݀͵ͳሻ൯ 
ൌ  ሺ͵ǡ ͳ͸ሻ     
൫ͳǡ ݂ሺͶሻ൯ ൌ  ሺͳǡ ሺሺ͹ ൅ ͳͻ ൈ Ͷ ൅ ʹͳ ൈ ͳ͸ሻ݉݋݀͵ͳሻሻ ൌ  ൫ͳǡ ሺͶͳͻ݉݋݀͵ͳሻ൯ 
ൌ  ሺͶǡ ͳ͸ሻ     
൫ͳǡ ݂ሺͷሻ൯ ൌ  ሺͳǡ ሺሺ͹ ൅ ͳͻ ൈ ͷ ൅ ʹͳ ൈ ʹͷሻ݉݋݀͵ͳሻሻ ൌ  ൫ͳǡ ሺ͸ʹ͹݉݋݀͵ͳሻ൯ 
ൌ  ሺͷǡ ͳ͸ሻ     
൫ͳǡ ݂ሺͷሻ൯ ൌ  ሺͳǡ ሺሺ͹ ൅ ͳͻ ൈ ͸ ൅ ʹͳ ൈ ͵͸ሻ݉݋݀͵ͳሻሻ ൌ  ൫ͳǡ ሺͺ͹͹݉݋݀͵ͳሻ൯ 
ൌ  ሺ͸ǡ ͻሻ     
When the trusted party takes any three shares, for example, (1, 16), (2, 5), and 
(3, 5), the trusted party computes the secret using equation 1 or 2.   
݂ሺݔሻ ൌ෍ݕ௜
௞
௜ୀଵ
 ෑ ݔ െ ݔ௝ݔ௜ െ ݔ௝ଵஸ௝ஸ௞
௜ஷ௝
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݋ݎǡ ݂ሺͲሻ ൌ෍ݕ௜
௞
௜ୀଵ
 ෑ  ݔ௝ݔ௝ െ ݔ௜ଵஸ௝ஸ௞
௜ஷ௝
 
                                                                     
݋ݎǡ ݂ሺͲሻ ൌ ෍ݕ௜
ଷ
௜ୀଵ
 ෑ  ݔ௝ݔ௝ െ ݔ௜ଵஸ௝ஸ௞
௜ஷ௝
 
ൌ  ͳ͸ǤʹǤ͵ሺͳ െ ʹሻሺͳ െ ͵ሻ ݉݋݀͵ͳ ൅
ͷǤͳǤ͵
ሺʹ െ ͳሻሺʹ െ ͵ሻ ݉݋݀͵ͳ
൅ ͷǤͳǤʹሺ͵ െ ͳሻሺ͵ െ ʹሻ ݉݋݀͵ͳ 
ൌ ሺͶͺ݉݋݀͵ͳሻ െ ሺͳͷ݉݋݀͵ͳሻ ൅ ሺͷ݉݋݀͵ͳሻ ൌ ͳ͹ െ ͳͷ ൅ ͷ ൌ ͹Ǥ 
In the above calculation, the answer is͹, and this answer is the same as the secret 
accommodated in the polynomial.  
6.5.4 Credential Policy Tree and Credential Sequence 
A credential c is defined as a structured object, and it is composed of attributes 
of the subject. The credential belongs to the subject. Credential of a subject is 
denoted as a predicate of the formݐሺܣݐݐݎܾ݅ݑݐ݁ௌ௘௧ሻ, where ݐ is a credential type 
name and  ܣݐݐݎܾ݅ݑݐ݁ௌ௘௧ሼܽݐݐଵǡ ܽݐݐଶǡ ǥ ǡ ܽݐݐ௞ሽ is the set of attributes. Credentials are 
compliant with a credential type, and with regard to credentials, the compliance 
means that an attribute set, its elements, and the values of the elements are consistent 
with the purpose of the credentials. For example, a passport is a credential, and it has 
appropriate attributes representing a unique person. The set of attributes denoted as 
ܣݐݐݎܾ݅ݑݐ݁ௌ௘௧  becomes consistent with the fact that the elements and the value of the 
elements in ܣݐݐݎܾ݅ݑݐ݁ௌ௘௧  indicate and represent the passport, and the passport 
belongs to exactly a unique person. The ܣݐݐݎܾ݅ݑݐ݁ௌ௘௧presented next represents or 
indicates a passport by assuming an appropriate value in each attribute.  
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ܣݐݐݎܾ݅ݑݐ݁ௌ௘௧ ൜ܨ݅ݎݏݐܰܽ݉݁ǡ ܵݑݎ݊ܽ݉݁ǡ ܦܽݐ݁݋݂ܤ݅ݎݐ݄ǡܦܽݐ݁݋݂ܧݔ݌݅ݎݕǡ ǥ ǡ ݌ܽݏݏ݌݋ݎݐܰݑܾ݉݁ݎ ൠ 
Conditional terms are of the form denoted as ݐሺܥ݋݊݀݅ݐ݅݋݊ௌ௘௧ሻ, where ݐ is the 
name of a credential type, and  ܥ݋݊݀݅ݐ݅݋݊ௌ௘௧ is a set of conditions against attributes 
in t. A condition is an expression of the form denoted as  ܽݐݐݎ݅݌ݎ݁݀݅ݒ݈ܽ݁, where 
ܽݐݐݎ݅  is an attribute, ݌ݎ݁݀݅is a (binary) predicate in ሼ൒ǡൌǡ൑ሽ and ݒ݈ܽ݁is a value 
from the domain of an attribute, ܽݐݐݎ݅. A term is specified and unspecified.  
ݐሺܥ݋݊݀݅ݐ݅݋݊ௌ௘௧ሻ ؠ ݌ܽݏݏ݌݋ݎݐሺ݌ܽݏݏ݌݋ݎݐܰݑܾ݉݁ݎ ൌ ܼͷͷʹʹ͹͹ሻ is, for example, a 
specified term. ݐሺܥ݋݊݀݅ݐ݅݋݊ௌ௘௧ሻ ؠ ܺሺܦܽݐ݁݋݂ܧݔ݌݅ݎݕሻ is, for instance, an 
unspecified term wherein ܺbelongs to the name of any credential type having an 
attribute as the ܦܽݐ݁݋݂ܧݔ݌݅ݎݕ. 
A credential policy is a finite set of conditionals terms, and each conditional 
term is associated with a credential and a condition set. Each condition set is a set of 
conditions against attributes in the credential. A credential policy is of the form 
denoted as follows: 
׎ሺݐͳǡ ݐʹǡ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ݐ݊ሻ 
ؠ ׎൫ݐͳሺܥ݋݊݀݅ݐ݅݋݊ௌ௘௧ሻǡ ݐʹሺܥ݋݊݀݅ݐ݅݋݊ௌ௘௧ሻǡ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ݐ݊ሺܥ݋݊݀݅ݐ݅݋݊ௌ௘௧ሻ൯ 
ؠ ׎ቌ
ܥͳሺܣݐݐݎܾ݅ݑݐ݁ௌ௘௧ǡ ܲݎ݁݀݅ܿܽݐ݁ǡ ܸ݈ܽݑ݁ሻǡ
ܥʹሺܣݐݐݎܾ݅ݑݐ݁ௌ௘௧ǡ ܲݎ݁݀݅ܿܽݐ݁ǡ ܸ݈ܽݑ݁ሻǡ ǥ ǡ
ܥ݊ሺܣݐݐݎܾ݅ݑݐ݁ௌ௘௧ǡ ܲݎ݁݀݅ܿܽݐ݁ǡ ܸ݈ܽݑ݁ሻ
ቍ 
        where ܲݎ݁݀݅ܿܽݐ݁݅݊ݒ݋݈ݒ݁ݏܾ݅݊ܽݎݕሼ൒ǡ ൌǡ ൑ሽ, 
v݈ܽݑ݁݅ݏݐ݋݄݁ܽܿܽݐݐݎܾ݅ݑݐ݁, credential, ܥͳ א ݐ݁ݎ݉ǡ ݐͳǡ ǥǥ ǡ ǡ ܥ݊ א ݐ݊, 
and  the symbol, א represents   “belongs to”  sign  in the set theory. 
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ؠ ׎
ۉ
ۈ
ۇ
ܥͳቀܣݐݐݎܾ݅ݑݐ݁ͳ ൌ ݒ݈ܽݑ݁ͳǡ ܣݐݐݎܾ݅ݑݐ݁ʹ ൌ ݒ݈ܽݑ݁ʹǡܣݐݐݎܾ݅ݑݐ݁͵ ൌ ݒ݈ܽݑ݁͵ ቁ ǡ
ܥʹ ቀܣݐݐݎܾ݅ݑݐ݁ͳ ൌ ݒ݈ܽݑ݁ͳǡܣݐݐݎܾ݅ݑݐ݁ʹ ൑ ݒ݈ܽݑ݁ʹǡܣݐݐݎܾ݅ݑݐ݁͵ ൌ ݒ݈ܽݑ݁͵ቁ ǡ ǥ ǡ
ܥ݊ሺܣݐݐݎܾ݅ݑݐ݁ͳ ൌ ݒ݈ܽݑ݁ͳǡܣݐݐݎܾ݅ݑݐ݁ʹ ൌ ݒ݈ܽݑ݁ʹሻ ی
ۋ
ۊ 
ؠ ׎
ۉ
ۈ
ۇ
ܲܽݏݏ݌݋ݎݐ ቀܨ݅ݎݏݐܰܽ݉݁ ൌ ܯܯǡܦܧ ൌ Ͳͳ െ Ͳͷ െ ͳͶǡܰݑ݉ ൌ ܼʹʹͷͷ͹͹ ቁ ǡ
ܣܶܯܥܽݎ݀ ቀܨ݅ݎݏݐܰܽ݉݁ ൌ ܯܯǡܦܧ ൑ Ͳͳ െ Ͳͷ െ ͳͶǡܰݑ݉ ൌ ܣͳͳʹʹ͵ ቁ ǡ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ
ܦݎ݅ݒ݅݊݃ܮ݅ܿ݁݊ݏ݁ሺܨ݅ݎݏݐܰܽ݉݁ ൌ ܯܯǡܰݑ݉ ൌ ͶͶ͹͹ͺͺሻ ی
ۋ
ۊ
 
where ܦܧ denotes ܦܽݐ݁݋݂ܧݔ݌݅ݎݕ and ܰݑ݉ denotes ܰݑܾ݉݁ݎǤ 
A term is satisfied if attributes appearing in a ܣݐݐݎܾ݅ݑݐ݁ௌ௘௧also appear in a 
ܥ݋݊݀݅ݐ݅݋݊ௌ௘௧, and a credential name matches with the credential name in a term, ݐǤ  
A credential policy tree is a tuple of a set of the nodes of the tree, the root of the 
tree, and the edges of the tree. A credential policy tree is a tuple,  ܶ ൌ ۃࣨǡ࣬ǡ ࣟۄ 
where ࣨ denotes a set of nodes, ࣬ denotes the root of the tree, and ࣟ denotes a  set 
of edges.  
In the following ݊ െ ܽݎݕ tree of Fig. 6.2, with  ݊ ൌ ͵, the root is ࣬ ൌ ሼܣሽǤ The 
set of nodes and the set of edges are respectively as follows:  
ࣨ ൌ ሼܣǡ ܤǡ ܥǡ ܦǡ ܤͳǡ ܤʹǡ ܤͳͳǡ ܤͳʹǡ ܤʹͳǡ ܤʹʹǡ ܥͳǡ ܥʹǡ ܥͳͳǡ ܥͳʹǡ ܥʹͳǡ ܥʹʹሽ 
ࣟ ൌ ሼܣܤǡ ܣܤܤͳǡ ܣܤܤʹǡ ܣܤܤ͵ǡ ܣܤܤͳܤͳͳǡ ܣܤܤͳܤͳʹǡǥǥǥ ሽ  
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A
A
B DC
B1
Notations Interpretations
A : ID given to a user
B : Credential, C1 as
a Passport
B1 : Name
B2 : Date
B3 : Number
B11 : First Name
B12 : Surname
B21 : Date of Issue
B22 : Date of Expiry
B2 B3
B11 B12 B21 B22
C1 C2 C3
C11 C12 C21 C22
D1 D2 D3
D11 D12 D21 D22
B C D
B1 B2 B3 C1 C2 C3 D1 D2 D3
Notations Interpretations
A : ID given to a user
C : Credential, C2 as
an ATM Card
C1 : Name
C2 : Date
C3 : Number
C11 : First Name
C12 : Surname
C21 : Date of Issue
C22 : Date of Expiry
Notations Interpretations
A : ID given to a user
D : Credential, C3 as
a Driving License
D1 : Name
D2 : Date
D3 : Number
D11 : First Name
D12 : Surname
D21 : Date of Issue
D22 : Date of Expiry
B11 B12 B21 B22 C11 C12 D11 D12C21 C22 D21 D22
 
Figure 6.2. A 3-ary Credential policy tree with pointer based representation. 
 
A Credential Sequence is an outcome of preorder or  inorder or postorder or  
any combination of the preorder, inorder, and postorder traversals. The credential  
sequence is a set of traversed nodes in order to verify an entity or generate credential 
questions by combining values from arbitrary nodes in the tree. 
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6.5.5 Assumption 
In this paper, we have assumed that an External Trusted Entity is neutral 
without any conflict of interest with a Data Owner, a user, and a CSP. CSP stands for 
a Cloud Service Provider or a Service Provider. 
6.6 Improved Trust Negotiation Protocols for Trust Ticket 
In this section, we provide improved trust negotiation protocols for Trust Ticket 
generation and deployment.  
6.6.1 Improved Algorithmic Protocol for Trust Ticket Generation 
A Data Owner solely issues the Trust Ticket, denoted by TrustUIDTicket, to a user 
after the user’s registration with the Data Owner. TrustUIDTicket  is used by a user to 
access a Data Owner’s encrypted data in a CSP.   
During a new user’s registration, a Data Owner receives a random number or a 
nonce nu from a user. This is to avoid replay attack. A user’s Public Key, his/her 
information, and his/her choice for the Data Owner’s data service are used by the 
Data Owner to generate relevant identity for that user as shown in the first line of 
step 2 in Fig. 6.3. In the second and third lines of step 2 in Fig. 6.3, the idea of Trust 
Ticket is respectively introduced and updated in the Data Owner’s local database. 
Updating TrustUIDTicket  in the database for a particular user’s UID facilitates the Data 
Owner’s control over the user. The Data Owner retains the control over data and a 
user by changing the user’s access right denoted by AR and trust expiration denoted 
by TTExp.  
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Internal structure of Trust Ticket, denoted by TrustUIDTicket,  is an encrypted 
expression, such as (Udo, UID, DID, AR, TTExp)SKdo,csp where (Udo, UID, DID, 
AR, TTExp) is encrypted with SKdo,csp which is a symmetric key. In the Trust Ticket, 
Udo stands for the identity of a registered user’s Data Owner. UID, DID, AR and 
TTExp respectively mean a registered user’s identity, data identity, access right and 
expiration of Trust Ticket. In the Trust Ticket, the identity of a user is included. The 
Data Owner as an issuer and a controller of the Trust Ticket includes the identity Udo. 
The Data Owner uses symmetric key SKdo,csp for encryption. This symmetric key is 
shared between the Data Owner and the Service Provider or the Cloud Service 
Provider. Trust expiration, TTExp is visible to a user to renew the Trust Ticket before 
its expiry.  Upon generating the TrustUIDTicket,  the Data Owner sends the user’s 
Public Key (KP+user ), Capability  List and the TrustUIDTicket  to the CSP and the user. 
The lowest key in step 3 of Fig. 6.3 is the Public Key of the CSP (KP+csp) which 
indicates that step 3 is confidential to the Service Provider or the Cloud Service 
Provider. The initial recipient of step 3 in the protocol is the CSP. The second key 
(the Private Key of the Data Owner, KP-do)  from the lowest signifies that  step 3 is 
sent exclusively by the Data Owner as a sign of authentication. The third and the 
fourth key from the lowest respectively indicate that the user’s capability list, the 
user’s nonce (nu)¸ TrustUIDTicket, Trust Expiration, and Secret Key, kO are 
confidentially sent to the user by the Data Owner. This whole block encrypted by the 
third and the fourth keys from the lowest (step 3, Fig. 6.3) is from the CSP in step 6 
of Fig. 6.3.  
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1: {nu, KP+user and user’s info and choice of expected data service} KP+do
2 : DO generates UID, DID, AR for user in the ongoing registration and
TrustUIDTicket as { Udo, UID, DID, AR, TTExp }SKdo,csp for user.
DO stores TrustUIDTicket in DB_CLdo.Tab1 as in Fig. 4.4 (a).
3 : { { nd, KP+user, Udo, UID, DID, AR, TrustUIDTicket
{ { nu, Udo, UID, DID, AR, TrustUIDTicket, TTExp, ko
}KP-do
}KP+user
}KP-do
}KP+csp
4 : CSP stores UID, DID, AR, KP+user and
{Udo, UID, DID, AR, TTExp}SKdo,csp in DB_CLcsp.Tab2.1 as in Fig. 4.4 (c).
5 : { nd, {Udo, UID, DID, AR, TTExp
}KP-csp
}KP+do
6 : { { nu, Udo, UID, DID, AR, TrustUIDTicket, TTExp, ko
}KP-do
}KP+user
7 : User is aware of the Ko and userid, dataid and access right,
TrustUIDTicket, Expiration of Trust Ticket by decrypting (6).
Circle is a process n within an entity.n
Rectangle is a process n between entities.n
Notations:
AR : Access Right
DO : Data Owner
ETE : External Trusted Entity
UID, DID : User ID, Data ID
KP+z/KP-z : Public/Private Key for z, where z={Data
Owner, User }
SKm.n : Secret Key between entity m and n.
TTexp : Trust Ticket Expiration
Nz : nonce with z={Data Owner, User}
Udo : Data Owner Identity of a user
Data Owner
(DO/d)
Service Provider/
Cloud Service Provider
(CSP/c)
User
2
1
3
4
5
6
7
Symbols:
 
Figure 6.3.  Protocol for a User’s Registration and Trust Ticket Generation. 
 
In step 4, the Service Provider updates its database as shown in Fig. 4.4(c) with 
the new user’s Capability List and the Trust Ticket. The Service Provider uses the 
database record to verify the user’s future request for the Data Owner’s encrypted 
data. The Service Provider also sends its signed copy of the Trust Ticket to the Data 
Owner in step 5. 
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1
External Trusted Entity
(ETE)
Data Owner
(DO/d)
User
(U)
Service Provider/
Cloud Service Provider 
(CSP/c)
 
2
2a
2b
2c
2d
3
 
4
5
5a
6
7
9
8
10
Circle is a process n within an entity.
n
Rectangle is a process n between entities.n
1: {nu1, KP+user, user’s info, and choice of expected data
service
} KP+do/
2 :    User needs credential approval from ETE.
2a:   Suspend for collecting credential details.
2b:  {Unique partial user ID, nu1
} KP+user
2c:  {Unique partial user ID
} SKdo,ETE
2d:   Resume with the unique partial user ID and nu2.
With credential challenge questions, user approaches
ETE for credential approval.
3 :     ETE verifies credential against credential policy tree, and
generates a credential sequence along with the unique
partial user ID. ETE maintains a set of credential
challenge questions.
4 : {Unique partial user ID, credential sequence, and
credential verification outcome
} SKdo,ETE
5 :  From the unique partial user ID, DO generates UID, 
      DID, and AR for user in the ongoing registration. DO 
      splits ko into ko1 to ko4, and retains ko1..  DO distributes 
      ko2, ko3, and ko4 to ETE, a user, and CSP respectively.   
      DO generates TrustUIDTicket as 
      { Udo, UID, DID, AR, TTExp }SKdo,csp for a user.
5a : {Unique partial user ID, ko2) SKdo,ETE
6 :   { nd, KP+user, Udo, UID, DID, AR, TrustUIDTicket,  ko4                          
          {nu2, Udo, UID, DID, AR, TrustUIDTicket, TTExp, ko3
                }SKdo.user 
       }SKdo.csp
7.  CSP stores UID, DID, AR, KP+user, ko4,  and 
     {Udo, UID, DID, AR, TTExp}SKdo.csp 
     in DB_CLcsp.Tab2.1 as in Fig. 4.4 (c).
8.  {    nd, {Udo, UID, DID, AR, TTExp
                }KP-csp
     }KP+do
9.  {nu2, Udo, UID, DID, AR, TrustUIDTicket, TTExp,  
       ko3
       }SKdo.user
10. Data Owner stores trust negotiation sequence in ETE.
 
 
Notations:
AR : Access Right
DO : Data Owner
ETE : External Trusted Entity
UID, DID : User ID, Data ID
KP+z/KP-z : Public/Private Key for z,
where z={Data Owner, User }
SKm.n : Secret Key between entity m and n.
TTExp : Trust Ticket Expiration
nz : nonce with z={Data Owner, User}
Udo : Data Owner Identity of a user
 
Figure 6.4.   Improved Protocol for a User’s Registration and Trust Ticket Generation. 
 
The user is aware of the Trust Ticket in step 7 as shown in Fig. 6.3. However, in 
Fig 6.4, a Data Owner allows a user to follow suspend and resume protocol strategy 
for its verification and registration. The suspend and resume protocol strategy is 
illustrated in section 6.5.2. The user receives a partial user ID from the Data Owner  
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prior to the user’s suspending the interaction with the Data Owner, and the user 
having the partial user ID approaches the External Trusted Entity that has also 
received the user’s partial user ID beforehand. The External Trusted Entity verifies 
the user using the credential policy tree as illustrated earlier in section 6.5.4. The 
External Trusted Entity checks the credentials from the user against the credentials 
preserved with the External Trusted Entity, and the External Trusted Entity verifies 
the credential through a credential policy tree. The credential is checked by 
traversing the credential policy tree The External Trusted Entity also maintains a set 
of credential challenge questions. On verifying the user, the External Trusted Entity 
feedbacks the Data Owner with the credential sequence, and the credential sequence 
provides the information of the traversed nodes of the credential policy tree for 
verifying the user. The Data Owner generates the Trust Ticket for the user that 
resumes the interaction with the Data Owner. Trust Ticket generation and trust 
negotiation in Fig. 6.4 employs less asymmetric encryption than that in Fig. 6.3. 
Secret Key is split based on secret sharing scheme as illustrated in section 6.5.2. The 
External Trusted Entity verifies a user based on the credential policy tree and 
credential challenge questions. As opposed to a single secret with a registered user in 
the prior work [122], the splits or shares of the Secret Key are distributed to multiple 
entities, and the entities include the Data Owner, the External Trusted Entity, the  
registered user, and the Service Provider or the Cloud Service Provider.  
6.6.2 Improved Algorithmic Protocol for Trust Ticket Deployment 
At the end of a user’s registration with a Data Owner, the user is aware of the 
Trust Ticket. The Service Provider or the Cloud Service Provider is also aware of the 
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Trust Ticket. The user’s request to the Service Provider regarding the Data Owner-
encrypted data is through the Trust Ticket as shown by step 1 in Fig. 6.5.  
 
Steps Codes Interpretations
1: { {nu, TrustUIDTicket
}KP-user
}KP+csp
2: CSP decrypts (1)
3i: If ( TTEXP at [TrustUIDTicket from user]
=
TTEXP at [TrustUIDTicket from CSP])
Then CSP invokes (3ii)
Else CSP ends by invoking (5)
3ii: If (UID at [TrustUIDTicket from user]
=
UID at [TrustUIDTicket from CSP])
Then CSP invokes (3iii)
Else CSP ends by invoking (5)
3iii: If (AR at [TrustUIDTicket from user]
=
AR at [TrustUIDTicket From CSP &&
CapList from CSP]
)
Then CSP invokes (3iv)
Else CSP ends by invoking (5)
3iv:
{ { nu, {data}KO
}KP-csp
}KP+user
4i: CSP sends (3iv) to user and invokes (6).
4ii: User receives and decrypts (3iv) and invokes (6).
5: CSP sends Error and invokes (6).
6: End.
CSP is aware of user with
Udo,UID, DID, AR, TTEXP by
decrypting Trust Ticket.
User encrypts inner part with
KP-user and outer part with
KP+csp for authentication and
confidentiality respectively.
For valid TTEXP at (3i), CSP
calls (3ii).
For valid AR at (3iii), CSP
retrieves {data}KO.
{data}KO was already
encrypted by DO. CSP
encrypts inner part with KP-csp
and outer part with KP+user for
authentication and
confidentiality respectively.
For valid UID at (3ii), CSP
calls (3iii).
2
Data
Owner
(DO/d)
Service Provider/
Cloud Service Provider
(CSP/c)
User
1
Else of if
3i
5
4
3ii
3iv
3iii
Else of if
5
Else of if
5
Circle is a process n
within an entity.
n
Rectangle is a process n
between entities.
n
KP-z/ KP-z : Private Key/Public Key of z.
nu and
TTExp
: Nonce and Trust
Ticket Expiration
AR, DID,
UID
: Access Right,
Data ID, User ID
Ko : Secret Key
Symbols
 
Figure 6.5.  Algorithmic Protocol for Trust Ticket Deployment. 
 
The Service Provider or the Cloud Service Provider verifies the attributes of the 
Trust Ticket sent by the user. A nonce, nu is used by the user to avoid replay attack.  
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Step 2 in Fig. 6.5 makes the user’s credentials visible to the Service Provider. Step 3 
is split into four parts. First part denoted by (3i) verifies Trust Expiration (TTEXP) of 
the user. If there is no deviation from TTExp, remaining steps are executed in order. 
At the end of the successful verification of (3i), the second part of step 3 denoted by 
(3ii) is executed. In this part, user id (UID) is verified. For a valid user, access right 
(AR) is verified at the third part (3iii) of step 3. Final part denoted by (3iv) is 
executed by successively verifying prior parts, (3i) through (3iii). During the final 
part, the Data Owner-encrypted data retrieved by the Service Provider is further 
encrypted by the Service Provider with the Public Key of the user (KP+user) and the 
Private Key of the Service Provider (KP-csp). These further encryptions respectively 
ensure that the encrypted data is explicitly sent to the registered user by the Service 
Provider. The user matches the received nonce with the nonce sent at step 1 as shown 
in Fig. 6.5. At the end of step 4, the user is aware of the Data Owner-encrypted data. 
The Secret Key,  kO, obtained by the user as shown in steps 6 and 7 of Fig. 6.3, is 
used by the user to decrypt the Data Owner-encrypted data. 
The improved algorithmic protocol, in Fig. 6.6, shows the verification process 
of a user before the user is able to access data in the Cloud. The Service Provider 
makes an initial verification with the Trust Ticket. However, at the External Trusted 
Entity side, three features improve trust and security scenarios in Fig. 6.6. As 
compared to the protocols of the prior work [122] in Fig. 6.3 and Fig. 6.5, the 
corresponding improved protocols respectively in Fig. 6.4 and Fig. 6.6 improve the 
trust and security from a Data Owner’s perspective. These three features include 
credential verification by the credential policy tree, further verification by the 
credential challenge questions, and further verification by combing the three out of 
four split Secret Keys.  
Chapter 6 Preventing a Malicious User from Sharing a Data Owner-Given Secret Key 
  
227 
 
Steps Codes Interpretations
1 : User approaches SaaS.
2 : If (valid Trust Ticket exists)
Then CSP invokes (2i)
Else CSP invokes (2a)
2i : { {nu, TrustUIDTicket
}KP-user
}KP+csp
2a : Follow registration protocol in Fig. 6.4.
3i : If (TTEXP at [TrustUIDTicket from user]
=
TTEXP at [TrustUIDTicket from CSP])
Then CSP invokes (3ii)
Else CSP ends by invoking (5) For valid TTEXP at (3i), CSP calls (3ii).
3ii : If (UID at [TrustUIDTicket from user]
=
UID at [TrustUIDTicket from CSP])
Then CSP invokes (3iii)
Else CSP ends by invoking (5) For valid UID at (3ii), CSP calls (3iii).
3iii : If (AR at [TrustUIDTicket from user]
=
AR at [TrustUIDTicket From CSP &&
CapList from CSP]
)
Then CSP invokes (3iv)
Else CSP ends by invoking (5) For valid AR at (3iii), CSP
retrieves {data}KO.
3iv : { User’s input  to ETE about the split secret 
with the user
{ nu, ko4, {data}KO
}KP+ETE
}KP+user
3a : CSP sends (3iv) to user
3v : {ko3, { UID, nu, ko4, {data}kO
}KP+ETE
}KP+ETE
3b : User sends 3v to ETE.
3vi : ETE extracts unique partial user ID from UID, and
arrange credential challenge questions.
3c : Credential challenge questions.
3d : Feedback on (3c).
3vii : Feedback evaluation against credential policy tree,
credential sequence, and credential challenge questions and
answers.
3viii : If (feedback evaluation is valid)
Then ETE invokes (3ix)
Else ETE invokes (5)
3ix : ETE combines its ko2 with ko3 from user and ko4
from CSP, and generates ko to decrypt data from
(3v, 3b, and 3vi). ETE sends {data}KP+user by invoking (3e).
3e : {data}KP+user
4i : ETE stores trust negotiation sequence.
5 : CSP sends invalid information and invokes (6)
6 : End.
Data 
Owner 
(DO/d)
Service Provider/
Cloud Service Provider 
(CSP/c)
User
(U)
1
Else of if
3i
5
3a
3ii
3iv
3iii
Else of if
5
Else of if
5
Circle is a process n
within an entity.n
n
KP-z/ KP-z
: Private Key/
Public Key of z.
nu and
TTExp
: Nonce and Trust
Ticket Expiration
AR, UID : Access Right,User ID
Ko : Secret Key
Notations:
Rectangle is a process n 
between entities.
External Trusted Entity
(ETE)
Else of if
2
2a
2i
3v
3b
3vi
3vii
3viii
3ix
4i
3c
3d
Else 
of if
3e
 
Figure 6.6.  Improved Algorithmic Protocol for Trust Ticket Deployment. 
In the next sections, we provide the significance of applying suspend and 
resume strategy, secret sharing scheme, and credential policy tree. In section 6.6.6, 
we provide the experimental evaluation of our improved algorithms in Fig. 6.4 and 
Fig. 6.6 as compared to the ones in Fig. 6.3 and Fig. 6.5 of the prior work [118, 122]. 
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The experiment result is based on the extracted features of the prior work [122] and 
the current work in the chapter.  
6.6.3 Significance of Applying the Suspend and Resume  Strategy 
The suspend and resume protocol strategy is illustrated in section 6.5.2 and 
applied in the protocol, and the protocol is in Fig. 6.6 of section 6.6.2. The user 
receives a partial user ID from the Data Owner before the user suspends the initial 
interaction with the Data Owner. The user having the partial user ID approaches the 
External Trusted Entity that has also received the user’s partial user ID beforehand. 
The suspend and resume protocol strategy limits and organises the interactions 
between the Data Owner and the user at a measurable amount towards greater clarity. 
The user limits the interactions by providing the suspend request to the Data Owner. 
The Data Owner leaves the opportunity open for further interactions with the Data 
Owner. The Data Owner reflects the intention of further interactions with the user, 
and further interactions will take place after the user is verified by the External 
Trusted Entity. The Data Owner reflects the intention of further interactions by 
providing the user and the External Trusted Entity with the partial user ID. The user 
approaches the External Trusted Entity with the partial user ID. Upon becoming 
verified by the External Trusted Entity, the user resumes the interactions with the 
Data Owner.   The work break down structure of the suspend and resume protocol 
strategy provides the clarity in the interactions between the Data Owner and the user,  
the user and the External Trusted Entity, the External Trusted Entity and the Data 
Owner, and the user and the Data Owner. The clarity in the interactions highlights 
the purpose in the interactions, and the purpose of the interactions eliminates the lack 
of trust.   
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6.6.4 Significance of Applying the Secret Sharing Scheme 
The ሺ݇ǡ ݊ሻsecret sharing scheme is illustrated with the mathematics and 
numerical examples in section 6.5.3. The scheme is applied in the protocol in Fig. 6.6 
of section 6.6.2. The user retains a share of the complete Secret Key instead of 
possessing the complete Secret Key. The user possessing the complete Secret Key 
may share the Secret Key with malicious insiders or malicious outsiders of the 
Service Provider. When a user approaches the Service Provider for a Data Owner- 
encrypted data, the Service Provider verifies the user. On successful verification, the 
Service Provider sends the user a message to receive the data from the External 
Trusted Entity. In order to receive the data from the External Trusted Entity, the user 
needs to input to the External Trusted Entity the share of the complete Secret Key. 
The External Trusted Entity verifies the user the credentials preserved with the 
credential policy tree and the credential questions.  On successful verification of the 
user, the External Trusted Entity combines the shares from the user and recovers the 
secret. The External Trusted Entity preserves the trust negotiation sequence or the 
credential sequence with the Data Owner. The ሺ݇ǡ ݊ሻsecret sharing protocol scheme 
adds additional verification to eliminate the lack of trust from the perspective of the 
Data Owner. 
6.6.5 Significance of Applying the Credential Policy Tree 
The External Trusted Entity verifies a user using the credential policy tree as 
illustrated earlier in section 6.5.4. The External Trusted Entity uses the credential 
policy tree in support of the suspend and resume protocol strategy and the 
ሺ݇ǡ ݊ሻsecret sharing scheme. Each node in the credential policy tree holds a 
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credential related attribute, and each attribute is used to generate a credential 
question and verify a user. The External Trusted Entity generates a credential 
sequence at the end of verifying a user. The credential sequence is the preorder 
traversal, inorder traversal, postorder traversal, or any combination of traversals 
with regard to verifying a user. The credential sequence is generated by the External 
Trusted Entity from a credential policy tree, and the External Trusted Entity shares 
the credential sequence with the Data Owner. The credential policy tree and the 
credential sequence provide a view of the user’s attributes with the Data Owner, and 
the user’s attributes are used the External Trusted Entity for the user’s verification. 
The view of the user’s attributes and the view of the user’s verification eliminate the 
lack of trust perceived by the Data Owner.   
6.6.6 Experimental Evaluation 
In this section, we discuss the experimental evaluation of our work in the 
chapter with regard to the algorithmic protocols in the prior work [122].  
We perform experimental evaluation in two stages. In the first stage, we extract 
the features from the algorithmic protocols of the prior work [122], and we also 
extract the features from the algorithmic protocols of the current work.  In 
continuation with the chapter 4 that describes our prior work, we have provided the 
algorithmic protocols of the prior work in Fig. 6.3 and Fig. 6.5 of this chapter. We 
have also provided the corresponding improved algorithmic protocols over the 
foregoing algorithmic protocols of the prior work, and the improved algorithmic 
protocols are in Fig. 6.4 and Fig. 6.6 of this chapter. In Table 6.1, we present the 
categories of interactions with respect to Fig. 6.3 and Fig. 6.4, and we also provide 
the extracted features of each category of interactions.  
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Table 6.1. Categories of interaction with respect to Fig. 6.3 and Fig. 6.4 for a user’s registration and 
Trust Ticket generation.     
Category Prior Protocol (Fig. 6.3)  Features 
New Protocol 
(Fig. 6.4) Features 
1 1 Initiated by a user 1 Initiated by a user 
2 - Nil 2 
A Data Owner’s and the 
user’s interactions towards 
the verification of the user. 
3 - Nil 3 
The External Trusted Entity 
verifies the user as needed by 
the Data Owner. 
4 - Nil 4 
Outcome of the user’s 
verification to the Data 
Owner from the External 
Trusted Entity. 
5 2 
Trust Ticket 
generation by the 
Data Owner. 
5, 5a 
Trust Ticket and Secret Key 
shares generation by the Data 
Owner that passes the Secret 
Key share to the External 
Trusted Entity. 
6 3 
The Data Owner 
passes the Trust 
Tickets to the 
Service Provider. 
6 
The Data Owner passes the 
Secret Key share and the 
Trust Tickets to the Service 
Provider. 
7 4 
The Service 
Provider updates 
the Trust Ticket in 
its database. 
7 
The Service Provider updates 
the Trust Ticket in its 
database. 
8 5 
The Service 
Provider the 
signed copy of the 
Trust Ticket to the 
Data Owner. 
8 
The Service Provider the 
signed copy of the Trust 
Ticket to the Data Owner. 
9 6, 7 
The Service 
Provider passes 
the encrypted 
version of the 
Trust Ticket to the 
user. 
9 
The Service Provider passes 
the encrypted version of the 
Trust Ticket and the Data 
Owner’s Secret Key share to 
the user. 
 
Fig. 6.4 is an improved algorithmic protocol for a user’s registration with a Data 
Owner and the Data Owner’s Trust Ticket generation for the user. The improvement 
in Fig 6.4 is over the algorithmic protocol in Fig. 6.3. The improved algorithmic 
protocol in Fig. 6.4 provides more features than that of the algorithmic protocol in 
Fig. 6.3 in ensuring a Data Owner’s trust, and the trust is on a user’s registration and 
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the Data Owner’s Trust Ticket generation for the user.  The improved algorithmic 
protocol in Fig. 6.6 adds features to and removes the shortcoming of the algorithmic 
protocol in Fig. 6.5. The improvement ensures a Data Owner’s trust, and the trust is 
on a user’s access to the Data Owner-encrypted data through the deployment of the 
Trust Ticket.  
In the second stage, we run the experiments written in Java Programming 
Language, and the experiments take the extracted features into account towards 
evaluating a Data Owner’s Trust Perception Level.  
With regard to Fig. 6.3 and Fig. 6.4, the Data Owner’s Trust Perception Level is 
measured, and this trust perception shows the Data Owner’s level of trust towards 
the operations of a user’s registration with the Data Owner and the arrangement of 
the Trust Ticket generation and distribution for the user.  In connection with Fig. 6.5 
and Fig. 6.6, the Data Owner’s Trust Perception Level is also measured during a 
user’s access to data through the deployment of Trust Ticket. 
In the following experimental results, a Data Owner’s trust perception is 
important factor in the interactions among entities. From the perspective of a Data 
Owner’s trust perception, we classify the all interactions in Fig. 6.3 and Fig. 6.4 into 
9 categories for trust negotiation and establishment. Each category, referred to as an 
interaction class, reflects a Data Owner’s trust perception, and the trust perception is 
the outcome of the interaction classes. We provide the categories of the interaction 
classes in Table 6.1. In the experiment, we set the Trust Perception Level as an 
interval from 0 to 4, and we denote the Trust Perception Level as [0, 4]. The lowest 
Trust Perception Level is 0 while the highest is 4. 
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For a user’s registration with the Data Owner and the Data Owner’s generation 
of the Trust Ticket, our improved algorithm in Fig. 6.4 engages an External Trusted 
Entity. The External Trusted Entity interacts with a user for the user’s credentials; the 
External Trusted Entity feedbacks the Data Owner regarding the user. In the 
improved algorithm, trust negotiations among an External Trusted Entity, a user, and 
a Data Owner are in the form of interaction classes 2, 3, and 4 as shown in Fig. 6.4 
and Fig. 6.7 through Fig. 6.12.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.7.  A Data Owner’s Trust Perception 
Level in Trust Ticket generation for a user 
during the iteration 1 out of 56. 
Figure 6.8.  A Data Owner’s Trust Perception 
Level in Trust Ticket generation for a user during 
the iteration 22 out of 56. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.9.  A Data Owner’s Trust Perception 
Level in Trust Ticket generation for a user 
during the iteration 44 out of 56. 
 
 
Figure 6.10.  A Data Owner’s Trust Perception 
Level in Trust Ticket generation for a user during 
the iteration 55 out of 56. 
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In the interaction class 2, a Data Owner wants a user’s credential approval from 
an External Trusted Entity which receives credential and credential challenge 
questions from the user. The External Trusted Entity preserves the user’s credential 
and credential challenge questions; therefore, a Data Owner perceives the highest 
trust in the interaction class 2. However, there is no such credential related provision 
in our prior work; therefore, a Data Owner perceives the lowest trust in the 
interaction class 2 as seen in Fig. 6.7 through Fig. 6.12.  
In these interaction classes 3 and 4, the Data Owner becomes aware about the 
authenticity of the user, as the External Trusted Entity verifies the user through the 
credentials. These credentials from the user are verified with the ones already 
maintained in the External Trusted Entity through the credential policy tree. 
However, there are no such interaction classes  3 and 4 in our prior work [122] as 
shown in Fig. 6.3 and Fig. 6.7 through Fig. 6.12.  
In the following Table 6.2, we provide the 5 categories of the interaction 
classes, and these interaction classes are from the protocols of the prior work and the 
current one as illustrated in Fig. 6.5 and Fig. 6.6 respectively. These interaction 
classes provide the operation of the entities in ensuring a user’s access to a Data 
 
 
 
Figure 6.11.  A Data Owner’s Trust 
Perception Level in Trust Ticket generation 
for a user during the iteration 1 out of 7. 
Figure 6.12.  A Data Owner’s Trust Perception 
Level in Trust Ticket generation for a user during 
the iteration 6 out of 7. 
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Owner-encrypted data. These interaction classes show the Data Owner’s Trust 
Perception Level during the user’s access to the Data Owner-encrypted data. In the 
experiment, we set the Data Owner’s Trust Perception Level as an interval denoted 
as [0, 4] in which the lowest Trust Perception Level is 0 and the highest one is 4. 
Table 6.2. Categories of interaction with respect to Fig. 6.5 and Fig. 6.6  for a user’s access to a Data 
Owner-encrypted data.  
Category Prior Protocol (Fig. 6.5)  Features 
New Protocol 
(Fig. 6.6) 
 
Features 
 
1 1 Initiated by a user. 1, 2 Initiated by a user. 
2 2 Processed by the Service Provider.  2, 2i, 2a 
Processed by the Service 
Provider in response to the 
user’s interaction. 
3 3i, 3ii, 3iii 
The less decision 
taking capability 
than the new 
protocol 
3i, 3ii, 3iii, 
3iv, 3a, 3v 
The Service Provider and the 
user’s interactions about the 
Data Owner-encrypted data. 
4 3iv, 4i 
The Service 
Provider sends the 
Data Owner-
encrypted data to 
the user 
3iv, 3a, 3v, 3b, 
3vi, 3c, 3vii, 
3viii, 3ix, 3e  
The External Trusted Entity 
sends data to the user in 
articulation with the 
combined interactions among 
the Service Provider, the user, 
and the External Trusted 
Entity. 
5 4ii, 5, 6 
The user receives 
the data before the 
end of the service 
by the Service 
Provider. 
3e, 4i, 5, 6 
The user receives the data and 
the External Trusted Entity 
stores the trust negotiation 
sequence before the end of 
the service by the Service 
Provider. 
 
The interaction class 2 in Fig. 6.13 through Fig. 6.18 is related with the 
interactions (2, 2i, and 2a) in Fig. 6.6 and the interaction (2) in Fig. 6.5. These 
interactions take place between a Service Provider and a user, and the Service 
Provider prepares to verify the user based on the Trust Ticket. Therefore, a Data 
Owner perceives the highest trust in the interaction class 2 as seen in the following 
Fig. 6.13 through Fig. 6.18. The reason for the highest trust in the interaction class 2 
is that the attributes in the Trust Ticket facilitate the Service Provider in 
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authenticating an   appropriate user holding the Trust Ticket. The interaction class 3 
follows the same process as the interaction class 2. However, there is a significant 
influence of the split Secret Key on our current work regarding the authentication of 
a user, and the Secret Key split mechanism in our current work, as opposed to the 
mechanism in our prior work, provides higher level of the Data Owner’ trust 
perception as seen in Fig. 6.17; However, the experiments show that the occurrence 
of such a lower perception as seen in Fig. 6.17  of our prior work is infrequent, and 
this infrequency is  evident from the comparison of the trust perception in Fig. 6.17 
with that in Fig. 6.13 through Fig. 6.16 and Fig. 6.18.     
  
Figure 6.13.  A Data Owner’s Trust 
Perception Level in a user’s data access during 
the iteration 1 out of 166. 
Figure 6.14.  A Data Owner’s Trust Perception 
Level in a user’s data access during the iteration 20 
out of 166. 
  
Figure 6.15.  A Data Owner’s Trust 
Perception Level in a user’s data access during 
the iteration 60 out of 166. 
 
Figure 6.16.  A Data Owner’s Trust Perception 
Level in a user’s data access during the iteration 
100 out of 166. 
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Figure 6.17.  A Data Owner’s Trust 
Perception Level in a user’s data access during 
the iteration 165 out of 166. 
Figure 6.18.  A Data Owner’s Trust Perception 
Level in Trust Ticket generation for a user during 
the iteration 1 out of 18. 
 
In the interaction classes 4 and 5, the trust perception is higher than that of the 
prior work. The reason for the higher trust perception is that the External Trusted 
Entity authenticates a user through the verification of credentials and replies to the 
credential questions.  
In the next section, we provide the security analysis with focus on realising the 
claims that overcome the attacks, and CSP stands for a Cloud Service Provider or a 
Service Provider throughput the discussion in the next section. 
6.6.7 Security Analysis for the Claims Countering the Attacks 
In our work, a Data Owner is the issuer and the controller of the Trust Ticket. 
During a new user’s registration by a Data Owner, additional steps by the Data 
Owner generate the Trust Ticket as detailed in Fig. 6.3.  Trust Ticket containing a 
user’s attributes such as, access right (AR), and trust expiration (TTExp) is distributed 
to the CSP and the new user.  The Data Owner receives and maintains a signed copy 
of the Trust Ticket from the CSP as shown in step 5 of Fig. 6.3. Through the Trust 
Ticket, the CSP being aware of the user and relevant attributes, such as AR and 
TTExp of that user uses the relevant attributes to verify the user who later on requests 
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for a Data Owner-encrypted data. The Data Owner does not need to remain online 
during the user’s request for the Data Owner-encrypted data in the CSP. Through 
secure generation and distribution of the Trust Ticket, the Data Owner’s trust is 
established with control over data and user. We discuss the details of the Data 
Owner’s control over data and the user in the following section.   
The Data Owner encrypts data with the Secret Key, KO or kO. The Data Owner 
outsources the encrypted data to the CSP. Due to the encryption, insiders in the CSP 
cannot access the Data Owner-encrypted data in the CSP. The Data Owner shares the 
kO with registered users. At any point in time, the Data Owner updates encrypted 
data in the CSP along with the user’s Capability List denoted by CapList. The Data 
Owner and the CSP separately maintain database records of the CapList. By 
updating a registered user’s CapList in the Service Provider, the Data Owner 
controls a registered user. For instance, access right (AR) updated by the Data Owner 
in the CapList is sent to the Service Provider as illustrated in chapter 4. If the 
updated AR is different from the AR held by a registered user, the CSP debars the 
registered user from obtaining the Data Owner-encrypted data. This process of 
verification by the CSP on the basis of the Data Owner’s updated AR is shown in 
step (3iii) of Fig. 6.5. While a registered user possesses the Secret Key, kO and the 
Data Owner remains offline, the user’s access to the data is controlled by the Data 
Owner through the CSP. The CSP, on the other hand, cannot view the content of the 
data as this data is encrypted by the Data Owner with the Secret Key, kO. However, a 
malicious user that can share the Secret Key with an insider in the CSP may cause 
risks. We claim that our new mechanism in Fig. 6.4 nullifies a malicious user’s 
effort, and we regard this claim as the Claim 1. Before we discuss our new 
mechanism to prove the Claim 1, we cover below our prior mechanism of Fig. 6.3.    
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With the logical sequence of tasks as shown in Fig. 6.3 of our work, a registered 
user is linked with the CSP through the Data Owner. Cryptographic manoeuvres and 
keys are used to ensure the authentication and confidentiality in each phase. For 
instance, as shown in Fig. 6.3, a user’s request to the Data Owner in step 1 is 
responded by the CSP at the end of step 6. During the intervening steps, several 
interactions between the CSP and the Data Owner ensure authentication and 
confidentiality. Step 3 in Fig. 6.3 is confidentially sent to the CSP by the Data 
Owner. Only the CSP having the respective Private Key reveals that the content is 
sent by the Data Owner. The inner part of step 3 sent by the Data Owner is 
confidential to user. This inner part forwarded to the user by the CSP at the end of 
step 6 is revealed by the user having the respective Private Key. These authentication 
and confidentiality processes by encryption with respectively private and Public 
Keys ensure the transparency of the interactions. This transparency aligns the Data 
Owner’s trust.  However, the Secret Key once revealed to an insider in the CSP 
causes a Data Owner’s loss of control over data; therefore, a Data Owner’s trust 
depends on the disclosure of the Secret Key, kO or KO. We claim that our new 
mechanism ensures the protection of data and Secret Key, and we regard this claim as 
the Claim 2. Before we discuss our new mechanism in support of the Claim 2, we, in 
the following section, cover verification process that our previous work follows for a 
user.  
In our previous work, the verification of a registered user is based on the 
updated Trust Ticket and CapList as shown in steps (3i) through (3iii) in Fig. 6.5. 
During these triple verifications, the Data Owner does not have to be online.  Any 
deviation of the user’s trust expiration (TTExp) in step (3i) results in the immediate 
termination of the algorithmic protocol as shown in Fig. 6.5.  This ensures that the 
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Data Owner can update TTExp in the CSP at any time. This update of TTExp debars a 
registered user from accessing the Data Owner-encrypted data.   
Trust Ticket deployment shortens the interactions between a CSP and a user. A 
Data Owner generates Trust Ticket in step 2 of Fig. 6.3 and distributes it to a CSP 
and a user in steps 3 and 6 of Fig. 6.3 respectively. During these steps, interactions 
are based on authentication and confidentiality. Unless a Data Owner updates Trust 
Ticket, these interactions at steps 3 and 6 of Fig. 6.3 are not repeated further between 
a user and a CSP due to existing Trust Ticket. The overall computation time in our 
algorithm is less than that of the prior work [118] as shown in Table II of  our prior 
work [122].     
Altogether, deployment of Trust Ticket in our work ensures the Data Owner’s 
control over user and data. A Data Owner changes Trust Ticket in a CSP any time. 
By updating the Trust Ticket, a Data Owner can change a user’s access right and 
Trust Ticket expiration. Also, a Data Owner can update data by changing the Secret 
Key, kO  shared with users. The Data Owner’s updating encrypted data in the CSP 
provides the Data Owner’s control over data as the CSP does not have the Secret 
Key, kO to view the content of the data. This control is linked with the Data Owner’s 
trust on the CSP holding the data in different locations. 
However, on obtaining the Secret Key a malicious user may shares the Secret 
Key with the CSP. We claim that secret sharing and verification of a user through a 
user’s credential policy tree and credential challenge questions  prevent the 
disclosure of the Secret Key, and ensure a Data Owner’s control over data and user ; 
let this claim be Claim 3. Before we prove the Claim 3, we discuss the deployment of 
the Trust Ticket and multiple asymmetric encryptions in the following section.  
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 Further, the deployment of the Data Owner’s Trust Ticket gets the CSP to 
encrypt the Data Owner’s encrypted data twice with Public Key of user (KP+user) and 
Private Key of the CSP (KP-csp). This paper, through a Data Owner’s Trust Ticket 
deployment, ensures three layers of security for data. The inner most layer is by a 
Data Owner with kO  and outer layers are by a CSP with  KP+user and KP-csp as shown 
in step (3iv) of Fig. 6.5. Further, through the deployment of Trust Ticket, there are 
also three layers of verification from (3i) to (3iii) of Fig. 6.5 before the triple 
encrypted data is available to a user. As a Data Owner is the issuer and the controller 
of a Trust Ticket, triple verifications of a user at steps (3i) through (3iii) of Fig. 6.5 
and triple encryptions of the data step at step (3iv) of Fig. 6.5 establish a notion of 
trust on a Data Owner’s part. However, these multiple asymmetric encryptions incur 
computation overhead. We claim that our new mechanism provides the near real time 
protection with less number of multiple asymmetric encryptions; let this claim be 
Claim 4.  
 Claim 1: The new mechanism nullifies the malicious effort of a malicious user 
sharing Secret Key with an insider in the CSP. 
Proof:  We show by means of games that a user’s credentials are maintained in 
an External Trusted Entity. The External Trusted Entity also preserves credential 
challenge questions.   Suspend and resume protocol with the External Trusted Entity 
allow a user to collect and provide credentials that are essential for future 
verification. A Data Owner splits the Secret Key and distributes the split secret parts 
to himself/herself, a user, an External Trusted Entity, and the CSP.    
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Game 1: This game is similar to the execution of a real world scenario in which 
a user’s credential are revealed along with the credential policy tree and credential 
challenge questions. 
Game 2: This proceeds when a malicious user shares Secret Key with others. 
Under the scenarios of Game 1 and Game 2, credential policy tree is preserved 
by an External Trusted Entity. Credentials received from a user are organized 
through the credential policy tree. Credential challenge questions are also preserved 
in an External Trusted Entity, and randomly served to get feedback from a user on a 
predefined pattern. Any deviation from the pattern results in the distribution of 
invalid information to a user. A Data Owner distributes split Secret Key; a user 
inputs the share of the Secret Key only after prior three layers of verification as seen 
in Fig. 6.6. The External Trusted Entity receives Secret Key shares from a user and a 
CSP. The External Trusted Entity reveals Secret Key by combing its share with the 
two shares of the Secret Key from a user and a CSP. The External Trusted Entity 
decrypts data with the Secret Key, encrypts the data with the user’s Public Key 
KP+user,  and sends the encrypted data to the user as shown in Fig. 6.6 (steps 3v and 
3e). Therefore, the user cannot share the Secret Key with the CSP in our new 
mechanism in Fig. 6.4 and Fig. 6.6.  
Claim 2: The new mechanism protects data and Secret Key from an insider. 
Proof: With a game, we discuss that data and Secret Key propagate from the 
CSP to a user. The data move from a user to an External Trusted Entity that reveals 
data to the user only after several verifications. 
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 Game 1: The game proceeds when a user shares Secret Key and data with an 
insider in CSP. With the Secret Key, the insider in the CSP cannot modify the data. 
Under the condition of the Game 1, a user receives data from an External 
Trusted Entity at the successful end of the verification; the External Trusted Entity 
encrypts the data with the user’s Public Key. As the data is decrypted and encrypted 
in the External Trusted Entity, the CSP cannot access Secret Key and data.    
Claim 3: The new mechanism retains a Data Owner’s control over data and a 
user. 
Proof:  We show with the means of a unique Trust Ticket that a Data Owner can 
update the attributes in the Trust Ticket in a CSP to prevent a user from accessing 
data. 
Game 1:   This game is the same as the real world scenario in which a user can 
access data by avoiding any mismatch in attributes of the Trust Ticket in the CSP and 
the Trust Ticket in a user. 
The scenario of the above Game 1 is not possible in our new mechanism, as any 
mismatch made by a CSP in the interest of a user is countered through the credential 
verification. Therefore, when a Data Owner updates attributes in a user’s Trust Ticket 
or the Trust Ticket in a CSP, this update controls the data and a user.   
   Claim 4: The new mechanism has less number of multiple asymmetric 
encryptions. 
Proof:  With the protocols in the Fig. 6.3, Fig 6.4, Fig. 6.5, and Fig. 6.6, we 
show that the new mechanism has less number of asymmetric encryptions.  
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Game 1: The game proceeds by considering the fact the new mechanism incurs 
computation overhead because of encryption. 
Under the context of the above game, we find that there are two symmetric 
encryptions in our new mechanism as compared to all asymmetric encryptions in our 
previous work. There are less double encryptions in our new mechanism (Fig. 6.6) as 
compared to our previous one (Fig. 6.5). Therefore, the new mechanism incurring 
less computation overhead is an a priori. 
6.7 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, we have devised an algorithmic protocol in continuation with 
our prior work in chapter 4.  The algorithmic protocol in the chapter is for the 
deployment of a Data Owner-generated Trust Ticket. This new algorithmic protocol 
in the chapter is a notion of trust from the perspective of a Data Owner’s control over 
data and a registered user. We have argued that the new algorithmic protocol in the 
chapter is a link between a Service Provider and a registered user through a Data 
Owner. A Data Owner encrypts the data with the Secret Key, kO and outsources the 
encrypted data   to a Service Provider. A Data Owner also updates the data, and the 
Data Owner splits the Secret Key, kO and distributes the secret shares. While the Data 
Owner is the issuer and distributor of the Trust Ticket during a user’s registration, the 
Data Owner remains online only during a user’s registration. In the new algorithmic 
protocol, interaction classes establish the Data Owner’s notion of trust, and the 
notion of trust provides high Trust Perception Level during a new user’s registration, 
Trust Ticket generation, the user’s access to the data during the deployment of the 
Trust Ticket.  
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Chapter 7 
Conclusions and Future Work 
7.1 Conclusions 
In this section, we present the core contributions, and we also present insights 
into far-reaching prominent research directions.  
7.1.1 Major Contributions 
Lack of trust in Cloud Computing emerges from the concerns of Data Owners. 
Lack of trust in Software as a Service Cloud Computing has been particularly an 
issue of more concerns because of the nature of handling the Data Owners’ data in 
machines that are in remote and unknown locations. The aims of our research are to 
develop protocols that can replace Data Owners’ lack of trust or Data Owners’ 
concerns with the Data Owners’ sense of confidence, and the Data Owners’ sense of 
confidence is about the processing and operations that are performed on the Data 
Owners’ data by the remote entities on remote machines. As part of the aims of our 
research, we investigate salient approaches to mitigating Data Owners’ concerns, and 
we develop protocols and frameworks by gaining broader understanding of the 
technical phenomena in the field of Cloud Computing research, by extracting and 
applying knowledge from the other renowned existing domains of studies, and by 
establishing the practicality of our works in comparison with the features of our 
works with those of other competing works in the literature. Having now achieved 
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the aims of this research, our major contribution, in particular, can be pointed out as 
follows: 
x Chapter 1 highlights the gradual arrangement of technical phenomena in 
broadly understanding the Cloud Computing research. This gradual 
arrangement is from a general aspect to a more specific aspect, each of the 
aspects is illustrated with clear diagrams for deeper insight into the operations 
and the management of the physical and virtual machines by the entities in a 
Service Provider, the operations and the management of the physical and 
virtual machines show the nature of handling Data Owners’ data in the 
Service Provider, and the nature of handling Data Owners’ data show clear 
avenues of research in multiple directions. We have pursued one of the 
avenues of research, and this avenue of research is in the direction of trust 
enhanced security. To the best of our knowledge, we are the pioneer in 
articulating the insight into avenues of Cloud Computing research in multiple 
predominant directions.  
x Chapter 2 critically enumerates potential works in the contemporary 
literature. The critical enumeration or itemisation of the features and 
limitations are prominent in understanding the gap of knowledge in the field 
of Cloud Computing research. Since we have critically enumerated the 
features and limitation of potential works, we have found the methodologies 
to be compared in our effort to improve the works. The critical enumeration 
of the features and the limitations of the potential works in the literature is 
one of our contributions in facilitating the researchers to comprehend the gap 
of knowledge.    
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x One of the contributions in chapter 3 is the methodology of successive 
refinements of the security principles, and the successive refinements of 
security principles are towards the evolutionary problem solving approach to 
the first research question. Extracting the features of our protocol is another 
contribution, and setting up experimental evaluation to compare our protocol 
with the competing SSL/TLS also belongs to our contribution. Organising the 
best case and the worst case scenarios, organising games or attacks, and 
analysing security strength of the protocols with regard to the games are our 
contributions in chapter 3.   
x In chapter 4, one of our contributions originates from identifying other 
existing renowned fields of studies, these fields of studies are sources of 
suitable ideas towards finding solution to our research problem, these fields 
of studies are orthogonal to Cloud Computing, and chapter 4 shows the 
process of extracting and applying one of the ideas to solve our research 
problem.  In chapter 4, Trust Ticket is our contribution in linking a user and 
Service Provider through a Data Owner. The Trust Ticket being an encrypted 
container is  a logical outcome of a user’s registration with a Data Owner, and 
the Data Owner distributes the Trust Ticket to the newly registered user. The 
Data Owner also shares the Trust Ticket with the Service Provider to link the 
user with the Service Provider. One of our other contributions includes the 
experimental setup, experiments, and security analysis in connection with the 
attacks or games.  We have set experimental environment with the VMWare 
ESXi 4.1 hypervisor that facilitates multiple virtual machines, and the virtual 
machines are created on the hypervisor having 18GB memory, and the virtual 
machines are created on the hypervisor from the desktop of another physical 
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machine that is linked with the hypervisor as a client. We have developed 
frameworks in Java Programming Language, and in the framework, we have 
tested the functionality and practicality of our protocols in comparison with 
one of the potential works from the literature. One of the other contribution is 
the tracing the propagation of trust, recording the trust values in a file during 
each propagation, and plotting the resultant graph with the recorded trust 
values from the file. 
x Our contributions in addressing the third research question in Chapter 5 
include identifying features of our protocol and the features of the protocol in 
one of the potential work in the literature,  setting up experimental 
methodologies, codifying the features in Java, generating data from each of 
the protocols, extracting data by Matlab, and demonstrating the outcome in 
graphical forms.  
x One of contributions in Chapter 6 is the smooth transition of improving the 
work in chapter 4. Major contributions in chapter 6 include applying secret 
sharing scheme in distributing shares of Secret Key, coordinating the 
distribution and combining of the shares, and applying credential policy tree 
in authenticating a user prior to receiving the data. One of the other 
contributions is the selection and application of suspend and resume strategy 
to have tasks suspended, verified and done in distributed form of a work 
break down structure methodology. Other contributions include experimental 
setup for experimental evaluation, organising games or attacks in analysing 
the security strength of our protocols. 
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7.1.2 Major Benefits 
Trust problem has been a prominent issue of concerns in the wide adoption of 
Cloud Computing in general and Software as Service in particular. We have made an 
effort to systematically address the main research problem by splitting it into sub 
problems or research sub questions. Our systematic approach in addressing the trust 
problem from dividing the problem into sub problems, solving the sub problems, 
extracting features of our solutions and the solution of the competing works in the 
literature, setting up experiments, providing experimental evaluation, and organising 
games or attacks for security analyses have paved the way for looking into the area 
of research with more insight.     
7.2 Future Work 
While the research on trust problem in Cloud Computing has grown rapidly and 
many researchers have developed similar approaches to ours, there is no other 
systematic work like ours in specifically, experimentally, and analytically addressing 
the trust problem and the insight into the trust problem. In this section, we present 
the insights into far-reaching prominent research issues latent in our work, and we 
envision that handling trust issues from the perspective of multi-cloud will be widely 
relevant and more research on it will be accomplished in the future. Here we enlist 
three out of several potential research directions that emanate from our work.    
x A Computation Server (SCS) registers with the Trusted Coordinator (TC) 
long before the SCS is assessed. The TC assesses the SCS later for any 
operation to be executed by virtual machines on the SCS. There is no 
mechanism of a threshold time for the SCS to present its trustworthiness to 
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the TC while it is being assessed for acceptance with the SCS. This leads to a 
research direction for reliable assessments of Computation Servers in a single 
and a multi-Cloud perspective. 
x In line with previous research issue, there is no mechanism for the TC to 
select another SCS depending on the expired threshold time of the SCS. This 
knowledge gap leads to a research direction for trustworthy standardised 
mechanism to choose another Computation Server belonging to a new Cloud 
Service Provider or new Cloud, and the new Service Provider remains to be 
unknown to the old Cloud Service Provider or old Cloud so that there is no 
internal liaison for tampering data in the new Cloud.  
x There is no mechanism to select another Computation Server on another 
Cloud without informing either of the old and the new Cloud Service 
Providers. The Old Cloud Service Provider is the Principal Cloud Service 
Provider from which a Data Owner receives continuous service. The New 
Cloud Service Provider is the one from which a Computation Server is 
selected for registration, and the registered Computation Server in the new 
Cloud Service Provider is set for carrying out the computation through a 
virtual machine on the Computation Server. This mechanism is so needed 
because an existing Computation Server without a threshold time may 
become compromised. When the existing Computation Server becomes 
compromised and its Trusted Public Key derived and preserved with the 
Trusted Coordinator during its registration remains unchanged without 
reflecting its compromised status, there is a risk of malicious insiders’ threats.  
In the future work, we intend to present mechanisms by focussing on the issues 
highlighted above. 
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